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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Drisco", Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PllC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
MADISON 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-I0-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
-82011 
with his sole and separate property, and REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an HIGHWAY 101'5 MOTION FOR 
Idaho limited liability company, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
siiton to Highway 101'5 brief in support of motion for summary 
pAGE 401 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC ("Highway 101"), files this brief in 
reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to Highway 101's motion for summary judgment against 
the Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg 
Plumbing & Heating, LLC, (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). 
II. IDAHO APPLIES THE REASONABLENESS TEST WHEN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF 
INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVILEGES A CONVEYANCE GRANTS. 
Plaintiffs are correct in pointing out that there is a split of authority in the United 
States when addressing the issue of interference with privileges a conveyance grants an 
easement holder. In support of the "bright line test," Plaintiffs cite cases from Hawaii, 
Maryland, Alabama and Pennsylvania to argue that any interference with their use of 
the easement is per se unreasonable. 
However, other states, including Missouri, South Dakota and most importantly 
Idaho, apply a "reasonableness test./I For example, in Baum v. Glen Park Properties, 660 
S.W.2d 723 (Mo.App.1983), a case virtually identical to this one, Baum sold property to 
Glen Park Properties "subject to an easement for road purposes over a strip of land forty 
(40) feet wide . . .. /1 The easement provided the only access to the property Baum held. 
The land Baum sold was the site of "A Storage Inn", a mini-warehouse operation. 
Following the sale, Glen Park Properties erected a sign mounted on two poles at a 
height above the rooftop of a one-story building, installed curbing and planted trees and 
sod on the easement area. Baum testified that the sign, curbing and trees interfered 
with her easement. Baum's position was not that the sign, curbing or trees prevented 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5 
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access to Baum's land, but that any obstruction erected anywhere on the 40 foot 
easement was unlawful. Baum's position was essentially that her easement amounted 
to a fee simple interest in the easement tract. 1 The trial court agreed with Baum's 
position and granted an injunction against erecting the signs, installing the curbs, or 
planting trees on the right of way easement. 
In reversing and remanding the case, the Court of Appeals stated that the 
injunction the trial court issued was impermissibly broad: 
Appellant was entitled to erect any structure on the easement as 
long as that structure did not interfere with the reasonable use by 
respondent for purposes of ingress and egress to and from her land .... 
Respondent has the right to use any part of the easement tract she 
chooses for roadway purposes, but subject to her reasonable use, 
appellant may also use the land .... But in prohibiting the erection of 
any structure on the forty-foot easement, the injunction was too broad. 
Upon remand, the trial court should determine a reasonable width 
sufficient for road purposes for motor vehicles and farm equipment. 
Bourn v. Glen Park Properties, supra, 660 S.W.2d at 726. 
In DeHaven v. Hall, 753 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 2008), the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota upheld the trial court's finding that a mature pine tree seventeen feet from the 
western boundary of a thirty foot wide express easement did not "interfere with Halls' 
reasonable use of the easement," notwithstanding that the granting conveyance 
provided that "no person or persons shall interfere with GRANTEES' benefit of the 
1 Ironically, Plaintiff Nephi Allen testified: 
"A. In my mind, an easement is for the people that own it. And so just because someone owns 
the piece of property doesn't give them the right to not have the other people own their 
easement."(Alien Depo., 142:20-23). 
"Q. But Highway 101 owns the property, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Are you saying that Highway 101's use is limited only to ingress and egress. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Even though they own the property, they can't use it for any other purpose? 
A. No." (Allen Depo., 28:6-14). 
nrn,,, ~~ ft' • "'~,rr~' ~ftft~~'_'_.' -- ... - ......... A •• " MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
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easement hereinbefore described . ... " In so doing, the Supreme Court stated the 
following: 
At the point of entry, however, Halls only utilized approximately 
fourteen feet of the easement. DeHavens, as the owners of the land 
underlying the easement, had the right to use the portion of the 
easement not used for ingress and egress ... in any reasonable manner 
that does not interfere with [Halls'] ability to travel upon the roadway. 
This includes the right to use the ditches of the current roadway, and the 
ditches of any future roadway, for parking signange, fences, fence posts, 
curbing, planting or removal of trees, sod, or other vegetation. In this 
case the trial court found, and the evidence reflects, that the tree did not 
interfere with the Halls' reasonable use of the easement .... Because the 
trial court found that the tree did not interfere with Halls' reasonable use 
ofthe easement, Halls were not entitled to remove the tree. 
The court should note that Plaintiffs have not identified these other jurisdictions 
that follow the "reasonableness test" but instead chose to identify for the court only 
those jurisdictions that follow the "bright line test." Moreover, although Plaintiffs state 
that /If uJnfortunately, it does not appear that Idaho has addressed the issue of whether 
an expressed easement may be diminished based on a 'reasonable interference' 
analysis, II this statement is patently inaccurate. Idaho cases have applied the 
"reasonableness test/' and none has applied the lib right line test" Plaintiffs urge this 
court to apply. 
The first Idaho case ever to apply the "reasonableness test" is Boydstun Beach 
Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). In Boydstun Beach, a 
deed created a beach easement (access was granted along a twenty-five foot strip) 
together with boating and bathing privileges, and parking privileges along a 200 foot 
length of lakefront property 75 feet wide. The Aliens bought a lakefront lot burdened 
by the easement and nearly all of their yard including grass, landscaping and sprinkler 
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system were on the lakefront easement. The Association sought an injunction 
prohibiting any further interference with the easement and an order directing the Aliens 
to remove the obstructions (trees, rocks, bushes, railroad ties, and lawn sprinklers). 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with 5 Restatement of Property, 
Servitudes §486 (1944). That section provides: 
The possessor land subject to an easement created by 
conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance. 
Comment: 
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language 
ofthe conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges 
of the owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient 
tenement are also precisely defined. As the precision of definition 
decreases, the application of the principle that the owner of the 
easement and the possessor of the servient tenement must be 
reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges becomes more 
pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the possessor of 
the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs of himself and 
the owner of the easement vary. 
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376. (Emphasis added). 
The court noted that "[u]nder §486 it is necessary to determine the precision of 
the granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the easement 
owner's rights are paramou nt to those of the servient owner. These respective rights 
are correlative and where the grant is general in nature the owner of the servient estate 
is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not 
materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. 
Thus, we begin by isolating the privileges specifically granted by the easement." 
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376-377. (Emphasis added). 
------. -----.-.- •. -- ... _ ...•.•••• -.,~ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
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"An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from 
exercising privileges granted by an easement." Id. 
Within this framework, the court looked first to the written conveyance and 
found that "the easement prohibits structures on the beach or parking space, but 
otherwise does not limit the allowed privileges in location or time of use." Therefore, 
the court precluded a fence erected through the 75 foot easement that obstructed 
parking but allowed the fence and even a gate on the easement where they did not 
obstruct parking and were not on the beach because these were "sensible," i.e., 
reasonable. Similarly, the court found that the trial court's open fire prohibition was 
reasonable because there was no express language in the deed on this privilege: 
The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, 
the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted 
consistent with the normal development of their respective lands .... 
Mandating the use of roasting devices is a reasonable balance between 
the easement owner's interest in picnicking and the protection and 
enjoyment of the servient estate. 
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 378. 
But where the easement granted a privilege in express and specific rather 
than general terms, the trial court could not apply the "reasonableness test" 
because to do so would bypass the legal rights of the easement owners and go 
directly to the equitable resolution ofthe parties' conflicting interests. 
Therefore, the trial court could not prohibit parking on the Aliens' lawn even 
though it created a nuisance because the easement expressly created a privilege 
to park on the entire 200 by 75 foot strip. Similarly, the trial court could not 
restrict use of the easement between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5 
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Because an easement authorizes limited use of the subject 
property, the landowner is entitled to make other uses of the property 
that do not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment ofthe easement .... 
Whether a particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable 
interference with enjoyment of the easement is a question of fact. 
Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890. (Emphasis added.) 
The record contained substantial evidence that "the operation of vehicles had 
been hindered by the garden. Carson's cars and a boat occasionally required the extra 
room in the circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised 
garden." Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 891. 
The court in Carson never identified whether the privilege the deed 
granted was express or general. Instead, the court simply said that "Carson 
enjoys an easement to use the driveway." However, the reason the court found 
against allowing the continuation of the raised garden was that it unreasonably 
interfered with the plaintiff's use of her easement to use the driveway. The 
important point is that the court applied a "reasonableness test/' not a "bright 
line test" on whether the raised garden would stay or go. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied the "reasonableness test" in Nampa & 
Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518 (2001). 
Interestingly, then district court judge, Daniel T. Eismann, (now Idaho Supreme Court's 
Chief Justice), was the trial judge who applied the "reasonableness test" to an express 
40 foot easement. At issue in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District was whether 
Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and sidewalk within an irrigation 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5 
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district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district claimed that Washington 
Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the easement. 
The Idaho Supreme Court began its analysis by citing to Carson and Boydstun 
Beach as well-settled Idaho law on the issue: 
The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of 
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient 
estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, 
or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by 
the owner of the dominant estate. In other words, the servient estate 
owner is entitled to make uses of the property that do not unreasonably 
Interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment ofthe easement. 
Thus, an easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is 
obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement." 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 
Idaho at 522-523. (Emphasis added.) 
The court then applied the law to the trial court's findings and conclusions 
agreeing with the trial court as follows: 
Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed 
fence would unreasonably interfere with its easement, the district court 
denied NMID's injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled 
to construct the sidewalk and fence. 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 
Idaho at 521. (Emphasis added.) 
In short, the court found that "NMID's activity will be so infrequent that its 
easement rights will not be unreasonably interfered with" and affirmed the trial court's 
order allowing for the installation of the fence and sidewalk. Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 522. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Here, this court should first look to the deed itself to determine whether the 
privilege granted in the conveying deed is express and specific or general in nature. The 
deed by which Plaintiffs acquired their property states: 
ALSO, A right-of-way to be used in common with others described 
as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, township 6 
North, Range 40 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; 
thence East 140.90 feet; thence North 565.74 feet to the true 
point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49' 50" East 
378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50" 
West 394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the 
point of beginning." 
Although the deed description does not specifically state "over the property" 
described as follows, such language is implied because the description is a metes and 
bounds legal description of the property over which the easement runs and not a 
description of the easement itself. Any other reading would mean that the easement is 
the property and give Plaintiffs a fee simple interest in the property rather than a mere 
easement. Plaintiffs do not have a fee simple interest. 
Significantly, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right-of-way" or 
expressly state that Plaintiffs have the right to use the entire width of their easement as 
a right-of-way or any other restricting language. 2 The deed simply gives Plaintiffs a 
general privilege over the described property for a right-of-way. Therefore, although 
Plaintiffs have an express easement, it is not an easement of a specific width or length, 
and therefore a general privilege for a right-of-way over the described property. When 
2 To the extent that Highway 101 has referred to the easement at issue being 25 feet wide, such reference 
should be corrected to reflect that "the property over which the easement runs" is 25 feet wide, not that 
Plaintiff have a 25 foot wide the easement itself. 
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dealing with a general privilege, the law in Idaho requires the court to look at whether 
the proposed use unreasonably interferes with the privilege granted in the deed 
conveying the easement. 
Here, Plaintiffs' undisputed testimony establishes that the sign post and bollards 
do not interfere-let alone unreasonably interfere--with Plaintiffs' right-of-way privilege 
for ingress and egress to their property. Moreover, Highway 101 chose the location for 
the sign because it is the only practical place on Highway 101's property where the sign 
can be visible from the road. 3 
Plaintiffs try to distinguish the cases Highway 101 relies on by asserting that 
"neither case involves an unambiguous private right of way easement.,,4 However, 
Boydstun Beach Association and Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District both involve 
unambiguous private right of way easements conveyed by express grants. The one in 
Boydstun Beach Association was 25 feet wide and the one in Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation District was 40 feet wide. And they are both controlling Idaho cases that 
applied the "reasonableness test," not a "bright line test" Plaintiffs urge this court to 
apply in the absence of any Idaho authority. 
As evidenced by the foregoing, not only does the easement at issue convey a 
general right-of-way privilege that invokes application of the "reasonableness test" in 
favor of Highway 101, but also a balancing of the equitable interests involved tips in 
favor of allowing the sign post and bollards to remain because Highway 101 has no 
other place to locate the sign to advertise its business. 
3 See Affidavit of Barbara Miller dated April 7, 2011. 
4 Plaintiffs' Answering Brief in Opposition to Hill"hw;,v 1 01's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
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III. PLAINTIFFS HAD AMPLE TIME TO ASSERT THEIR RIGHTS. 
Plaintiffs' assert that Highway 101's position is that Plaintiffs had only three (3) 
days to assert their rights (i.e. by August 5,2008). However, this is not Highway 101's 
position. Highway 101's position is that the sign post and bollards were not installed 
until August 19, 2008; therefore, Plaintiffs had a full two to three weeks to assert their 
rights, and they failed to do so. Highway 101 submits this gives rise to a laches defense 
in favor of Highway 101. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD FIND IN FAVOR OF HIGHWAY 101 ON THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
DEFENSE THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOTICE OF. 
Plaintiffs assert that Highway 101 "did not plead quasi-estoppel as an affirmative 
defense" and "Plaintiffs were not able to address the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in 
discovery - for example quasi-estoppel emphasizes the unconscionable behavior of the 
allegedly estopped party."s Thus, Plaintiffs assert Highway 101 should not now be 
allowed to rely upon quasi-estoppel in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
A. Highway 101's Estoppel Defense Is Sufficient To Put Plaintiffs On 
Notice. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading. Straley v. 
Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917 (1972). Under Idaho's pleading system, a pleading "which 
sets forth a claim for relief ... need only contain fa short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in addition to alleging jurisdiction of the court 
and a demand for judgment .. .. " Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26,33 (2000) citing Archer 
v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 866 (1967) (quoting I.R.C.P. 8(a)). Even an "inartful" 
5 t'" __ A. __ '. .' ......,.. ..... 
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pleading is sufficient because "[n]otice pleading frees the parties from pleading particular 
issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the courthouse door by merely stating 
claims upon which relief can be granted." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 
437 (2010) citing Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33 (2000). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has succinctly stated the notice pleading rules in Idaho as 
follows: 
A party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a 'just, 
speedy and inexpensive' resolution of the case. With the advent of 
notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular 
theories in its pleadings. 
Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929,931 (Ct.App.1988). 
A trial court that fails to apply the liberal and broad notice pleading rules will be 
reversed on appeal. See Cook v. Skyline Corp., supra, 135 Idaho at 33 where the district 
court was reversed for failing to read the complaint liberally and broadly in support of a 
cause of action for both negligent selection and negligent retention. 
Here, Highway 101 has pled the affirmative defense of estoppel. There are many 
forms of estoppel: collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, judicial 
estoppel, etc. By asserting this defense, Plaintiffs were put on notice that their actions 
and/or inactions before the installation of the sign post and bollards would be at issue. 
Identifying the specific type of estoppel is no more required under Idaho's liberal notice 
pleading rules than is identifying the type of negligence (negligent selection versus 
negligent retention). Accordingly, the court should consider Highway 101's estoppel 
defense. 
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B. The Court Should Rule In Favor On Highway 101's Substantive Estoppel 
Defense. 
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel requires that the offending party must have 
gained some advantage or caused a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel . .. 
quasi-estoppel is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who can point 
to no specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that 
plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be 
unconscionable for them to do so." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 
357 (2002) (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson acknowledge that Dean Moon of 
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC told Danny Miller of Highway 101 that Highway 101 
could put the sign at its present location provided Highway 101 owned the property and 
the City of Rexburg permitted the sign. These predicates turned out to be true because 
Highway 101 does own the property, and the City of Rexburg permitted the sign. 
Allen and Johnson further argue that to the extent estoppel applies here, 
estoppel applies only against Dean Moon (a nonparty) and Rexburg Plumbing and 
Heating, LLC because neither Allen nor Johnson made similar statements to Danny 
Miller. Although the general rule is "Silence generally cannot be relied on to support 
estoppel," silence can be relied upon to support quasi-estoppel"when a party who has 
a duty to speak fails to do so and thereby produces an advantage for himself, or a 
disadvantage for someone else, which is unconscionable." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, 
Inc., supra, 137 Idaho at 358 (Emphasis added). Allen and Johnson both had duties to 
speak because they admit that Dean Moon told them what he had told Danny Miller. If 
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Allen or Johnson felt differently as they now claim, they should have told Danny Miller 
to avoid Highway 101's reliance and an unconscionable result. 
Finally, Allen and Johnson argue that the conversation between Moon and 
Danny Miller happened on August 6, 2008 and Highway 101 was committed to installing 
the sign on August 5, 2008; therefore, Highway 101 could not have relied on Moon's 
statement. However, the facts are undisputed that the installation ofthe sign post and 
bollards did not occur until August 19, 2008--well after the August 6, 2008 conversation. 
v. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Highway 101's pleadings, this court 
should grant Highway 101' motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this ~~pril' 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
Bryan D. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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because the easement expressly granted a privilege for ingress and egress 
without such limitations. 
Finally, the court reversed and remanded the case with respect to the retaining 
wall for "(flurther findings. " to determine i/the wall obstructs the parking, boating or 
bathing privifeges granted by the easement" with specific instructions that the trial 
court was to "indicate whether these findings are based on the specific language of the 
easement [in which case the "reasonableness test" would not apply) or on the principles 
applicable to easement granted in general terms" in which case the "reasonableness 
test" would apply. Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 379. 
The rules announced in Boydstun Beach Association are simple and 
straightforward. The court looks first to the written instrument itself to identify the 
privilege granted in the deed. If the deed grants the privilege in express and specific 
terms, the court cannot apply "equitable principles" or what is reasonable under the 
circumstances. But ifthe deed grants a privilege in general terms, the court allows the 
proposed use ofthe servient estate as long as the proposed use is reasonable in view of 
the privilege granted in the deed. Finally, none ofthese rules involves a "bright line 
test" like the one Plaintiffs urge this court to apply. 
The next Idaho case to apply the "reasonableness test" was Carson v. Elliott, 111 
Idaho 889 (Ct.App.1986). Carson involved an obstruction placed in a right-of-way 
easement. The court upheld the trial court's removal of a raised garden placed in the 
"eye" of the circular end ofthe single driveway providing access to two homes. In so 
dOiM. the court noted the following: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
and NEPHI I-I. ALLEN, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property, ) 
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING, ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2010-115 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I. F ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson are the managing partners of Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating LLC (hereafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"). On October 23, 
2000, Plaintiffs acquired real property in Rexburg together with a "right-of-way" easement 
(hereafter, "Easement") over a strip of property abutting the property they purchased. Plaintiffs' 
deed describes the Easement as follows: 
ALSO, a right-of-way to be used in common with others described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 17, township 6 North, Range 40 
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence 
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49' 
50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West 
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning. 
On February 20,2007, Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereafter, "Highway 101") 
acquired real property in Rexburg, which lies to the east of Plaintiffs' property, and also included 
a right-of-way easement, identical in all material respects, to Plaintiffs' Easement. The strip of 
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land over which both easements run is commonly known as "American Street," but will 
hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Property." On July 29,2009, Highway 101 acquired 
fee simple title to the Subject Property from Leishman Electric. Leishman Electric now has an 
easement that allows them to use the Subject Property for egress and ingress. 
Plaintiffs and Highway 101, as well as their predecessors in interest, have used the 
Subject Property for years to access their respective businesses. 
In May and June 2008, Highway 101 sought and obtained a permit from the City of 
Rexburg to have a sign erected on the northwest comer of the Subject Property. On August 6, 
2008, Young Electric Sign Company (hereafter "YESCO") began digging the hole in preparation 
to install the sign. After a delay that resulted from YESCO damaging the sewer line while 
digging the hole, the sign-post and two bollards were installed on August 19,2008. YESCO 
placed the sign atop the sign-post on August 26,2010. 
The sign post is approximately five feet from the north border of the Subject Property, 
leaving approximately nineteen feet between the sign-post and the south border. There is 
approximately forty feet of additional space between the south border of the Subject Property 
and Plaintiffs' building. On the north side of the sign, Highway 101 's building is approximately 
fifty feet from the border of the Subject Property. The sign is approximately twenty feet wide 
and ten feet tall. The bottom of the sign is fourteen feet above ground, and the sign-post is 
approximately sixteen inches in diameter. The two bollards are each approximately five inches 
in diameter. Highway 101 paid YESCO $27,234.00 for construction and installation of the sign. 
On February 19,2010, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking removal of the sign. On April 
1, 2010, Highway 101 filed an answer and counterclaim. 
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On November 17,2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment asking this Court 
to rule in their favor on the following affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by Highway 
101: latches, estoppel, equitable estoppel/recoupment, unclean hands, merger, forfeiture, right-
of-way forfeiture, no unreasonable restriction, set off, unjust enrichment, and trespass. 
On March 9, 2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for summary judgment asking this court 
to determine that the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the Easement 
and that the doctrines of latches and equitable estoppel bar Plaintiffs' claims. 
On March 31, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Highway 101' s motion for 
summary judgment. 
On April 1, 2011, Highway 101 filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
On April 7,2011, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in support of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
On April 11, 2011, Highway 101 filed a reply brief in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. 
This Court heard oral argument regarding the motions for summary judgment on April 
14,2011. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to 
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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 
P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S.Ct. 
2548 (1986), stated: 
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment 
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as 
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
!d. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor ofthe non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co., 
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v. 
Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party . Farnworth v. Ratlti!, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P .2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win 0/ Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 PJd 330 (2002); Thomson v. City o/Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 
(2002). 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way 
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 Idaho 800, 41 PJd 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The 
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a 
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. 0/ Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 Pold 1018, (1998). In such 
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
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concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Rights of Dominant and Servient Estate Owners 
Highway 101 believes it can use the Subject Property in any way that does not 
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' Easement. Highway 101 asks this Court to grant 
summary judgment in its favor because Plaintiffs admit there is adequate space on the Subject 
Property for them to access their business without unreasonable difficulty. 
Plaintiffs appear to admit that the sign-post and bollards are an inconvenience rather than 
an unreasonable interference with their use of the Easement. However, Plaintiffs argue the 
Easement is "express," and as a result, permanent structures such as the sign and bollards are per 
se unreasonable. 
Neither party asserts the Easement is ambiguous, and this Court concludes it is not. Thus, 
the legal effect of the Easement will be decided as a matter oflaw. See Latham v. Garner, 105 
Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983). Both parties have cited to cases outside this jurisdiction to aid 
this Court in making that determination. Plaintiffs believe the issue presents a question of first 
impression in Idaho. After reading the parties' briefs and conducting additional research, this 
Court finds it unnecessary to consult the laws of foreign jurisdictions. 
In Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1986) the Idaho 
Court of Appeals determined the permissible use of an easement described as follows: 
[ingress, egress privileges], together with parking space extending along 
the beach in a southeasterly direction 200 feet from north line of said drive, and 
extending 75 feet in width from the meander line, and boating and bathing 
privileges along said 200 ft [sic] strip, and these presents provide, that, no 
structures or tents shall be erected along said 200 feet of beach, or parking space; 
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and that said second parties may, at their option, assist in the improvement and 
maintenance of said drive and parking space. 
In deciding the legal effect of that language, the court began its analysis by quoting the following 
from the Restatement of Property: 
The possessor of land subject to an easement created by conveyance is 
privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance. 
Comment: 
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of the 
conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges of the 
owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient tenement are 
also precisely defined. As the precision of definition decreases, the 
application of the principle that the owner of the easement and the 
possessor of the servient tenement must be reasonable in the exercise of 
their respective privileges becomes more pronounced. Under this 
principle, the privilege of use of the possessor of the servient tenement 
may vary as the respective needs of himself and the owner of the easement 
vary. 
5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 486 (1944) (emphasis added). 
The court then stated, 
Under § 486 [of the restatement] it is necessary to determine the precision 
of the granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the 
easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the servient owner. These 
respective rights are correlative and where the grant is general in nature the owner 
of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent 
with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the 
owner of the dominant estate. City of Los Angeles v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 57 
Cal.App.3d 889, 129 Cal.Rptr. 485 (1976); Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. 
Sambo's of Massachusetts, Inc., 8 Mass.App. 815, 398 N.E.2d 729 (1979). Thus 
we begin by isolating the privileges specifically granted by the easement. 
Boydstun Beach, at 376-77, 723 P.2d at 920-21. 
On numerous occasions subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate courts of Idaho 
have addressed the rights and privileges of servient estate owners. This Court, however, is not 
aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than the reasonableness test. 
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The rights of landowners concerning easements are well settled. Because 
an easement authorizes limited use of the subject property, the landowner is 
entitled to make other uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with 
enjoyment of the easement. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. 
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984). As noted by the 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 486 (1944): "The possessor of land subject 
to an easement created by conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the 
servient tenement as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating 
conveyance." Accord Reynolds Irrigation District v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 333, 
206 P.2d 774, 785 (1949). Conversely, the easement owner is entitled to full 
enjoyment of the easement. In the case of an access easement to a dwelling, such 
enjoyment includes not only a right of ingress and egress but also an implied right 
to tum vehicles around. Annotation, Right of Way-Width, 28 A.L.R.2d 253 
(1953). 
Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890-91, 728 P.2d 778, 779-80 (Ct. App. 1986). 
The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of dominant 
and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially 
interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. See 
Boydstun Beach Ass 'n, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921. In other words, the 
servient estate owner is entitled to make uses of the property that do not 
unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of the 
easement. See Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App. 
1986). Thus, an easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is 
obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement. See Boydstun 
Beach, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921 (citations omitted). 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 522,20 PJd 702, 706 
(2001). 
In Idaho, "an easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific 
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the 
owner." Abbott, 119 Idaho at 548, 808 P.2d at 1293 (emphasis added); see also 
Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (1986) (summarizing the 
rights of landowners concerning easements). As long as Sorensen is able to use 
the easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the 
easement was granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received 
everything to which he is legally entitled. 
Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 540, 989 P.2d 276, 282 (1999). 
It is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is the right to use 
the land of another for a specific purpose. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 
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119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). The easement owner is entitled 
to full enjoyment of the easement. Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 
778, 779 (Ct. App. 1986). To the degree privileges are expressly granted, the 
easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the servient owner. Boydstun 
Beach Assoc. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 376-77, 723 P.2d 914, 920-21 (Ct. App. 
1986). Every easement is a particular easement, privileging the owner thereof to 
make particular uses of a servient estate. The more precise the express language 
of the easement, the more certainty there is regarding the specific privileges 
granted. Id. 
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. o/Control, 141 Idaho 463, 471, 111 P.3d 148, 156 (2005). 
Based on the cases cited above, this Court concludes the law of Idaho gives servient 
estate owners the right to use their land, but forbids them from unreasonably burdening the 
privileges of the dominant estate owner. Moreover, the precision with which a dominant estate 
owner's privileges are defined is important in determining whether a particular use by a 
dominant estate owner is permissible. 
Thus, this Court begins by looking at the granting language in Plaintiffs' deed, which 
describes the Easement as follows: 
ALSO, a right-of-way to be used in common with others described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 17, township 6 North, Range 40 
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence 
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49' 
50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West 
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning. 
Plaintiffs' are entitled to full enjoyment of the privilege granted to them by their 
Easement, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief upon showing they are obstructed from exercising 
that privilege. 
The privilege created by the Easement is "a right-of-way," or a right to use the Subject 
Property for ingress and egress. The legal description contained in the granting language 
precisely describes the location of the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise that privilege. 
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Thus, while the location ofthe Easement is precisely defined, the privilege is stated generally as 
a "right-of-way." This Court concludes Highway 101 has the right to use its servient estate (the 
Subject Property) in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right to use 
the Subject Property as a "right-of-way." 
B. Highway 101 's Use of the Subject Property 
Plaintiffs' only argument in opposition to Highway 101 's placement of the sign on the 
Subject Property is that such use by a servient estate owner is per se unreasonable. In the 
discussion above, this Court concluded Highway 101' s placement of the sign and bollards is not 
per se unreasonable. 
Typically, "[w]hether a particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable interference 
with enjoyment of the easement is a question of fact." Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890-91, 
728 P.2d 778, 779-80 (Ct. App. 1986). Plaintiffs, however, have never argued that the sign and 
bollards constitute an unreasonable interference with their use of the Easement. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs have never argued there is a material question of fact regarding the reasonableness of 
the sign and bollards on the Easement. 
While being deposed, Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson admitted they and their 
customers and suppliers are able to the Easement despite the presence of the sign and bollards on 
the Subject Property. Based on those concessions, Highway 101 asserts there is no dispute that 
the sign and bollards are reasonable. 
Nephi Allen testified as follows: 
Q. And you are saying that you cannot use the exact area where the pole and 
bollards are located? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But you acknowledge that you can go around them, correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. The poles or those bollards, do they prevent you from accessing your 
property? 
A. No. 
Q. SO you can still access the property where the Rexburg Plumbing and 
Heating is located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's just talk generally about that. In terms of accessing your property, 
what kind of vehicles do you use to access your property? In other words, 
I'm assuming that you've got plumbing trucks, and HV AC trucks, and 
maybe a boom truck-I don't know what you've got. So just tell me what 
do you use to access the property? 
A. We have service trucks, we have a forklift, we have delivery trucks, 
various UPS, Federal Express. 
Q. What was that last one? 
A. Federal Express. Just normal everyday usage. 
Q. And is there anything about the location of the pole and these bollards that 
prevent any of these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, or any UPS 
or Federal Express vehicles from accessing your property? 
A. No. 
Q. Over the easement? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Would you then agree that notwithstanding the fact that there's a 
pole and two bollards, your equipment, your service vehicles can still 
access your property on the easement? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. But as you sit here today, is it your testimony that the pole and 
the two bollards, do they unreasonably interfere with your ability to use 
the easement to access the property? 
A. Not to access the property. 
Allen Deposition at 31-34. 
Kenton Johnson testified as follows: 
Q. Let's talk about how this placement the pole and the two bollards interfere 
with your ability to use the easement to access your property. Can we do 
that? 
A. It doesn't interfere with it. 
Q. It doesn't interfere, does it? 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. Is that a-
A. No, Sir. 
Q. No interference, does it? 
A. No interference. 
Q. The fact is that-
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A. It doesn't interfere with the ability to get in and out of there. It doesn't 
interfere with the professional truck driver's ability to get in and out of 
there. But for some reason, some of our customers it seems to interfere 
with them. I had one hit it yesterday .... 
Q. And notwithstanding the placement the pole and bollards, your customers, 
and you, and your employees still have plenty of room to drive on the 
easement to access your property? 
A. I wouldn't say 25 feet is plenty of room in today's world, I guess. 
Q. Okay. How about - we actually have it's 19.34 feet, correct. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Instead of saying plenty of room, would you agree that that is sufficient 
room to access your property on the easement? 
A. We're making it work, let's put it that way. 
Q. And so it is sufficient? 
A. It is sufficient. 
Q. And so you could actually have two trucks passing in the 19.34 foot space 
and still be totally on the easement, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so there is sufficient room for you, and your service people, and 
delivery people, and your customers to use the easement to access your 
property? 
A. Yes, Sir. There is today. 
Johnson Deposition at 19-26. 
This Court acknowledges evidence in the record indicating Plaintiffs and some of their 
customers have backed into the bollards while leaving Plaintiffs' property. However, even if 
presumed true, that fact would not render the placement of the sign and bollards unreasonable 
when there is ample evidence that delivery trucks, service vehicles, and customers have all be 
able to access Plaintiffs' property without unreasonable difficulty. 
This Court concludes Highway 101 's use of its servient estate, by placing the sign and 
bollards on the northwest comer of the Subject Property, does not unreasonably interfere with 
Plaintiffs right to use the Subject Property as a "right-of-way." Highway 101 's motion for 
summary judgment should be granted on that issue. 
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C. Highway 101's other Defenses and Counterclaims 
Having concluded Highway 101 should prevail on its claim of reasonable use, this Court 
need not address Highway 101 's defensive claims oflatches, estoppel, unclean hands, set-off, 
recoupment, and merger. This Court will, however, address Plaintiffs' request for summary 
judgment on Highway 101 's counterclaims of forfeiture, unjust enrichment, and trespass. 
1. Forfeiture 
Count I of Highway 101' s counterclaim asserts Plaintiffs have "overburdened" the 
Easement by allowing their customers and others to use it. Highway 101, therefore, believes 
Plaintiffs' use of the Easement constitutes a forfeiture of their rights therein. 
Plaintiffs argue there is no basis in law or fact to conclude they have forfeited their rights 
in the Easement. 
"[C]ourts have held that forfeiture of an easement was available in certain limited 
circumstances, but most courts have recognized that forfeiture is not available." A.L.R. 5th 313 § 
2(a). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "As a matter of Idaho history, most forfeiture 
provisions, even those incorporated in written agreements, signed and acknowledged by all of 
the involved parties, will not be honored in order to avoid unconscionable results." Graves v. 
Gore, 119 Idaho 425, 807 P.2d 643 (1991). 
[T]he general rule concerning easements is that the right of an easement holder 
may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the 
easement. Id In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals observed that an easement does not include the right 
to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land. 
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The use of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation must 
be confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved, 
and in compliance with any restrictions imposed by the terms of the 
instrument. Where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its 
terms, use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or 
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is 
limited to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible. In other 
words, an easement granted or reserved in general terms, without any 
limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use. It is not 
restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are 
reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right 
may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that 
estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus, there may be an increase in the 
volume and kind of use of such an easement during the course of its 
enjoyment. 
25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 74, pp. 479-80 (1966). 
In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 
1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement: 
"The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made 
by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal 
development of their respective lands." 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922. 
Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548-49, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293-94 (1991). 
The record in this case indicates Plaintiffs use of the Easement is consistent with 
historical use of the Easement. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs' use of the Easement has 
overburdened the Subject Property or harmed Highway 101 in any manner. There is no evidence 
that Plaintiffs' use of the Easement interferes with Highway 101 's or Leishman Electric's use of 
the Subject Property. Furthermore, Plaintiff's deed describes the Easement as a "right-of-way to 
be used in common with others .... " Thus, there is no restrictive language that would limit use 
of the Easement exclusively to the easement holders. 
This Court concludes Plaintiffs have not overburdened the Easement and forfeiture is not 
an appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be granted on this 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
,: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
PAGE 431 
2. Unjust Enrichment 
Count II of Highway 101 's counterclaim asserts Plaintiffs have been unjustly enriched by 
Highway 101' s efforts to improve the Easement. 
Plaintiffs concede Highway 101 spent considerable time and money paving the Subject 
Property. However, Plaintiffs argue they had no part in Highway 101's decision to improve the 
Subject Property, and Highway 101 's work has harmed rather than benefitted them. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-in-
law contract. Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 
466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The theory is based upon the defendant having 
received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without 
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention of the benefit is unjust. Id. 
In order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must 
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the 
benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Idaho Lumber, 
Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 710 P.2d 647,655 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The principle of unjust enrichment, however, is applicable only if the 
person conferring the benefit is not an "officious intermeddler." The officious 
intermeddler rule essentially provides that a mere volunteer who, without request 
therefor, confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution. This rule 
exists to protect persons who have had unsolicited "benefits" thrust upon them. 
Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 372, 
374 (Ct. App. 1989) (adopting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 
2 (1937)). A person is not an intermeddler if such person has a valid reason for 
conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest. See comments to § 2 of 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, supra. Cf Western Coach Corp. 
v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147,650 P.2d 449,456 (1982). 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Regardless of whether the work done by Highway 101 actually "improved" the Subject 
Property, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs were involved at all with Highway 101's decision to 
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undertake the "improvements." There is no evidence that Plaintiffs requested or desired that 
Highway 101 do the work. There is no evidence that the improvements were necessary to 
protect Highway 101 's interest in the Subject Property. 
Because there is no evidence that Highway 101 had any valid reason for thrusting the 
unsolicited "improvements" upon Plaintiffs, it would be improper to allow Highway 101 to 
thrust a portion of the expenses upon Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
should be granted regarding the issue of unjust enrichment. 
3. Trespass 
Counts III and IV of Highway 101' s motion for summary judgment assert Plaintiffs have 
trespassed on land owned by Highway 101.1 
Plaintiffs assert there are no facts to support Highway 101 's trespass claims. Plaintiffs 
believe the following interrogatory, and Highway 101's response, show that Highway 101 's 
trespass claims were based on an incorrect plat, and therefore not supported by the undisputed 
facts: 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please list each fact that supports Count III of the 
Counterclaim (Trespass) as well as who has knowledge of that fact and who will 
testifY to that fact at trial. 
RESPONSE: Hwy 101 had a plat that showed a small strip of land between 
plaintiffs' property and property belonging to Hwy 101 situated on nearly the 
same "footprint" as the right of way. This strip appeared on the plat to belong to 
Hwy 101 and not plaintiffs. Hwy 101 has since obtained an updated plat that 
shows this strip as a "deed overlap." See attached plat. Hwy 101 is continuing to 
conduct discovery on this issues and will supplement its discovery as discovery 
progresses .... 
1 Count Tn asserts tre~na",,,, hv Rf'vhnra Plllrnhin" ~"rI uO'1.ting. Count IV asserts trespass by Nephi Allen and 
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Insofar as this Court is aware, the Subject Property, which is owned by Highway 101, 
directly abuts Plaintiffs' property. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have a right-of-way easement 
over the Subject Property. 
As the moving party, it is Plaintiffs obligation to prove the absence of a material fact 
regarding Highway 101's trespass action. Other than the interrogatory and response quoted 
above, Plaintiffs have not directed this Court to any evidence that disproves Highway 101's 
trespass causes of action. Highway 101' s response to Interrogatory No.9 references two plats. 
If those plats are in the record, Plaintiffs have not directed this Court to them and have not 
provided any explanation or discussion regarding them. Thus, this Court is unable to reach any 
conclusion regarding a possible "deed overlap" or other discrepancy in the deeds that mayor 
may not create a factual basis for the alleged trespass. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
must therefore be denied on that issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Highway 101's motion for summary judgment is granted on the issue of reasonable use 
of the Subject Property. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted on the issues of 
forfeiture and unjust enrichment. The parties' motions for summary judgment are otherwise 
denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this ~day of May 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this t2 day of May 2011, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing 
the same to be hand-delivered. 
Hyrum D. Erickson 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, CHARTERED 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Brian D. Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE 435 
Marilyn R. Rasmussen 
Clerk of the District Court 
Madison County, Idaho 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY lO 1 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS,LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby, 
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd. hereby move the Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), to reconsider 
that portion of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment 
determining that the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way 
and granting summary judgment to Highway 101 on that issue. This motion is supported by the 
attached Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2011. 
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Hyrum ickson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RlGBY, ANDRUS & RlGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterc1aimant, ) 
v. 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson of 
Rigby, Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. and submit the following brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration. 
BACKGROUND 
At summary judgment Highway 101 raised for the first time the argument that the term 
"A right-of-way to be used in common with others" was a "general" grant and as such Highway 
101 could place a permanent obstruction within the right -of-way. The Court accepted this 
argument and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter Decision) on May 6, 2011. Plaintiffs now bring this Motion to Reconsider. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to reconsider a grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed by the trial 
court using the same standard as the original summary judgment motions. When a motion for 
summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of material 
factual issues, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Treasure Valley 
Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 20 P.3d 21 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. 
Shama Resources Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270,899 P.2d 977, 980 (1995). A party against 
whom summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his 
pleadings, but must come forward and produce admissible evidence to contradict the assertions 
of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 
765,820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See 
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Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court's decision purports to affect the "type" of easement, but in actuality, 
addresses only the location of the easement. 
The Court rejected Highway 101's argument that the language in Plaintiffs deed 
described the entirety of the servient property rather than the right-of-way itself. The Court 
specifically found that ''the legal description contained in the granting language precisely 
describes the location of the easement[.]" Decision at 8. However, the Court then ruled that 
"Highway 1 0 1 's use of its servient estate, by placing the sign and bollards on the northwest 
corner of the Subject Property, does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs right to use the 
Subject Property as a "right-of-way." Decision at 12. 
However, the Court does not address or explain why, if the right-of-way is precisely 
described, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the use of the described property as a right-of-way. The 
Court identifies the meaning of the term right-of-way as a "right to use the Subject Property for 
ingress and egress." Decision at 9. The subject property in this case is a precisely described strip 
ofland at least 25 feet wide. However, it is clear that under the Court's Decision, the Plaintiffs 
do not have the right to use the "subject property" - they have a right to use only a portion of the 
subject propcrty since they cannot possibly use that portion of the subject property upon which 
the sign has been placed. 
The Court appears to recognize that Plaintiffs have the right to use the full 25 feet, but as 
they do not currently need it to access their property, it finds that the placement of permanent 
obstruction in the easement is not an unreasonable interference with their rights. Presumably, if 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating did need thc full 25 feet it could return to court and ask that the 
sign be removed. Counsel for Highway 101 recognized as much at oral argument. However, 
asking Plaintiffs to return to Court to enforce an easement right they already have is extremely 
inefficient and ignores the realities of people's everyday lives. If Rexburg Plumbing and Heating 
needs the use of the full 25 feet, because they will need it when they need it, not 6 months or a 
year down the line when a court decides that their use is "reasonable." As a practical matter, the 
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Court's Decision says nothing about the "privilege" granted, but addresses only the location by 
shrinking the size of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating's right-of-way from 25 feet wide, as set out 
in their deed, to 19 feet. 
2. The placement of a permanent obstruction within a right-of-way diminishes the 
ability of the easement holder to use the right-of-way. 
The Court has identified the privilege granted by the right-of-way as follows: "to use the 
Subject Property for ingress and egress." However, the terms "ingress" and "egress" do not 
appear in the deed. The "right-of-way" is not limited to a specific purpose, but is a general right 
to pass through or over the described property. This is consistent with the historical use of the 
subject property as well as the deeds relating to it. For example, in 1986 Leishman Electric 
received a deed to the property that conveyed only the right-of-way and no other property and as 
such, could not have been for ingress and egress to a particular parcel. Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary JUdgment, Exhibit E, bate 5. A right-of-way is 
defined by Black's as follows: 
right-of-way. 1. The right to pass through property owned by another. • A 
right-of-way may be established by contract, by longstanding usage, or by public 
authority (as with a highway). Cf. easement. [Cases: Easements 1.] 2. The right to 
build and operate a railway line or a highway on land belonging to another, or the 
land so used. [Cases: Railroads 69.] 3. The right to take precedence in traffic. 
[Cases: Automobiles 154, 171(4); Highways 99;] 3. The strip ofland subject to a 
nonowner's right to pass through. - Also written right of way. PI. rights-of-way. 
private right-of-way. See easement. 
public right-of-way. The right of passage held by the public in general to travel on 
roads, freeways, and other thoroughfares. 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), right-of-way. The Court erred when it ruled that 
Plaintiffs' right-of-way was solely for the purpose of ingress and egress to their property. Rather, 
the Plaintiffs have the right to pass over the right-of-way regardless of purpose. Their ability to 
access their property is not relevant to the an analysis of whether their easement rights have been 
infringed upon. Unambiguous deeds, including deeds granting easements, must be interpreted 
based on the language of the deeds. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,697, 827 
P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1992); Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.3d 391,396 (ldaho,2010). The Court 
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has correctly determined that the conveying document is unambiguous. The Court must look to 
the conveying document and determine if Plaintiff's are able to use the property described in the 
conveying document as a right-of-way. As the sign makes it impossible for Plaintiffs to pass 
through property subject to the right-of-way, they are entitled to its removal. 
3. Boydston Beach does not support Highway lOlls position, but supports Plaintifrs 
contention that they are entitled to the use of their entire right-of-way. 
Highway 101 has relied heavily on the Boydstun Beach Ass In v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 
P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1986). However, the decision in Boydstun supports the Plaintiffs' position. 
In Boydston, a recorded deed granted an easement for ingress, egress privileges and parking 
space on a specifically defined strip ofland 200 feet long and 75 feet wide along the shore of Big 
Payette Lake. Id. 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P .2d at 921. Subsequent owners of the servient property 
had developed the area subject to the easement. Id. 111 Idaho at 373, 723 P.2d at 917. Nearly 
their entire yard was on the easement, including grass, landscaping, and a sprinkler system. Id. 
In addition, they had built mounts of dirt and rocks and planted shrubs and trees. Id. There was 
a 25 foot strip of the easement area that was not developed. Id. The district judge found that the 
mounds of dirt and rocks interfered with the ability to park and drive on the easement. Id. 111 
Idaho at 374, 723 P.2d at 918. The district judge also found that the full area of the easement 
was not necessary for its use and that there was sufficient room to park and tum around on the 
twenty-five foot wide undeveloped area. Id. He found that building fires and parking cars on the 
lawn of the owners of the servient property would be a nuisance. Id. The district court ruled that 
the holders of the easement were not entitled to park on the lawn and to the removal of the 
obstacles in the easement. The district court's decision was a reasonable attempt to resolve a 
difficult situation in a manner that was equitable to all involved that the Court of Appeals 
described as "commendable". Id. 111 Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921-922. In overturning the 
district court the Court of Appeals recognized the good intentions of the district court but 
determined that in attempting to reach a reasonable workable solution, it had failed to take into 
account the legal effect of the easement. The Court stated as follows: 
The district court apparently sought to preserve the existing improvements to the 
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easement area while allowing those with easement rights the fullest use available 
consistent with the changed use of the servient estate. The district court's efforts to 
accommodate the interests involved and arrive at a realistic solution to the 
problem are commendable. However, since the plan adopted by the court does not 
take into account the full legal rights of the dominant estate owners, we are 
constrained to reverse and remand for the formulation of a new plan of use. 
Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921-922. In reaching its decision the Court of Appeals 
stated a number of generally accepted rules of law regarding easements - and given the dearth of 
Idaho cases on point, referenced numerous out of state cases for support. The Court stated the 
following rules: 
• Where a servient landowner takes the land subject to the easement, as did the AlIens, he 
must refrain from interfering with the use of the easement, and the court has the authority 
to order removal of obstructions. Id. III Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921 (Citing Brown v. 
Alabama Power Company, 275 Ala. 467, 156 So.2d 153 (1963); Warsaw v. Chicago 
Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Ca1.3d 564, 199 Cal.Rptr. 773,676 P.2d 584 (1984). 
• An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from 
exercising privileges granted by an easement. Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921-
922. (Citing Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Holson Co., 185 Conn. 436, 440 A.2d 
935 (1981). 
• All privileges expressed in a written easement and those necessarily incident to 
enjoyment of the express rights pass with the easement. Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723 
P.2d at 921-922. (Citing Smith v. Wright, 161 Colo. 576, 424 P.2d 384 (1967); City of 
Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land and Water Co., 17 Ca1.2d 576, 110 P.2d 983 
(1941).1 
IAn additional inference can be drawn from the Boydstun Court's heavy reliance on out 
of state authority - Idaho courts have interpreted the law of easements consistent with the courts 
of its sister states. While the out of state cases cited by Plaintiffs in earlier briefing are not 
binding on this Court, they are directly on point and the reasoning in them is persuasive. The 
consistency of the decisions across state lines is remarkable. Absent an Idaho case directly on 
point, the Court errs by not following, or at least addressing, the well thought out decisions of 
other states. 
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The Court of Appeals engaged in a reasonableness analysis regarding only two issues - open 
fires and toilets/sanitation. In doing so the Court specifically stated that these issues were subject 
to a reasonableness analysis because they were not part of the easement. "The right to have fires 
is not granted by the easement and hence is subject to reasonable adjustment." Id. 111 Idaho at 
379, 723 P.2d at 922. Regarding the sanitation services the Court stated "This [the requirement 
for toilet and sanitation facilities] does not interfere with the granted privileges and is proper in 
light of the normal development of the servient and dominant estates." Id. 111 Idaho at 378-379, 
723 P.2d at 922-923. At no time did the Court of Appeals use a "reasonableness" test to 
determine a right granted in the easement. It simply applied the language of the easement. And 
it did so in spite of the factual findings by the trial court that the entire area subject to the 
easement was not necessary for its use and that it would be a nuisance to the owner of the 
servient property. 
F or support of its position, Highway 101 points not the substance of the Boydston 
decision, but to the language of the Restatement of Property cited in the decision. The Court of 
Appeals cited the Restatement as follows: 
Our analysis is guided by principles stated at 5 RESTATEMENT OF 
PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 486 (1944): 
The possessor ofland subject to an easement created by 
conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient 
tenement as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating 
conveyance. 
Comment: 
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of 
the conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the 
privileges of the owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of 
the servient tenement are also precisely defined. As the precision of 
definition decreases, the application ofthe principle that the owner 
of the easement and the possessor of the servient tenement must be 
reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges becomes 
more pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
;ideration- Page 7 
PAGE 445 
possessor of the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs 
of himself and the owner of the easement vary. 
Id. 111 Idaho at 376, 723 P.2d at 920. However, that language provides no support for Highway 
10 l's position. The key phrase in the restatement is "not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
creating easement." As applied by the Court of Appeals in Boydston, the rights expressed by the 
creating document are enforced specifically - regardless of whether the amount of property set 
out in the easement is more than is necessary for the enjoyment of the easement. 
In this case, the creating conveyance provides for a "right-of-way to be used in common 
with others" and specifically describes the location of the right-of-way with a metes and bounds 
description. The right conveyed by the conveying document is the right to pass over the subject 
property and the Court has properly ruled that the subject property is precisely defined by the 
creating conveyance. However, like the trial court in Boydstun, the Court has found that the 
location of the right is more than is necessary - the Plaintiffs do not need the full 25 feet set out 
in their deeds. However, the location of the right was determined decades ago when the deeds 
for the properties involved were created and the easement was granted. Affidavit o/Counsel in 
c)'upport 0/ Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment, Exhibit E, bates 5, 6, 9. The Plaintiffs, and 
numerous prior owners of the parcels, purchased their property in reliance on the existence of the 
25 foot right-of-way that appeared in their deeds. As in Boydstun, this Court does not have the 
authority to shrink the size of the easement granted because it is inconvenient to the current 
property owner. 
4. Carson v. Elliott does not support Highway 101 IS position, rather it shows that the 
holder of a right-of-way is entitled to remove obstructions from the right-of-way. 
The sole question in Carson was "whether an easement owner was entitled to remove a 
physical obstruction placed in a right-of-way by the owners of the land." Carson v. Elliott, 111 
Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App. 1986). The Court of Appeals found that the 
easement owner was entitled to the removal of an obstruction. Id. The Court described the 
easement as an "access easement to a dwelling" and the location or size of the easement was not 
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addressed by the Court. Id It appears that the dimensions of the easement were not set out in the 
creating document. The Court cited to a ALR annotation that addresses the width of a right-of-
way created by an express grant, reservation, or exception that does not specifY the width of the 
easement. Id A copy of that ALR article is attached. Given that the location of the easement 
was not described in the deed, the Court had no choice but to consider the facts surrounding the 
use of the easement. The Court approved the easement holders removal of a garden although the 
easement holders vehicles only "occasionally" required the space occupied by the garden to turn 
around and "sometimes" struck the raised garden and in spite of evidence that these occasions 
were rare. Id 111 Idaho at 891, 728 P.2d at 780. Carson provides no support for Highway lOl's 
position. 
The raised garden in Carson is quite similar to the sign in the present case. The easement 
holders are able to access their property and the obstruction is an inconvenience rather than an 
absolute bar to the properties. Unlike Carson, the evidence indicates that sign is hit regularly, 
and particularly when drivers are attempting to turn around or back out of Rexburg Plumbing and 
Heating. Plaintiffs have affirmed as follows: 
[C]lients or persons visiting plaintiffs have hit the sign. Nephi Allen and Kenton 
Johnson have both seen people hit the sign. For example, they saw a driver from 
Clair and Dee's Tire Factory hit the sign. They also had a client come back into 
thcir building to apologize for hitting the sign. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Exhibit C, pg. 4-5. 
Nephi Allen has testifIed as follows: 
Well, that's one of our major complaints about that sign is that many of our 
costumers, as you can see by the pictures of the pipe bollards, have hit that sign. 
And I believe that our costumers are the only ones that are in that unique situation 
because how they pull in using the easement, and then when they back out, that's 
where the sign is, so. 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 
"A", Depo. Of Nephi Allen, pg. 33, L. 15-21. Nephi Allen himself has hit the sign while using 
the right-of-way. Id pg. 34, L. 4-10. 
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In its Decision, the Court states that Plaintiffs' only argument to the placement of the sign 
was that it was per se unreasonable and that they have never (emphasis in original) argued that 
the sign constitutes an unreasonable interference with their use of the easement. Decision 10. 
This statement is not supported in the record. Plaintiffs maintain that the placement of a 
permanent obstacle in a right-of-way must, as a matter of law, interfere with the ability of the 
easement holder to use the right-of-way since, due to the permanent obstacle, they cannot pass 
over that portion of the right-of-way. Due to the clarity in case law and efficacy of resolving the 
matter on that basis, much of Plaintiffs' briefing has been in support of that position. However, 
they have always maintained that the sign unreasonably interferes with their right to use the 
easement based on the fact that they and their clients have hit the sign. 
The Court, in finding that there is no dispute that the sign is reasonable confuses 
Plaintiffs ability to access their property with their right to use the right-of-way. Decision 10-12. 
The question is not whether Plaintiffs and their customers can access Plaintiffs' property - the 
question before the Court is whether the sign prevents the Plaintiff from using the property 
subject to the right-of-way as a right-of-way. 
As in Carson the sign does not prevent the Plaintiffs from accessing their property, but it 
does interfere with their right of way, both as a matter of law, and as shown by the fact that both 
Nephi Allen and various customers have hit it. As in Carson, Plaintiffs are entitled to its 
removal. 
5. If the Court determines Plaintiffs are not entitled to pass over the entirety of the 
right-of-way described in their deeds, the Court should described the area of the 
right-of-way over which they are entitled to pass over. 
If the Court determines on reconsideration that Plaintiffs' are not entitled to travel over 
the entirety of the described right-of-way, the Court ought to determine the portion of the right-
of-way over which they are entitled to unobstructed access. "[I]t is well settled under Idaho law 
that any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, 
width, length and location of the easement." Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, _, 248 P.3d 
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1265, 1277 (2011). In this case it is important that the parties understand precisely what they 
mayor may not due so as to avoid future disagreements and litigation. If the Court determines 
that Plaintiffs' are not entitled to pass over the entirety of their described right-of-way, the Court 
should determine what portion they are entitled to pass over. Such a ruling would also benefit 
Highway 101 by making clear what portion of the described right-of-way it may place permanent 
structures on. For example, if Highway 101 installs a sign that is one foot larger and reduces the 
useable portion of the right-of-way from 19 feet to 18 feet and Plaintiffs' object to the expansion 
of the sign, are the parties required to engage in costly and lengthy litigation to determine if this 
additional encroachment is "reasonable?" To avoid the need for additional litigation, Plaintiffs 
request that the Court determine what portion of the right-of-way they are entitled to pass over. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant PlaintifTs' Motion to Reconsider and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to the signs' unreasonable interference 
with Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way. Additionally, for the reasons set out in Plaintiffs' prior 
briefing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on all counts and Plaintiffs their 
costs and fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.c.P. 54(e)(l). 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
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necessary width); Perry v. Wiley 
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and easterly ' sides nor the loca-
d width on the southerly side, 
a question of fact as to what 
intended as to these limits 
time of the original convey-
Indiana. ---.: Vanatta v. Waterhouse 
(1904) 33 Ind App 516,71. NE 159 
("sufficient for the purposes"). 
Iowa.-Bina v. Bina (1931) 213 Iowa 
432, 239 NW 68, 78 ALR 1216 (neces-
sary width). 
Maine.-Cleaves v. Braman (1907) 
103 Me 154, 68 A 857 ("convenient" 
width for all the ordinary uses); 
Drummond v. Foster (1910) 107 Me 
401, 78 A 470 ("suitable and conven-
ient"); Willband. v. Knox County 
Grain' Co. (1929) 128 Me 62, 145 A 405 
("reasonable, suitable and conven-
ient") . 
Maryland. - :Frank v. Benesch 
(1891) 74 Md 58, 21 A 550, 28 Am St 
Rep 237 (reasonable and necessary); 
Burroughs v. Milligan (1952) - Md 
-, 85 A2d 775, 28 ALR2d 243 (rea-
sonable width). 
Massachusetts. - Salisbury v. An" 
drews(1837) 19 Pick 250 (a reason-
ably convenient and suitable way); 
Atkins v. Boardnmn (1841) 2 Met 457, 
37 Am Dec 100 ("reasonably suffi-
cient;" "suitable and convenient"); 
Johnson v. Kinhicutt (1848) 2 Cush 
153 ("reasonable· and convenient"); 
O'Brienv. Murphy (1905) 189.Mass 
353, 75 NE 700;. Lipsky v. Heller 
(1908)199 Mass 310, 85 NE 453 ("con-
venient" and "sufficient"); McKeimey 
v. McKenney (1913) 216 Mass 248, 103 
NE 631 (convenient and suitable); 
Dunham v. Dodge (1920) 235 Mass 
367, 126 NE 663 (suitable and con-
venient); Van Buskirk v. Diamond 
(1944) 316 Mass 453,55 NE2d 687 
(reasonable and convenient). 
Missouri.-'-'-Davis v. Watson (1901) 
89 Mo App 15. 
v. Durrant (1940) 
, 196 So 802 (Haconvenient 
e" way). 
- Barber v. Allen (1904) 
was Addison County v. 
(1928) 101 Vt 384, 143 A 700. 
New Hampshire.-Smith v. Wiggin 
(1872)52 NH 112 (convenient and 
suitable); Gardner v. Webster (1888) 
64 NH 520, 15 A 144 (convenient and 
suitable). 
New Jersey. - Simeone v. Varloro 
(1930) 107 NJ Eq204, 152 A 173 (Hit 
shall be of reasonable width to accom-
plis'hthe purpose contemplated"). 
New York.-Grl:tfton,v. Moir(1892) 
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130 NY 465,29 :t'l'E 9'14, 2'7,A.m St ~ep 
533' ("reas()pably necel?~~rY ' ~nd eQn~ 
venient"); Dalto,n, v.L.evy, (19B?) ~q$ 
NY .161, 179 . N,E 3,7:1, • (','re"as,O»a,bly ' nec~ 
essary . andco~veJ\iellt") ;Smithv. 
Sponable (19,()0), t?4 App Piy 61,5, ,G6 
NYS ' in ("the :widt~ ortll~ riS'~t of 
way is regl.\lated,.; hy. a rea.1lona.ll1e ,ne-
cessity") ; . O~Ee~'l"lle, Y, Gild er,s.Ie eve 
(1907) 116 App Div 902; 10? NYS 39:1, 
("necl?ssll,ry and c(;nweni~nt"); Far-
rington v. E\lndy (187[D J'IHuI~ Ei17 
("a rea,sonabh~ wi(ith;'); Xo~k V. 
Briggs ' (1887, sup) 7 NYSR .124 : (such 
width "as was necessaryJQr'its ,pro~­
er andre~sc;>nilbl~ enjoxmenp') ;, LaW~ 
mer v.80kolQwskU1941, Sup) 31, NXS 
2d , 880 V'reasQllabiy .. necessary and 
convenient;')'. ",." • , 
Pennsylvania,..,..,. Be,ers ,v, Woodruff 
(190·2)8 Lac!< Le~ News 1j14("refl~ 
sonillie~'). . .' , 
, Texas.~Elias v.Horak (1927" ,'re,x 
Giv: f..r>p) 29g'S\y ~88', ' ~rrO:r reJ ;C"rea" 
sonably necessary"); .LOIW Star Gas 
Go. v., Childress> (194q, Te.~CivApp) 
1~7 SW2(;1 93,6 , ("reasollably'': sufPcie.nt 
tor thetieed) ; Grliwfqrdv. ,Tennessee 
Gas Transmii;lsiori ' 0.0.(1952, TexCiy 
App) ' 25?, SW2.,d 237 , ("s1,l,~~ab,i.ei, a~4 
corivenient"""';'''r~aliol1,l;l,bly suffiCIent ), 
, '. Ver~ont.~W~lker~. ' P:ievce' (186,5) 
38 Vt ' 94 . 'C'r,ea,so!)~bly , go~~el}iElnt:',); 
Ad~ison ,Co,unt,y v.)~la~kmer , (19~~) 
191,y:t ?~4, .' l43 A 700', ("of al':eas:OIl-
ab1~'iwt4thi',;~onsideXing .i ts purpOSEl),. 
Virginia.-;-:-Buckles v. 'Kennedy Coal 
Corp. (1922) 134:Ya 1; 114SE233; (the 
width is,to be suc.h as is "reasonably 
sufficient" for the accomplishment of 
the ,object) • '" ' 
Washington; - Van ' De VahteJ"V. 
Flaherty (1905) 3'7 Wash 2i8;79 P 794 
(when notliinited :by the grant itself, 
the : wayrt,~is i bounded by the line oJ rea-
sonable enjoyment"). " . 
West . VitginHI. +'-' WHey : v •. ,Ball 
(1913) 72 W: , Va 6:85, 79 SE ' 6'59, >ceueh 
width as is "reasonabIY i u'eGes:l\ary")i 
Palmer v.New:ma:n: el922»:91 ;W Va 
13, 112 SE 194 (width is to be .st.icha,/l 
is . '~reasonably necessary'.' . fO.I: the pur-
pOil'e's; and isto.i~e ,i'as'uit.abieandcon,. 
venient way'); . state ~o.ac;l Corp., v. 
Chesflpeake & O·ll· Go. ,q,9~4} 1~5 ~ :W 
v:~ 647, 117 SE 5:39(the~,aseme!1ii' is 
"pounded by the , line(lof 
eIljOYIflent',') ; ' ll1l9desCe)l1et~ry 
v. Miller (1940) 122 W Va 139, 
2d 659 ("reasonabl~ width'.') • . ' 
, The dominant idea seems tQbe ' 
the way allowed fo\.; i(> one of ... ',., "07 .... 
able width, h iking intQ~onsi.<:l 
the '. charaCter and: situation 
p:r:opel~ty, the cir~4mstanGes .' 
tne us~; ·lJ.pd the purposes to 
',: The , widtll being Un 
tlie deed, the laws"ys 
ment shan be . QfareasQlla 
~on§'ideriI1g t4ePlln~Ose 'for 
wa(intenileg. ,· In ,deaJirig 
qilesti6nthe ' deed is to be 
liherally toward the gn].ntee . .. 
~ati9'n aridchataCter. of the rniiA'"li:« 
fbr the be~efit of which the 
Il1a:deal1d'it~~,; ~ther ' cir<; . 
~,sting', a,t tile Wrie !iteto 
c6risidetatiopa~ W!llI as . 
nec(lss:ary :to thebepefieial 
all tu the_ ~nd tl1<lt the purp " 
intehtibns of the parties may 
J;ied out,., ; AM,isgn ,Copn.t)' . v, 
lIl~r; (1928), )q~:Vt ?~4,)43 A 
'. In. Wiley, :v,BIiLIH19J3) 72 W 
7,9S£6,59., :a" suitto,.obtajna "UH'O' "',U' 
in cQJJfoxmitywith a .will 
part,of 'the-land·tQ ;a .daughter 
oth,erto 't,hechildren :Qf a 
testatQra.nd p.~·ovidingfor a 
Uneand d(l(:laring that "a right 
,is ,res:Elrved tlirough the; front itr 
the>pQ:bIic 'road.," , whe:reinr,the 
j.\;ldge fixed ' the: ,location ' of ; 
'W.a~ ' held that the d.ecree 
,ous· in fixi)J.g ,the width ' at 
sjnce for .' .all that . appeared 
record that :w.idthmight .be 
was necessarY, to provide g". "VU ill '"'' 
ingress and egress. According~ 
was. hel;d tJl;:J;t, the" decl'ee · shop,"!1t 
rt1(tjQine4by .s,tJ;iki.ng out the, "p,t"I,;:!1!'''' 
tion'9f wldthand providiing·sIlfllNIY)l!t 
f\:uch, U!'le of. a WaY.oG ,thel 
"as",js: J,'e:il,s9n:ably , n.eCElss:arv 
ordinary purposes of: 
going to anlj , frOIfl t,he land q 
them .. . 
• As already noted; some of the 
define the way . . !lSi one of con 
or su'itable width;, 'or the. lik~. ' 
! ', , ' _, ' J ;, , • • ~ • 
' tf}#,w~Tl&~tthf~th~t w1t~l! t~~; ~r~~t 
Heile ~~ ' tQ" th~ ~la~h the "Wl!'1 ~~1~ 
h~tlftb 'M; dfs'ticW }\'i:d~h ~~S; I'S)il:llt'" 
~ean9, c,onverti,llnt 'fb:r th.~(jrd.i:~~ry ~B!NbiH. '. free pa. s~ag,e; ' an.', .d., Jf ,the, p,.:a . f-~~llr6-bjk'6,( of the ,grai1.rofthe WI}-'J 
:r' "d: th~ ' width hhtst bEi suitablE! f tat~" '" " ' , " ," ',"" "" ,, ",' 
, ijl(~6hvifni'elllWitli :~enfr.etice, ,to that 
o j~ay Th1,sis 'in(~r'e!~, td\driitt~e ~M 
J.r8fit, ih ' , ac,(!bl'd.a,rtCe, ·' :-vith' , ;t;heJ:jfe~ 
IS ,fi\eH"ihtentiort 'oftlHlpartie$. , ~h~at 
I~Jit~bi~,J,art~, ' i:9hVel1~efrt ,mUst If;~C" 
l!alatiIy' depe,nd ~Bon~he ClrC?'IYlstan~ 
LOf,eacli C}tiH:l" ,'" The., prt!surrt,ed 
tp 'erit~6n; is:;" df _ ~dllrse;to , be , fb~~d 
irl .!li'E\:insfl'llrnent ItSelf, but ~h~ l~~~~U~ 
ment is to be re~d In the ligfit of :the 
ie~it£t conditiOn.}; 'a-nddlrci:IiilWmees 
IIldS't'itig at :Hsdate" ,trh( iri~etp:retaL 
t b, irrcl:!s,e' tifd'ou'bt mar be 'itidlld , by 
~r p't'h~H'ca,1 ct)rtBtl'il~tibjiwhtch t~e 
))l1l'tleS placed upon the ' l~hgtl!¥¢e, " by 
Ii " <lotte by bf1E3aticl acqmesMtt il'lby 
the other, espl1MAlly' when': ddtllitnllEia 
{Is' a;t)ong; time:: DrUrrlffiond 'vfiF~ster 
(l~nO) 107 Me 401, 78 A 470 . . :.,~, ,:; , 
The validity of an easement of way 
~'i'jtM i IMid io'i,"·l1MtIHlt' Is !fitiffim. 
" Jte'd altli.lJUgl1 it is. ltbt defiIHlilffi tl'ib 
, r by : rfleteS aitId b(jtii'ids~' 1;he : tlifmi~ 
n t i tenetMIlt il:i 'Such ' it cltSe" lJeiiig 
II itled tti'!il; G6rtVefil\:intand :,gtii'taM~ 
a , ;'depe:htli'ng: Oit- th-e conditi'ons ; cif 
h,6Hp1-M~' tin d ' the flU rp'o-sea ,1flft 'w hlth 
ft ' a:a l hit~ntl{;li:t:': Kotiak ".' Durrant 
;(9'40) 143' Flii ~86j , 196S(jg02i" ' 
.~ 'GeBri~ v.frot (fS~4l f'f4Mag~ 
2/\V'hete :; th~:CoiIveyail'cti Was of A 
~ ~aVor ' 1a:h'd ' abi:Jtlt :t47 feel d~~p 'and 
1tr~ J ~~~tWid~ . ~yip.g to th~ no~thof a 
~ bUrt, Me'th6distmMtihghditse, ' Uto_ 
ge lfer witIt'll rtght 'of a: fr.~ll pitSs~ge­
~ fi01n ' Medfbrd road by ,thtl ea.-st· 
e tY'"side': of th~;nf~ati,ng.house ,toliAid 
10 ,ii land/'ttffdlt:\*as clairiIM'thin 
ati the time of the- :gtatlb the gr'antee 
fl)atle c:a 'practical lOcation of the way 
by;ve/ltablishiIiga f'ence · so as to ,give 
8. Wi,dth of eighteen feet and that the 
Irt'aintors then ; and for a long time 
acqfiJescedthEirein, the court conceded 
-t t ,this; if done with intent to fix the 
VtitltlfOl the passageway, would oper-
at~\viththEf' Same legal effect as fixin'g 
·th~e:vJ-id'tli by"oee'd; but said that if the 
"fj'28ALR2dJ-17 
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jIlt'y ,Ilhollid find, ',ag-ninst i that daim 
then the instl'uctioh ' which , i 'he ',c/)uH 
l-nid given thattnede-ed 'gaYe,tlie-tgr'iin-
tee "1\ , way of ' ci6nve,nient width, -fOJ; 
all the 'ordilial'Y u~efl of fre~ passage 
td aHd :fi:on1 hisland/' Would b'e appro' 
pl'iatealYd correct, ' 
, In: ~Ht1ith v.Wiggiri(1812) 52 Nil 
11tii\tft~fe tMconv/)yailcei by deed 6f 
1833, included a . "ri&,ht. of a passa~e" 
Wayfr'oht 'Chapel ' sti'eettd lYl:e teat, of 
theiltdi.'e" ' on the ' gra:fited: rprefrlistls~ 
and it :tppearedthatfoi' alDhg tii!!\! 
'P~rsbns ' daimTilg under the tleed had 
used, Withteam~iihd bthel.'wise)a pM· 
i;iigeWiiY< )about thh'ty feeti:i1 ' WidtH 
m\.t11sh6ftly iJef~~e the· suit; 'Wlt~n ,'the 
tlW-nerbfthesei-'vi/)ntteneIfie'titere<lt· 
~t1 . sttucfUi'es which atbn'epoiht 1'~J. 
dUted the ' i.vldth t(j ' about twMvea:fHi 
6'M·hlrlf feet;H Was held that slti~l? 
plaintiff ' Was only el1tltieu fda pM-
~'!l.g~Way "colivehletit a.ndliUi't;~ble\'fbt 
~:iie pu'f'P,bses f'ot w hi'chgi"a'h'H!d, : antl 
tHe j'QrYfilid fdtiHd i thtit tl'\~ fE(J;Y1l:ti1ifig 
~ptite w¥t'shiffl.cie'li:Hoi' tho~-e PUi"pos'es, 
)~dg!TIeht :mus1; 'be, giyefi lor ' th,e o.~. 
Ientlal1t. ' . . 
,' InRiipde's, Cemetery, Asso,v: M'jiiit 
'(194b) 'i22W Va 139, 7 S'E2a 615Q,a 
conv@yance for cemetery purposGll ' of 
a ,one.half acre lying in the midsl·of 
'a ' farm; 'and the further, gr~nt, of " i~ 
convenient right ' of wayfi, o.vera~,d 
through ~he landS to the (lOunty road·, 
were held by the trial chancellor to 
entitle the,grantee to a way ~ixteen 
,and one-haIl fe:et in wJdtb. i 1:his hold-
ing was sustained on the appefLl as 
within the chanceHor's "sound discre-
ti()rt.'~ the court saying that' in deter-
mining the question of , width, 'it : is 
'prbperto consider thewholescO'pe and 
putpose:bfthe deed and the ' mal1ifest 
intentbf the patties, 
, : IiI' Lipsky v; HelIer (190'8) 199 Mass 
310, 85 NE 453, the court approved the 
dEiclsloh of thehiaste'r that silicethe 
deed did not define the litnits • Of 'the 
, way, and they were not established by 
user; the plaintiffs -were entitled tot'a 
convenient way. whose width ,throu'gh-
out should be determined by jtsSllffi-
ciency' to afford ample ingrel)S, a:nd 
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egress, for the owners, and occupants 
of the dominant estates.." 
Seemingly there is. in ordinary cIr-
cumstances no real difference between 
a passageway of "suitable and con-
venient" width, and one of "reason-
able" width, since a way inconvenient-
ly or unsuitably restricted would not 
in most circumstances be a reasonable 
one. 
In Palmer v. Ne .... >mnn (1922) 91 W 
Va 13, 112 SE 194, where the court 
stated that it was well settled that 
when the in trument creating or reo 
serving a right of way does not staLe 
ita width, "a suit ble and convenient 
way is mean t," to be determined by 
its sufficiency to afford Ingres and 
egress and by the purposes of . he 
grant or reservation and he circum-
stances of each cllse, the opinion goes 
on to say that the servient estate can-
not be burdened hy the occupancy of 
a greater width "than is reasonably 
necessary for the purposes for which 
the right of way wa intended," thu 
seeming to tre t a way of "suitable 
and convenient" width as the same IlS 
way of such width as is "reasonably 
necessary for the purposes" for which 
the way WIlS intended. 
In AtkIns v. Bordman (18 1, Ma ) 
2 Met 457, 87 Am Dec 100, infra, § 10, 
it was said that the width was to be 
"reasonably sufficient" nd also lIaid 
that the right was to a "suitable and 
convenient" passway. 
And see Willband v. Knox County 
Gr in Co. (1929) 128 Me 62, 145 A 405, 
infra. 
+ 
A mention in the instrument of the 
particular purpose to be lIerved is 
doubtless of aid in determining the 
width of the way, though the effect 
may be the same as ~ here the purpose 
appears other than by mention in the 
in trument. 
Alab ma.-Ellard v. Goodall (1919) 
203 Ala 76, 83 So 56 . 
Dlinois.-Barber v. Allen (1904) 212 
III 125, 72 NE 3S; Perry v. Wiley 
(1918) 285 III 25, 120 NE 455. 
Indiana. - Vanatta V. Waterhouse 
(1904) S3 Ind App 516, 71 NE 159. 
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lain e. - Drummond v. 
(1910) 107 Me 401, 78 A 470; 
v. Knox County Grain Co. (1929) 
Me 62, 145 A 405. 
Ma u tt - Atkin v . .DU.I~ UII1Rn' 
(1841) 2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec 
O'Brien v. Murphy (1905) 189 
853, 75 NE 700; McKenney v ..... "nL"l.-
ney (1913) 216 Mass 248, 103 
New York.-Grafton v. Moir ( 
130 NY 465, 29 NE 974, 27 Am St 
533; ndrews v. Cohen (19H) 163 
Diy 580, 148 NY 1028, reb den 
App Diy 918, 160 NYS 1074, mod 
other grounds 221 NY 148, 116 
862; York v. Briggs (1887, Su 
NYSR 124-
Penn yl ania.- Roberta v. 
(184) 8 Watts & S 464; 
Woodruff (1902) 8 Lack Leg News 
T a.-Elias v. Horak (1927, 
Civ App) 292 SW 28 • error ref; 
Star Gas Co. v. Childress (194.5, 
Civ App) 187 SW2d 93G. 
Vermont-Walker v. Pierce 
38 Vt 94. 
When an easement of way is 
by express grant, reservation, or 
ception, and the purpose or pu 
for which it is to be used nrc set 
but it is not otherwise limited 
fined, and no way is exislent w 
nite limitations or boundar 
within the contemplation of 
ties that the limit of the way 
be "such 8S might from time to 
be r asonable, suitable, and 
ient for the p rticular objects 
gr nt." Willband v. Knox 
Grain Co. (1929) 128 fe 62, 146 A 
When the particular object ot 
way Is stated the width must be 
able and convenient with ..... · ...... n" 
thnt object. Drummond Y. 
(1910) 107 !Ie 401, 78 A 470. 
In Barber v. Allen (1904) 
125, 72 NE 83, where the ,.n,'VPVAI 
reserved and excepted the right 
.. good and umcient pri ate 
way over and across the west 
the lot hereby conveyed, for 
and accommodation of the sto~~ 
lying on the north side thereof," 
w shown that the property 
(28ALR2dJ 
ANNOTATED ANNO: RIGHT OF WAY-WIDTH 
_ Drummond ,v .. 
OiMe 4tH, 78 A 470; . , 
County Grain Co.(i . 
45 A 405. , 
chusetts._Atkins v. DV,L,U JJI"l" 
l Met 457, 37 Am 
v. Murphy (190.5.) 1 .. 
fit JOQ;McKenney v. lVJ.,<e:n.e.a.' 
3)j~~ Mass 248, 103 
·ork.~Grafton v. 
t65 29 NE974, 27 ' re~s v.Cohen(1914) . ~, ,, .,.., ~.,,, .. 
148 NYS 1028, reh 
918, 150 NYS 1074, 
ounds 221 NY: 148" 
:k v. Briggs (1887, 
4 . . 
'Ivania.~Roberts V" 
Watts & S 464; ' .' 
(1902) SLack Leg NeW.il 
-Elias v. , Horak .( , 
292 SW 288, error r!lf" 
Co. v. Childress (19{q, 
187 SW2d 936. :t . 
It.'--'Walker v. Pierce l"ii;r.\"""·~" 
• bU'siness center of an important 
' and that the store lots for whose 
, the way was reserved fronted 
dllP::1Public stre~t, the court conclud-
edrthat the partIes contemplated that 
a mercantile business would be con-
ducted (in the lots and had had in mind 
no.t 'an alleyway to give :t:atrons access 
but a 'passage for the delIvery of goods 
at the : rear of the lots by drays and 
·'g.ons, and hence, no witness testify-
ing that a width of less than sixteen 
iept r would be sufficient for that pur-
pose and most of them fixing the )leC-
li~ry . width at fifteen to twenty-two 
Ie J, .. it was held that at the least a 
!Jth of eighteen feet was necessary, 
an ';~cpnsequentlY that the decree of 
e, I court below fixing the width at 
l'ye,feet should be reversed. 
-Iri !Roberts v. Wilcock (1844, Pa) 8 
aUs & . S 464, a deed including the 
rJgbi1,andprivilege of "a car tway and 
pa ~age of eight feet wide at least," 
~eably to a "plan and draft" in-
do ~d on . the deed and further de-
,lIailled as ' given for passage "with 
an Lwithdut hOrses, cattle,ca.rts and 
carriages" was held to entitle the 
8r4 tt;!~ to more than eight feet · at a 
o ntof turning where the fact was ~~i ,th~t. poin t eight feet was insuf-
llelent. ,·The court was of opinion that 
tb;il~h:guage ,used,,"eigbt feet wide at 
I, str. had t.he meaning of "fully, or 
.nof .Iess than" and indicated that the 
gralt~ee should have eight feet certain 
anJIhnore if more should be indispen-
a Hi, ,regardless , of the fact that the 
~1 "~~ttached to the deed did not so 
8h ,~,c ' ,', . : '- 'i>e~~y :v; Wiley (1918) 285 III 25, 
2O~, 455, wh!lre the conveyance of 
~!!51 : quesJiop. prqvJc!ed for a "right 
ot :ay fora carriageway" northerly 
f¥ Pi;~~e west. end of the lot "to Emer-
o .rEoad, together with the right to 
s,~,~<J. right of way for the passage 
of ea-iUs ' to and from said Emerson 
q to said 'land/; and a strip of hind 
n . tin width had accordingly been 
"".' .. m 'Tfw thephrposeand moreover the 
":.I\~lllDt(il' · had later conveyed: to the 
a lot to the north in which 
of wa,y. in question was rec-
as being ten feet in width, 
l
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the court was of the opinion that th~t 
certainly was as narrow a passage as 
could be construed as intended for 
the purpose; and 'held that the decree 
allowing that width should be af-
firmed. 
In Elias v. Horak (1927, Tex Civ 
App) 292 SW 288,error ref, where the 
deed stated that the grantee was to 
"have an outlet to the public road over 
our land," the court observed thatthe 
grantee became entitled to use only 
so much as was reasonably necessary 
for an outlet and noted that the' court 
below had awarded a strip four feet 
,wide on each side of a line designated 
and that no complaint had: been made 
as to that. 
A grant of a right of way and ,ease-
ment to construct, maintain, and OPElr-
ate pipelin es and appurtenances there-
to, and to construct, maintain, and 
operate telegraph and telephone lines 
' in connection therewith, together with 
the necessary poles, guy wIres, and 
anchors, over and through the lari.ds 
described, was h'eld, in Lone Star ~as 
Co. v. Childress (1945, Tex CivApp) 
187SW2d 93~, to en:title the defend-
ant to Use in the future as much . of 
the land "as ' each occasion may rea-
sonably demand." The court said that 
the amount of space reasonably need-
ed in any partIcular operation was, a 
questIon of fact and held thatlirider 
the testimony, the ''trial judge erred in 
tendering judgment confining the de-
fendant to a strip thirty feet wid,e for 
its future use. ' ' 
In Andrews v. Cohen (1914) 163 App 
Div 580, 148 NYS 1028, rehden 165 
App Div 918, 150 NYS i074, mod on 
other grounds 221 NY 148, 116 NE862, 
where the grant stated that the way 
began at a certain point "running 
thence always of sufficient width an:d 
with 'room to turn with'reasonable care 
' into the northern end of" a certain ai-
leyway, and that it sho~ld give a right 
"to pass and repass on, foot or with 
horses or vehicles of whatsoever de-
scription but was "not to be so inter-
preted that there " i~ to be room along 
. it for ' a wagon to be turned entIreiy 
' about," the court pointed out that 
however ample the :space then existing 
) ) 
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' the specifications limited the width, , ty,"the court was Of the 
' and 'that the iater removal of certain , the parties must have c 
: buildings giving more open space ;did ' that the" way should be sui 
"not ' increa~e the .!1im.ensions of ,the patticular locality, andac 
way.,., ,upheld the finding of the court ' 
In Day v. Atlantic & G. W. R Co. that to be, of ,any,bEmefit to the' 
,(1884)41 Ohio St. 392, a Gase riot on its ' tiff's property 'the way would 
facts within the scope of this annota- be thirty feet wide. ' rhe """'rt" 'ai'" 
tionbut involving th.e width of a rail- that "nothing less could have been 
ro:;td, right of way whic:h ;at ,the time of templatedby the parties than ,aF 
the grant thereof was"definedbya plat sufficient for the purpo'ses for : 
subsequently mislaid but showing a it was manifestly opened/' 
width of jJfty feet, .w.herein the issue In McKenney-v. McKenney ( 
pres,ented, was the width of the way as 216 ,Mass 248, 103 NE 631; whe 
'against a subsequent purchaser of the will gave one-half of a dOltble:' 
farm who had never seen the plat and to one son :hImied ' and the Otfl' € ':r" ,Il'AlfJ 
,wail not informed as tl) ,the width to another son; and ' to ' the l"rr""" "h.'. -
claimed by the railroad company" the heirs and assigns" aright of waY 
court"re)1larked thtne~essari1ya rail- thep'remises given to the'flrst' sorr ' 
' roaqriis,ht ofw~yinchides mOre space all purposes as':if the sarire were 
' tnf,l,ii.i's ' co,vered bYJhe cross ties; since Jic . highway,'~: the court :said : 
' cars r'eqiiire more than that for ,their wouJdbe ian unwarranted i'n fA""";,,,,, 
p~ssihll~!ithe track nee,ds, draillage ' I:wnclude that by, the words ,ab 
an~ .ties ' apd rails must 'be ,repiacededthe testatrix meanttogiv.e 
. and pending such w()rk materia, must · thewidth usually prescribed f",,,,,,,,,'hliltl 
lif:!: . a,r6ligi/ige~he tr~\!k an.d , l:ieyo~d , the "ways" the. words bein.g rather rlt>'g .... ,,1Ptl 
ql'\ltn, s, 'an~ that, con~eq!1entlythe PO$- tiveof' ,the character of the 
';~j:!,;isibh9:f"ihe raiIr9adin sijCh ~. eas,e : n()t ()f,the breadth of the riO',N , ,",8"" 
iri,<;lgdeS:not' ,only , the ' grouiid ' c9v~red sagewa:y.;~ 
byth~ .crossties ' and ,wl£hinth~ 'walls In :Bu'rnham v. MahOney " 
of 'the cuts but' ~'lsoso, nluchof the va- Mass 524, I'll NE:396; where ' c~i).t"gtouiidohbothsidesasis 'rea~~n- ' of three c6ntig'tioiis lots; in 
ablynecdssary 'roroperating and main- one of them>referred to ' 
. taiI\ipg ~hp r~ilway , in 'the customa,ry 'these premises'! 'lind, to a ,"e .. r"" l ""'~' 
: m~qT' ' ,', " ed street running , ., ' 1:1' : ,';f,'r"T" ~"Jo' 
"'j',' , . , . ' , ;+";,, ,::'" lot, to which the' name of' 
Cnrtam mstrumentshave ,see,med ,to is given on the> Plan.' af6r A'Q'"j71".f.Il'iII1'I 
"pro,y,ide 'faraway" comparable to a , stated 'that the ' sidd 'streElt .' 
'roador public highway:: ' " ' laid but within 'oneyear frbrti 
,IT) Yanattav" Wat~rh9use (190~) 33 Of ,:thedeeci;btlt'in.'factthere ' 
Irid App 516; 71 ,NE159,wherethere- such street ever laid out and 
speqtlveowners, of irr,egula;r :pieces of across the 'lbf! conv'eyed',' ' 
adjoining : l:;tnds, in arder .' to obtai:n defined,byuser,: itwa:~heid: 
)nor~ , ,desirapre . 'pol,ln9.ariesj , 1lgJ:'eed complaining of, obst:i:tfctiori's' 
"upqn an 'exch~nge or certain ,portions, Cla:inredto' 'exisfihd 8' 1 ~e~jIi,g 
Md" a~ong o,t'her,)hings;, agreed,' that -its p~ecise limits;)I' tlfat, a :"l'.."'"'''''' 
, One ~o(Hiem (tIiedefenciaiit~('!graptor) . fhelitnitshavlng become 
would open, establish; and maintain acolii'tof equityfnight locate hig~\vay, 'flout4 ,of and along and a:dj,a- ' ''in a reasonable iTIaimer." 
cent ' to .the south of the ' plriintnb '. "f, ;" 
premist\s, and the deed to plajntiff ac-
cordingly specified that the grantor 
' WQtjld ' provide , ; i~, p!1ssa.bl~ highw~ai" 
sou.thof and aii'joining pla,intIWs , ia'pd 
, to)nt~r~e(!t'a ':ceFtqinavenue an9. that 
thll ~am~ ~l:tQtlJd" bll "for puMic utili-
IEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
Width to pass; turn; OJdurn 
'" ' ' 'rhepurposefor which 
granted ,or reserved when, 
gether ;withthe: l:H",Ulm, 
rED ANNO::'RIGHT iOF' :W AY....;.WIDTH .' ; 2()1 
. eh11.bl'e' vehicles to' pass or' to 
to torn; around;: 
v.Woodruff (1902, Pa) 8 
News 194, the deed under 
claimed, which gave . 
. a ;' tight of. ' way along railroad 
e'i'ty "wide enough for wagons and 
uses," was regarded byth'e court, 
a · fair' construction of. ' the: lah-
ed, as entitling the defendants 
rtgl1tof way ofa reasonable width 
fori}'ar Wagon road, wide enough for 
wagons to pass · or hU'n around . . The 
ooiHt found under the evidence that a 
'Ii tlthmf thirty feet' was reasonable for 
tbG;tptupose. . , . 
~ridsee Barber v. Allen (1904) 212 
JU 125, ,72 NE 3S, supra; Bina v.Bina 
(19$1)'213.' Iowa 4~2{ . 239 <NW; 68; 78 
ALR 1216, mfra, § 6; and Rhodes Cem-
e c: y Asso. v. Miller (1940) 122 W Va 
18,91'7 SE2d 659, supra~ 
COFnpare Burroughs v. Milligan 
'9&2)-- Md -, 85 A2d775, 28ALR 
i243, and Good y.: Petti crew, (1936) 
1 Va 526, 183 SE 2t7; bothjnfra~ §9; , 
arldoa:lsoElias v. Horak (1927, Tex Civ 
App~l 292SW 288, errOr ref, supra. 
LIi 'Long v. Gill , (1885) 80 Ala 408, 
I~ra,§ 7; a width sufficient to .' give 
ro prfor turning was contemplated. 
:And see l)unham v.Dodge (1920) . 
235.:1'11ass367,126, NK.663, infra, § 6, 
a ck Robe:rts v. Wilcock (1844,. Pa) 8 
& , S . 4G4, ·slipra~ 
. ,{ \ ) ~ , , - . , ', 
'l{Jilder particular circumstances a 
;X"',_~,.r., l. ;sufficient to 'allow for turning or 
P . sing only at certainpraces may be 
'jmded: ' :,' 
" , York v. Brigg's'(1887; Sup)' 7 .NY 
S , L124, where .a conveyance of ware-
H ~.d se' premises' incltideda'privilege of 
6 A'C'e ' north : of: the north line "for 
:ins to' go to, and from," the 'ware-
, es, and the '1t1atter complained of 
, il lloth'e act of one: of ' the grantor's 
, rg; in con'structirig the foundation 
,#~ lS'. for a building ' on the north lot 
8 -'as ' to leave a passageway of:, only 
l eV,enteen feet on that lot and adjacent 
. ~hepurchased 'premises, ' and in all 
1>11 It; twenty"one feet between such 
fo "ndation and the warehouses, and 
it .a's insisted that theeffed ·was not 
.. leave enoug h room for teams to 
P, as' at that point, ' taking into account 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
PAGE 459 
[§4J 
the~ width Of vehicles used to de!{ver 
goods' to the warehouses, and moreQver 
that there was interference with teams 
and wagons turning al'ound so as. to go 
out atthepoint .of entry, the court, in 
holding that there was no interfeJ:enGe ; 
with ' the plaintiff's rights; said . t.hat 
the . question was . whether , the space ' 
stilL available amounted to a reason-
ably suitable width, or such width as 
was within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the grant. The 
court concluded that the remaining 
space was sufficient notwithstanding' 
the proof of the great width of vehicles 
coming to the warehouses, and said 
that it could not be concluded' as a 
matteroflaw that the passage of such 
vehicles abl'east came within the con-
templation of the grant, or that a width 
sufficient at all points for such pur- ' 
pose was actually or reasonably 'nec-
essary to the enjoyment of the way as 
contemplated at the time it Was made. 
The court further noted that neces-
sarily incident to the way for ingress 
and. egress were the means to , turn 
around, but observed that this did. not 
necessarily require sufficient width for 
the whole length of the way for teams 
and wagons to turn about,. "nor the 
mos~convenient means of doing so at 
any place." 
In Smith v. Sponable (1900)54 App 
Div' 615, 66NYS177, where the d~ed 
included "the right to pass and repa~s" 
from ,the .roaq t ,herein designated, 
"thence across the f actory bridge as 
it now lies; said right of travel nbt to 
extend , over, a strip of ground above 
three rods wide/ i the cOllrtpointed out 
that the deed did not in terms, grant 
a way three rods wide, rather . that 
three rods was the extreme timit 
which could be deinanded, and . the 
court said that within that limit the' 
width ' must be. regulated by J;~asona­
ble necessity; and concluded that, ;con-
sidering the right as being one to pass 
and repass only,and .that by thewor.d-
ing of the grant it could not exceed 
three rods, a reasonable interpretaJion 
did not require a width of three rods at 
the bridge, nor a way any wider there 
than the bridge itself. The cQurt 
pointed out that north of the bridge 
and a certahl barn there appeared to . 
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be all the space necessary for turning 
around, and al;;o abundant room for 
teams to pass west of the barn. 
In Walker v. Pierce (1865) 38 Vt 94, 
the conveyince which included the 
right to 'use the common passway at the 
west end of the building i'n question 
and which also gave a right to a pass-
way 'from the first passway mentioned 
"to the rear of the portion of the build-
ing hereby conveyed" in such manner 
as to give to the grantee his heirs and 
assigns "room to .pass of the width of 
a common cartway for all necessary 
and ordinary household purposes· to 
the rear of the building," was held not 
to limit the plaintiff to a width of 
twelve feet at the corner of the pas-
sage so indicated, even though the 
proof disclosed that an ordinary cart-
way was of the width of only twelve 
feet, since what would be sufficient for 
a common cartway on a straight line 
might not be such in the case of a 
way with sharp angles and curves, and 
the true construction of the grant was 
that the grantee was entitled to a 
space "reasonably convenient" for the 
purpose indicated. 
The instrument may, of course, 
specify whethei or not room is given 
for turning or turning around. An-
drewsv. Cohen (1914) ' 163 App Div 
580, 148 NYS 1028, reh den 165 App 
Div 918, 150 NYS 1074, mod on other 
grounds 221 NY 148, 116 NE 862, 
supra. 
+ 
There is no right to a use of space to 
turn teams around where turning was 
neither needed nor contemplated at 
the time of the conveyance. Drum-
mond v. Foster (1910) 107 Me 401, 78 
A 470, infra, § 5. . 
§ 5. - As limited to the width re-
quired at the time of the convey-
ance. 
Since ' the determination of the 
width of the way, when granted or re-
served without specification of width, 
is a matter of the construction of the 
instrument with the object of arriving 
at the intention of the parties, there 
seems to be no possibility of conclud-
ing that the width is greater than was 
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reasonable, convenient; or 
the purposes and uses cOlltemrllaj~'e 
when the instrument was exec 
The instrument is to be read in ' .. 
light of ·the relevant conditions 
circumstances existing at its 
Drummond v. Foster (1910) 
401, 78 A 470. 
It is the thep circumstances 
necessary uses which are to be 
into consideration in dot" ... ...";,, 
width. . Addison County v. Bl'HOJ""IU "Clo 
(1928) 101 Vt 384, 143 A 700, 
§ 4. 
The way is limited to the nature ' 
condition of the subject matter at , ' 
time of the grant and to the 
purposes which the parties 
mind; Dunham v. Dodge (1920) 
Mass 367, 126 NE 663, infra, § 6 .. 
. In Drummond v. Foster (1910) 
Me 401, 78 A 470, where, in con 
a strip of land lying at the rear 
grantee's store, there was also 
"a free right of way with teams, · 
riages, etc:," and the effect of the 
guage at the time of the grant 
provide for a through passage 
one street to the grantee's ~~.n~;:.'" 
and thence to an undi 
point, but subsequent to the 
successors in interest of the 
blocked the eidtas a eorisequen 
extension of .the buildings on 
nant tenement, thus forming a 
sac, the court rioted that the 
the way was to be determined 
deed and the circumstances 
at ,the time of conveyance and eon 
ed ' that there was no intent to 
a way of such a width as would 
point enable teams and wagons 
around; In rejecting the claim 
width of fifteen feet should be 
behind the store on the servient 
me nt, at a point where an open 
had existed for a long time, the 
noted that even the width 
for at that place would s 
sufficient to permit teams and 
to turn around. 
And see Lipsky v. Heller (1908) 
Mass 310; 85 NE 453, supra, § 3; 
rett v. Duchaine (1925) 254 
149 NE 632, infra, § 7; York v. 
(1887; Sup) 7 NYSR 124, supra, .§ 
and Palmer v. Newm:an (1922) . 91 ' 
rATED ANNO : RIGHT OF WAY-WIDTH 268 
ited to the ilaturea ' 
subject matter at :thll 
It and to the obvio~ 
the parties had' ( ilt 
v. Dodge (1920) . 2:S 
8.; 663, infra, § 6. ::; 
v. Foster (1910) :107 
,; where, in conveyin 
'ing at the rear ofilic 
here was also granted 
way with teams,car. 
the, effect of theIan. 
e of the grant was:,to 
lrough passage from 
e grantee's premises 
an undisclosed exit 
uent to the grant t he 
;erest ' of the grantee 
Ii a consequence of an 
,uildings on thedotjll. 
IUS forming 'a cul"d • 
ted that the width o! 
, determined frotnthe 
~ct1mstances existing 
veyance and cone ' 
s no intent to grant 
ridth as would at lltly 
s and wagons to tti 
ting the claim that po 
!et should be allowed 
on the servient teRe 
where an open spa~c 
long time, thecou t 
the width contendtlcl 
! would scarcelY ;,ibe 
it teams and wagons 
IS, 112 SE 19 , Infra, § 10. Noro 
the casea Inft , § 9. 
evertheless it may have been wilh-
the contemplation of the parties 
t the limits of the way shall be 
s. as may. "from time to time be rea-
,so,\\able, suitable and convenient for 
tbe particular objects." Willband v. 
ox County Grain Co. (1929) 128 Mc 
62 145 A 05, supra, § 4. 
);0 Lone Star Gas Co. v. Childress 
(194.6, T Civ App) 187 W2d 936, 
supr , § 4, a grant of a rigbt of way 
and easement to on truct, maintain, 
and operntc pipeline!! and appurte-
(lces was held to entitlc the grnntee 
. a future use of so much of the land 
each occa ion may reasonably de-
mand." 
!Dd in Crawford v. Tennessee Gas 
Tr~ll!mis ion Co. (1!l52, Te Civ App) 
25 SW2d 237, a grant of a right ot 
W 'Y to I y, construct, maintain, oper-
Ij,te, alter, repl ce, and remove pipe-
Jines for the transportation of oil, gas, 
petroleum products, or any liquids, 
g ses. or subst~J.nce which can be 
~ansported through a pipeline, and to 
e ect, maintain, and remove a line of 
poles and appurtenances thereto for 
the operation thereon of telephone and 
egraph wires, the grantee to have 
right to eelect the route, and the 
i ument further spec\fying that the 
~ nlee should have the right to lay, 
e'Ollstruct, ma,intain, etc., "one or more 
,a ~!tional lines o! pipe" adjacent to 
~Ild para lie) with the first one, for 
'~ich it, its successors or &asign , 
a ould pya s-pccified amount per rod 
Q additional line, was bcld not limited 
to ,n way of "any specinc width of 
J d," the court referring to the Lone 
t(tr Gas Co. Case (Tex) supra, as in-
olving a very similar agreement and 
e entitling the grantee to use 8S 
,m)lch of the land as each occasion 
)ht reasonably demand. 
In Hodgkins v. Bianchini (1948) 323 
if 169, 80 NE2d 464, where the con-
~Jance included a "privilege of a cart 
. oad to pass to and from main street 
. to ,the said premlses at all seasons of 
~ ye r," and the property over whicb 
the right to pass and repass was thus 
lP'.anted wa.s a parcel of land called the 
• ne," described by the court 8S ap.-
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proximately 8 hundred feet long and 
about thirty-three feet wide, no ques-
tion seems to have arisen as to the 
width of the way to which the grantee 
became entitled the principal question 
being the one as to the right to usc 
the way fo r hauUng gravel and loam, 
which hauling had occurred very ex-
tensively and to the inconvenience and 
annoyance ,nd damage of the servient 
owner by reason of the dust creat d 
and the failure of workmen to shut 
gates. 'lhere the court inted that al-
though be deed was given in the year 
1820. the grant uf the g neral right of 
way for vehicles therein 'did not re-
trict Ita u e to horse-drswn v hicles 
or limit the way to the wid h of vehi-
cles then in common use,' and the 
court quoted with approval langu ge 
to the effect that a court should be 
cry slow to hold that even ancient 
rights of way not expres Iy r tricted 
a to type of vehicle could not be m-
ployed at all for the means of trans-
portation in common use by a succeed-
ing generation. 
And see Dunham v. Dodge (1920) 
235 1\1 367, 126 NE 663, infra, § 6. 
§ 6. Width DS fndieat d by ay in fact 
e isUng. 
In ca e of the indefinite grant of a 
r~ght of way it sometimes bapp ns thnt 
there existed at the place in Question 
a way that had been used for the pur-
poses mentioned or can emplate.d. "In 
such ci rcumstances the limits of the 
way then existing are frequently 
adopted aB the limits of the way thus 
granted." Kotick v. Durt nt (1940) 
143 Fla 3S6, 196 So 802. 
And in Willband v. Knox County 
Grain Co. (1929) 128 Me 62, 145 A 405, 
the court used very similar language. 
So in Salisbury v. Andrews (1837, 
if ) 19 Pick 250, a grant of the 
"right to pass and repass on foot and 
with horse and carriage to said 
house and land" was held not one of a 
suitable nd convenient way subse-
quently to be deflned but one of a way 
limitcd and defined by the passageway 
existing at the time. 
In Kotlck v. Durrant (1940) 143 Fla 
386, 196 So 802, where a church, being 
the Owner of three tracts of land one 
AMERIGANLAw! REPORTS, 'ANNOTATED 
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of which 'wi's entirely surrounded'by 
the other 'p'toperty and did 'Dot , ab'ut 
on any street or th6rolighfal'e, 'con-
veyed the iinier tract by deed 'which 
provided' for ' an easement "bh' north 
and ' southlines of above propettyfor 
. use, as Ii. road, connecting with CO\lnty 
Road;" which amounted to a provision 
'for two ways acrosil'the gran tor's land, 
anCl it appeal'edthat the practical in-
terpretatioh. placed upon the gbiht had 
belm that th~ parties intended to ' use 
·generally the same roads that had 
beehin use by members of the church 
prior to the deed, it was held that the 
width of erg'ht feet allowed by the ttHH 
court Was not excessive, there being 
,e\ddencethat' that was about 'the'w'idth 
which had been used and accepted un-
' del" the : grant; 
In Bina v. Bina (1931) 213 Iowa 432, 
239 NW 68, 78ALR i216, where. the 
parentsCif the parties, ()wning 230 
. actes of Iarid. cOnveyed aninnei' 70 
acres there'of to the defe'ndant, grant-
'ing to him by the same instrument 'a 
right of way over the 160 acres re-
t idned by' the grantors, and later! on 
the same day, they conveyed toanoth-
erson, the plaintiff, the 160 acres sub-
jeCt to the right of way, all without 
specifying ,the width, but it appeared 
that ruri~inp'. Jr?mthe farm. building,s 
up6ri ,whcp the grantors resldedto}he 
hig}1~.ay . ~,hereexis~eda lane eigqt~en 
feet in width . and . :marked by, fenpes 
~hiIe the r~st oUhe 'c6ritemp~atI'4way 
* .as ' tirifencedarid siriipJy hty, :9ver hB-
Iyand .rocky fields, It was hel,dthat 
in view of the testimony. that the ,un-
fenced portion of the way as used since 
those conveyarices was also appr,oxi-
mit'tilly eighteen feet in ,wip.th a.ndthat 
w~i·l it less there would. be difficulty in 
v'ehiCIes passing e'ilth i other,tile' c()r-
t~t'{ conclusion was that the defendant 
'\VasentitIed to awciyeighteen f~et in 
wiqth throughout. ' . ... ., 
In Eastham v. Ch1,lrch (1949) 310 
Ky 93, 219 SW2d 406, where ' ~he ser-
vierit lotwas only thirty-three feet in 
width 'and the house thereon 8.0 stood 
as to leave room for a driveway on the 
west leading to a lot at the rear, and 
Hie driveway existing was paved with 
concrete for about one-half or the 
depth· of the lot to serve' a garage on 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
PAGE 462 
' those preh1ises, it 'V:'as 
reservation in 'tlie deed of "a s 
passway": ~'throughsaid lot';:· 
lofhacki6f itwas ' of the width 
driVeWiiy 'actually in' use; it app 
thatforyeius the ' occupapti and ' 
'ersofthe back lot had driven 
such aHveway. . ' . . .' 
And lzl 'L{psky-v, Heller (190gY~'1 9 
Mass 310, 85 NFl 453, supra, § 4, ,c ~ 
Width of the ' intended way was. 'fi 
to coi-respond with the covered "p ._ 
sageway thr6ugh which communI. ~ 
tionwith the street hid been obtai9red. 
In Dunham v . . Dodge (1920) '2S5 
'Mass367, 126NE 663; where thdee , 
'given in the year 1887, p 
"aright 'of way to pass " . 
from said granted premis~s .-.... ''''. ,._ .. 
. ownlarid onth~weste:rly side 
and the pa:!js'aie on " 
'was by a lane ."",.",' ta~"lY 
' in width; hit atihe point of 
'it froIn · thegranfe'e's '. , ." . 
·fences were so 'loCated ' ast6 
,'iVidth' iof' iinly twelve feet; al ' . 
'that point and in turning in ' . 
of the lane· and passing to or ' 
granted' premises ' it was ne,~' 4 ~ssaT:'f:'IQr 
. the . teams , to turn at righ 
'was held' that whetherasll 
c'oriveniEiht 'use of the 'way .' 
th:enarrowness of ' the laile' 
th"ebarway·td thecgi'lihted 
q ufretiaii'operiing' ill' ,the' 
'IEjs'S" than fifteen fe'i,jtiri 
question of filet' and t[iaf ' 
tHe trial jlidgetha't'stich 
was required ' coul.d 'not 'be 
prainlywr'ong'~' There plidti 
tended and offered eviderice ' 
~ that -the n'ari.'OWness of: tHe 
'cbn1plained of'a:.iid which , 
ailt had coilstr(lcted' in the ' 
'the fencea'fplairitiff's bouri 
it impossiblef6r large coal ' 
pass to' and from her Ii 
the lane and th'at an v>-'v ...... '" 
leastfif'teen feet ' at that 
necessary to a reasonable u,se 
,vay. . The court, though cori'c~ qing 
that what \-vas a reasonable width fer 
the use of the plaintiff at the' bafw r 
would ne'ed to be determined' byre l'-
ence to' what was presumed Jo'oh_a e 
been in the minds' of the parties a'Hhe 
time of the grantand that plaintiff ,ail 
.!lQt, e~titledd~~ 
,WIdth than ,waS;l 
§yen : d;hoMB"h ;~ 
, chang€)d;. sta:t~~~ 
inferreq frat r1ihfi 
the paBsageQ{;t~ 
of hay ; 01' :othilii 
, j.~g a , ~paci r'i~~ 
jighter a~d : SniiiJ 
COllrt noted' t1i~t: ~i~nt for ah~a~l1 
~Hng aiol1g ~ ,A.~ 
,De suffi~ient ~~~i 
glcs.. ComPar~: 
(1865 ) .38 Yt9~~ 
.. . - ."' - . '~!JJ 
,: ,! :A,~NQ;: ~~G~1l ) <tIf;;W4X-;-WJP;rJI ~~~ 
r 
1 
ter(190S~ 
lupra, §4~, 
way was 
! 'covered . 
h 
·that 
lable 
bugh ' 
)nable 
ff at the,O l-·-';"· ... ,1'I' 
rrriined' bY' 
'esUmed' to 
;he parties a 
thafplaintiff 
e~titI~4to a : i>assagei ot.,,8Te!!<tllr 
thth~nWilS rea,sonable ,at ~pat ,t,ime 
t~en :(, tho)J.:g.h .cond;i.;.F~m.s.,; :h. l}g '!'iP,c.: . e I}tange~. sta.ted th~t 'itmigh,t ;\ye)I lie 
. ~" 'rred tj:Jatthe paJ:',tie~contemp.lat~4 
:f1I;¥sa!5~of teamswHh; lW~YY , lQa~1> 
.P i~a::v :01' :pt.l1~r faJ;m; prod\1§!'~ il'e,q;u!,r~ 
g,:a!lpacewl<le,t; "th,a.n nec"s~ary ,fpr 
l .hter an.d : sl1lallelj ;x~h~cl,es, ~ndthe 
~I't note(i that: what, yvo)lld, pe . su!lir 
c.i9nHora heaviIylQa4e:d, wagon; tray" 
, Uhg along a . straight . Ii,ne, might tnQt 
~:~j,ufficient for turning at righ~, an." 
i4~? .. ; , Compare Walker . v.Plerce 
1~p!5) i38 yt 94; supra,§4. ,; 
h ,· + . 
:'": yray unrea1lonablf br()a~~~~:n~t 
~ :i:2ily be" t;on~~dere~ ,~o:h~veJN?f~ !jl1~ 
ten~~1 bl ~he !nst,rument~YeJ1 tllO,Ugh 
! ':llast us e ,'Yaspfmorespa~ th~n 
rll1.!iil'f!~·; , ' .. ; . ,'.: .. ; ... . ,\:1' 
'lil£tetson v;Curf;i1l.,(1876) 119,M,ass 
NLl .J -.. : I .• , : _ . '" .,. " J ,,' ',," . • ,.. • 
2 6,('> }V~er5l ;th~~rf1l1to!" , ~:ho ~wn!l.9: , a 
J gjil ' tractqf iand .i:lfontip.g on: ~acfi).r' 
from which,extendin.gback 
tract, tj:le,r,ei }~~~ f<.n i ;Qi?~n: 
egular width, varyingfr,om 
1.1, .......... -"""'. .. to fif~y-three .feef; an'd 
IIUI~JI~I,'m onthesi~s~>p'y tiet$.',. f.en:c~, 
. "'" and whleh' hadbeen 
s . tp~h~ , g!~};,tbr'8 Q.ther 
iiii: £l~~~. c,o~parativalY 
tion; "the eonvey;-that '" .. ' , .. 'wa" 
'l', . ., •. J! 
"c·'" i,Up." ....... i Jo.r~ 
iinob-" toth~ 
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[§§ , ~I.'!~ 
;if, the ,wholew.l}s then , 4,se~ fl,S , away 
f,9ra~Ces,s\t() ;1ii~ , pth~'r l~nd." " . " 
-i' ,4nd .s ee9!Bri~Ii , r-\ Mf)l!:ph~ ;9 995; 
189 Mass, 858,75 ,NE700; infra,§ , 7 •. '. ' 
." IILFarringtO,n v. Bundi:;(1875;NY) 
5 HJIiM7;aconveyr\llce of store pi.:~m~ 
ises which'incltid'ed "thk ' rightand 
?r.fvi,leg,e t () ):llty:e,an()ut~i~,e : s~a}rs l,eiad-
lUg t.o, the 'upper , rooP1:s:6f, the store,'~ 
;w,as, held t,o entitI~ , th~i'ra:ntee to a 
.Ilt~Xrs ofreasonabl,e , width" and ' also 
t9; aJanding a t. t~.e top of . r~aso~~ble 
Wl,dth,and that .Slllce the. tnal Judge 
had JUstifiiib.1 Yi ' found , that .astairway 
pij'our' fee.f vi.ils of rea:ro.u'ilble width 
thy",isXJlntee )eCameell~itle!l ,thereto 
al,lq., a,S weU to)m tlpper landing orthat 
wJdtn, Pl1fnorto a landing p{thiiwidth prs~ 'arici.Q~i?h~H , feit, ~¥eI1 'tho~gh at 
tJ~Hltn~ q;ftli'e con'vcyanC,e thc ,exist,ing 
litndiifg yvaso:f that wi~th. , 1'he result 
was, that" t.h.e grantOl: hayipg .sold the 
&4joiiling 'lot to the east, the. purchas-
¥~ in 'cbnst,ru<:\ing a building thereon 
~M j.n pro.,Vi4f~g~ .new stajrway 4nd 
hV~alI1~ }yil-.1l notpbhge,d to .al~qw ip-,: a 
lailding 'wider ' than the stairs. . 
':;~¢Q#ik'#'e; 'W~tl)th~ last ' three deci~ 
s~6,!;fs,; ,the .\!.ases infi'a, § 7. , 
,,',:]'( tne ' grMft was by express refer-
~npe : to . an existing way the case is 
d~~Jt .. W~th,in ,§§ 9 and 10, infra. 
§:7. WJtHh as coextensIVe with par~el 
, ,~ :(it' area over whiCh granted or re~ 
-!,,' , } setviti :: ., 
, ·:A grant hi-reservatIon: of a right of 
'Y,!Y'.~Qver" a particular area, striP, or 
p'arcd: or ground is n.ot · ordinarily to be cdnstiued . as prov'fding for . a way 
AS broad ,as the ' ground : referred ' ~(). 
, Alabama.-'- Lbng v.GilI(lS8'5) so 
')\1&408. ' ..' ". .. 
'.'Ma'i1ie. ~'j:;leayeil'y,: Bratttan;; (l~67) 
1og'M ' lMl§s A '857' " '", . ,. , . 
. {:h;tji~:a~h~l!le~ts: '·. ~ 'j~h.r,1?on \1. 'Wili-
l),i~i,iJt (1848) ,2 Cush 158,; . Sh9rtv. 
Devine , {1E88) 146 Mass 119, : 15 NE 
.14~' ; ;' {)~.Bt{enV:'MutphY ' (i1l05) 18'9 
Ma1ls8S8, 7,5 NE700; Barrett v. Du-
:.c;h~i~e (1'925) :~51 '1\1:,a~fl' ?7)49NE' 632. 
, ': ;NEtW ,n,~k.~,qr~ft.9,n", :Moir (1~92) 
~3!):N:Y465, 2~ N:!p ,97 ~; . 2T,Am ,S,tRep 
.583 ; DaJton ' v ... Lev.y (1982) 258 NY 
J~1, 1,79' N~; ,3,n :) (~,9. C,6,hsid~i~d~. eV¢fl 
though thegxarltOi'IOr a. tiihif all()wed 
a greater ~Hith'~Qt M used); ·SIllit1).~. 
266 thr; 
AMERICAN LA WREPORTS, ANNOTATED 
Sponable (1900) 54 App Div615, 66 
NYS . ~77;Re Buffalo (1910) 65 Misc 
636, 120 NYS 611;' Lattimer v. Soko-
lowski (194i,Sup) 31 NYS2d 880. 
Rhode Island. ~ Abney v.Twombly 
(1916) 39 Ri 304,97 A 806: . 
The leading case touching this point 
is Johnson v~Kinnihtt(1848, Mass) 2 
Cush 153. There; thecohveyance to 
plaintiff was of certain lands "togeth-
er with the right of passing and re-
passing over the space of twenty feet 
between the west wall ' of the' store 
aforesaid and the eastern :line" of the 
granted pi'emfses, and the matter com-
plaimid' of was the defendants' use of 
Ii part of the fwenty~foot space for 
the piling .of boxes and barrei.s against 
the rear of their store. The question 
being whether plaintiff was entitled to 
a right of passing and repassing over 
the whole area of twenty feet, or, on 
the contrary, to a mere passwiy Kt 
re'asonable and convehient . width 
through that area, it was held thatthe 
latter ,vas the correct construction and 
that a jury sljould be ailowed to det~r­
mine under all the facts and circum-
stances whether or not the acts of the 
defendant had impeded plaintiff in his 
use of a convenient way for any use-
ful and, prOPer purpoSe for which the 
iand. might oe used, considering its 
position in relation to streets and oth-
er parts of the' town "and .other like 
circum~tance~." . ' . ' . 
So in O'Brien v .. Murphy (1905)18,9 
Mass 353, 75 N,E 700, where .it ap-
peared that in the year 1874, the owner 
of the two tracts, whereon there stood 
two dwelling houses so located as to 
leave a space between them . thirteen 
feet in width, affordillgtheonly feasi-
ble means by whiCh the land ' in the 
rear of either house could be reached, 
conveyed to the defendant's predeces-
sor in title the easterly tract t,ogether 
with the dwell~ng house thereon and 
also a dght of ' passage "over a strip 
.of land sufficjeI1tly' wide for . ali' pdt-
poses of travel, withte,~m ' or 'onfo,ot." 
lying "along the .,\:\;esterly side' of the 
hind above descriqed;;' and to be used 
,ill ' ~ommonw'ith th¢gb.n~or and thos~ 
claIming underhin(~or the purpose of 
. enferingupon the rear part of the lot 
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de'scribed, the court stated ; H' la];" .. nr.fI!\~ 
withstanding the narrowness ' 
space of thirteen feet betwe' 
houses the boundaries of the n'~," '·~"< 
not described "but only 
within which a way con 
be laid out," and concluded 
way lay entirely upon the 
unconveyed premises and 
western boundary of the p 
veyed; and that since the hOljn"' ;,;I·; .... 
of the way were left un 
were to be "determined by 0 
the purposefor whichit was gri;l:n M 
and the acts of those having the right 
of user." 
, And in Barrett ' v.Duchaine (J~25) 
254 Mass 37, 149 NE 63~, the l:inguage 
of a deed of theY-ear 1905, giving "a 
right Of way over a strip of lan:'d ly_ 
ing ~etween two houses," was . h~rd not 
to grant a way over the whole ,of that 
land but to h.ave "referg'Ilceorily"to be 
area in 'which: the , '\Vay Was to :" I 
cated." In , that 'case; ' . rmrou"'" 
question was rrot specifically ' 
the width of t4e way but url1'.,tln· .. . 
was confined loa footway, or ._"'-_'L.'L..": 
as the defenda,nt clainYed,$t H";! UU",U 
the right of pass'age by' 
In coricluding th~t the ' 
sage byatitomoJ)'i1e was ' 
court· noted that an au"'l'lUl'Ull 
not have passed thtough ' the oPeJlj:rlj~ 
in the boundary ' 'fence ' as' ()' 1"0',"", 
constru,cted atthe. Hme of 
ance ;md as it remained 
time. . There the order of '. 
judge givingth"e plaintifft~e' 
10,cate the f90twiyand hi . lCn.' r,,[Il'_. 
providing that the way 
the pIa(:e arid of the width 
in the Mcree was ' upheld 
'stanti,aLcompljance with,' a 
gested " inprevidus Mas"', 0'''' '],;, .,,,,,.: 
cases a,s appropriate. ' . 
And In Short v. Devine ' (i 
Mass 1i9, i5 NE 148, a: res"1'""r''''" 
the right to pa;;s and repass 
upon a strip orland ten(iO 
'width ,on the , sou ' " ,', lirie 
granted prenlises ' . ' 
C6i:t street with t~arbs " 
washeld,iipp:ti. the • au 
J o'hnson Case (1848, Mass) 
supra, not to' describe the 
way but the close over which 
tee should have a conv 
able way, although th 
called upon to determi 
way was • . The quest: 
, obstruction by gates . . '
i Arid see Stetson v. G 
Mass 266, ' and Far'riI 
· (1875; NY). 5 Hun 6 
§ 6; 'and Atkins v. ' ] 
Mass) 2 ME£457, 37 } ira:, § 10". ':;; 
~. In Long :v.GiIl (18 
· wliere the grant of 1 
". over the following a 
'. llind;" was followed wl 
by metes and distaRi 
· space immediately infJ 
· store of thegrantee;;"i 
the opinion thatthe -tl 
was not intended to ':~ 
6rthe;"'ay ,j'Jiit rmi n;;l~ 
rilaceoveiwhich th~ l~ 
. and con~equently thli1 
· came entitled niereIy~" ~'se ofs1!~h ,area '~~'~ 
sary to thepurposes:lI 
thepremis~s to he ~~r 
it was coricluded ill t 
(time entitled to a Wa 
vehient ror' convefah 
and \I 
rED ANNO: RIGHT OF WAY-WIDTH 267 
aUT n r,rlT·v 
"Mass) . 
e the iimits · 
l r which the ·· 
,' .', 
tee should have a convenient and suit-
ble way, Ilbougb the court w not 
called upon to determine how wide the 
VI. y wa. The question wa one of 
obstruction by gatea. 
I And aee Stetson v. Curtis (1876) 119 
266, and F rrington v. Bundy 
(1 75, Y) 5 Hun 617,. both supra, 
§ 6; and Atkins v. Bordman (1841, 
La ) 2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, in-
irf, 10. 
In Long v. Gill (1885) 80 Ala 4.08, 
where the grant of "right of way 
cfver the {ollowing lot or parcel of 
lAnd," wa followed with a d scription 
6y metes and distances of an open 
space immediatel), in the rear ot the 
store of the grantee, the court was of 
the opinion that the descriptIon giv n 
wu not intended to de.fine the limits 
ci~ the way but merely to designate the 
place over which the way wa t.o exist, 
and consequently that the grantee be-
came entitled merely to the convenient 
e of such rea a ,shQ'uld be nec -
saTY to the purposes in tended. There, 
the premises to be ser ed being a store, 
i · WIlS concluded that the grantee be-
came entitled to a way reasonably COD-
ehient for conveyances 8uch as are 
lIually and generally employed in 
transporting goods to nd from stor s. 
1'.he court said that the case reduced 
ft8elf to • question of fact whether 
~he obstruct!on complained of 
• ~dged or impeded the reasonable 
a ~ convenient use' ot the way for the 
~os'es inte~ded. , The decision a~ 
lit ed at: by 'the court below that the 
o struction was not of that cbaracte.r 
's, however, upheld nofuithstandlng 
b Supreme Court lntima,t d its opin-
ton to be that the spa~e left aIter 
e',~ation of the obstruction was "to (ojD'e extent IJ.t~onveni~t1y restricted 
to the tu rning of vehicles." 
H.' D Re Buffalo (1910) 66. Mlsc 636, 
,l:.i::Q S 611, a grant of prem[selS "to-
&'~ther with a J'ight ot way over a strip 
of land 621 links wide bounding on 
lie 'easterly line at said lot No. 11," 
Was held to constitute 'not the grant of 
• ay 6U links wide but merely of • 
y over a strip of land of tbat width. 
'!Ilie court said In effect that in uch. 
e tbe question whether the fliurea 
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given measure the way will depend 
upon the circum tances of the cue. 
In Cleaves v. Braman (1907) 103 fe 
154, 68 A 857, where plaintiff's hotel 
premises were bounded on the south by 
the county road and on the ea t by a 
strip of land forty feet in width, called 
the "avenue," which extended north 
and south along the whole fran t of 
such premise for a di Lance of 160 
feet, and the gnnt to him was of 
right of way "for all purposes of a 
way over a piece of land 40 feet wide 
In every part, lying easterly," etc., 
(being the "venue" above m n-
tioned ), it wa beld that while ordi-
narily a grant of a w y over a de -
19nated trip of land is not of a w y 
a wide as the whole strip, in this in-
stance the Intention was to allow for 
passage onto and over the so-called 
avenue from every feasible point on 
plaintiff's eastern border Dd thence 
south to the county road. 
.. 
The idea that a grant of a way 
"over" a particular piece of ground 
does not give IS way as wide as the area 
ref rred to has in aome instances pro-
duced tr nge results, wher the refer-
ence was to an existing passageway. 
See Atkins v. Bordman (1841, M .) 2 
Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, and Grafton 
v. Moir (1892) 130 NY 465, 29 NE 974, 
27 Am St Rep 533, both infra, § 10. 
IlL Grant or r ervation by reference 
to an ex!. ting BY 
§ 8. Generally. 
Ordinarily a grant or reservation of 
A right of way by instrument r eferring 
to an exIsting way at the place ' con-
tempI" led, and not otherwise indicat-
ing the WIdth of the passage, operate 
to limit the width to that of the exist-
Ing way (aee cases infra, § 9); al-
though contrary results have beeD 
reached in certain instances (see cases 
infra, § 10). • 
§ 9. Width defined by the existing way. 
With the cases set out herein com-
pare those supra, § 6. 
Usually If the instrumeDt granting 
or reserving a right of way makes 
reference to a way existing at the place 
contemplated, and especially if the 
268,~ AMERICANLAWiREPORTS; i ANNOTATED 
::., 
[§9) 
r.ight I:lxpressly given is ,to; use ~ tha;t­
way ,' and ,.it is welL defined. , there is, 
little ground, fOLthe , ~ontention that 
t4e iJ1t~ndedwidthwas o,ther than' that 
of the existing way. ':,' , , ' ;, ' " ,~'-," 
' In Di,ckinsQn v. Whiting. (1886) 141: 
Mass 4H, 6 NE 92iwhere th'e ;convey, 
ance inclUded a privilege' in, tbe , gl'an~: 
tee, his heh'sandassigns,"tb; ,use the, 
lane onth,eso,uth ~ side of said, pr:eJn~ 
i.8es , to ,ddvehjs,cattle ; to 'P<1<stPl'e, ,and:, 
4is teams, fQrc,tb.e ; convenient Occup\t-
tion ,of said pl;~mi:ses,'? , and at the time; 
of theconveyancetbere was a"defined: 
way; about twentYcfiYefeet:in widt h, 
bounded ,bn each sjde ;bya' stOlle : wall. , 
with qarwaysaUntetva1.sopenjng into: 
adjace,nt, field's. exten'9,ing , frQI:U , :tl1e, 
hjghW,ay ; to ,a:, point back ,;to"Jhe:,dveJZ, 
which):lO,1;lnqeci,the: w:holetra<lt; it was, 
held that the right ' granted, was nqtl 
a general rightof, w~y ,overthe graut1: 
or's preni!sgs :convenient for thegxan~f 
tee, of such "a , width, "dh,ectiQn, ,(and-
general character a,s might thereafter 
l:!.e ; , ;detenwir1~cl , ,_,bYi, ' Vf}1l10US .. l ;c irc~m­
stances, but was: of the lane, so ex:ist-
iug on ;the, S9}\th', side ',Q( t]IElPreplfses 
and : s,o, defi,ne,q ,by ,tli~, iWqlIs,) :ani!' Jh;at: 
to cons,trlle j ,t 'q,s , an¥th,ing-, ;el,Sf) ,; wqqld, 
be to ,do jnju sti.c~ ,to ,the , gr1>nt~ei , A-~", 
cording,~y the ;fin ,d~iig;9Hh,~tr,iaJ;itidge 
th~:t a. fep' ,c~ E)reft~(t a,cp~s\l (:tP;e : Jll:ne;, 
aIthoug,h ~ 1?rovided,"wHh ,a , g~te 'iwpi:cp" 
coulfiea1i1~; ;bi: , ,~p:~rie,d;; ,,~:n ,d , ~4iC;Q: 
when open l~ft sufficient ipa,c.e f~r: the 
paifsag~M tea':Iri's ) rtti'd"~ca ttlte; ' eoli'stittitJ 
ed an unjusti,fiahh!; "obsti-u'ction and 
materially interfered wit,hethe conven., 
i~~t ,ij$e , giy~,p. , :»,a,~ ,\l-phelcC ' ,':: ,. <' 
T# Wn,h~¢ :y.Q~rgg(1991) ~, ~~, 
-77 A2d 595" "he'N~ "'laifltHl" l'laviA " 
' " ,,,, , , ' vf. " p , .. " ", " ,,, g, 
be,eh iJ:l thE!' Ye,#' , 199~ ,W~ ' 6~h¢t " ot 
lll'pan ' " i:d erfd bii ~ wiii'cy{) Ohe :'c6n~ ~ ~iit~,d~ ,fifHhl~t:~i9I{ :4f t~~N~r: r9f 
whicll., ) tbo'9. "t tIu·ee~c.ar: :Wi?'69.en:g'!lri 
aig~, ,'in th1it YMrI~a:s~4'tM Jht:~e~c;~lf 
g~rag~ J(ftp/' 4efehd ?;nt! ,l:t,~~~yi,rl~; ~ha~ 
defefid'lfnt iiltended' to "c6ird,uct; th~\"¢~ 
with a general garage blls'iriMs, ' iind; 
after :' ahou:t ;; a 'i YE(,~r(1 1,1>te,li:-~n d ; after. 
deJ~nd,!,LUt <h.a;d ,:,been , eOJ:lClue~ing , ,sl1ch 
business. plaintiff:)c:ony~y~4to : hiP'\} the 
1e.a:sedpre;lJ:l~ses, ; : ,t.ogether with; ,l}right 
of,; ,w?y,;descdbed/l;.s "pei:llg ,' :';on; tln~ 
:n9Xt~er}y ~ sigeot .. loy,~qf ,s?.id ,gr:8:n t91? 
iW.hich, is,C'~~&x:l~ de~ll~_d g!1t4:~JiJ.~(!f), ,9if 
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the"eart,h;and:now;jn, use'} ... , 
s:eeJ;l1s thaHnfact there. were no 
to, ind;icatedhe width , of the" 
~sed, :and , neither: plaintiff inor', 
ant had ever discussed , the 
under;,sueh ,deed defendant. can 
hl:;; ; qq~in~~~' and atJeng~h cO,ll(ltr 
a ; stjpstantial garage · bui,lding' orr, 
granted premises aAd 9ger<tt,ed!~, g~' • 
ly increasedb1,l siness" dnvolving", 
sei.;viciiig ' of lal'ge ' t~aile'r tr~lcks, Wi h 
the ,res;ult , t ha,t, ~, .y~n~rpyer.sy" ,~~\~qs~ ~ 
t9, the ,ixt~nt , Qfth~ ; dei e:ridan'VsFF 
of' u,!ei"', it' W~s plai,n th~t d ur f!1,g ;; (! 
later y'~a.rs d;~~ypda~t h:a,d In ,f~Ct '~f e 
a. mutll larger . PortJQ;n or ,the hyen r-
slx,foot st f$'P . in 'qu'estion tharif6dhr: -
ly;' Y?t.th.¢A~~~W,oljJeft)o ,th~i'j~lrJ 
~r}~rmi!iff;rQm'th~ : eyi~e:riF~ , ~\Ta~(:'91at 
'Y.JVi tj1 ~>tlcl t,~~ . of We .W',a~;,.~ranM .·· n t?e; qe~\i ... , ;rJ:l.e, ver,dlst, . w1},~cp.!;~'1a,(!.j p~ 
h.~ .. W. '~.~. '. ;suP.' . ,Il Q,rt., .ed. , by 'i a. ,m., ~.1 e. ,c.,W ~lq, e'ylden c~'" w~~ tPll.t th? ,'YH1Eh 'lBt t,ll . 
'Y~y, a,.~ It)a:;v, ,f,r,9F\ tJ:H~f'1tr~~t ,t<;> ,fI ,}£.c r· 
t,I1:HLPOl~t W,a~ , t,e,n;.::feeta,nq ,tP,§!t. frp 
t4itpoiri t oii't'o' ,tnereai'o:f H\:kpltlin-
tijf;s, ian~i:h'e .wi'dHi wa's: ;twe1v~:,fee , 
TtC~ , q,J~~i,ipri;, iefrt<,; ' th~.: j\lr~; ) ~#P. " 
" w.a" , wl:a~ . )~udth : qt. •. \Y:~~ 9 Ii 
use" vVlthmthe , Ia,Il,l~U~~Jt I)f 
th"t 
. . ' fl . '. ' 
the "Wl\-Y , 
could not'::l'l'e 
deedsilithe reaso'ria ble ' 
location; ,fol" ,iuch: tight ,of i 
strip of,land ten 'feet wid:e", ,etC;),WI18 
uphe}d.:. ,," i ' '''; .< i ' ," 
" In ,Bu:rgas Y . • Stbub , (:1902) ' 
586 •. ,141 S6, 67,. where "the, sale ' 
lol! , A- together with tM ' :prJyil 
!lsi~g, tlwJ Paveq. dri;v,~Wlty "op.' . 
a~C1 the, "eport i?t.?-t~J:! t.~aJ, ~ .'in, 
j,t :\V,~I'! !l~ip\!l~J.E!,Q; ",thl!-t . 
TATED 
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I!hould "have the privilege of using 
the 'Paved drivewAy in the rear of ~he 
proll fLy," lying on lot H," the "ruhng 
mnd~ was that defendant' atta.ck up-
p ' the languan providing for h~ way 
118 being InsufficienttQt; failure to state 
the length or width of he passage w.ss 
\ ithout merit, the paved runway De-
11f t' a phy'ical objec on the surface 
'Of the grouhd' and its lehgth aI1d width 
bejng easily ascertainable. 
In Bricault v. Cavanaugh (1982) 261 
1lch 70, 245 NW 573, where plaintiffs 
ere he owners 1:11 the south half and 
the def ndant the bwner Of h north 
holf of Ii certain urban Jot, and the 
de d to the plaintiffs, from the cOm-
mon grantor of th parti s, sta ed that 
the conveyance was "subject to 0 joint 
driveway b~tween s id bove de-
cribed premises and the north onc-
half of aid lot three," ODd specified 
tbat the driveway was to be kept and 
maintained a joint driveway by the 
respective owners, ond it was shown 
that the grantor knew from prior re-
'cord d conveyances. that e emenLs ior 
joint dl'iveway over the south five 
f eet of the north parcel and the north 
five f et of the south parcel had been 
cr.eated by conveyances under which 
ahe obtained titlo to both parcels, the 
court said i was right'to. assl1me that 
she intended to re-e tabli h the ease-
ments in the lIame location, and the 
court concluded that comjdering the ~anguage and circumstances the deed 
b the plaintiffs created a joint drive-
way over the Bouth five feet of the 
north hal:£ oi lot 3 and the north five 
:teet of the soutb balf. Such was the 
ruling notwithstanding . the eJtisting 
driveway did not lie over and along thCl 
bounduy line but Int entirely llPon 
ihe north half of the lot, seemingly (1 
.tact which bad not been realized until 
~hortly before the jnstant suit was 
·commenced. 
-I In Jackson v. Richl1rds (1941, To: 
lOiv App) 157 SW2d' 982, error ref, a 
eservation to the grantors of an ease-
intent "for a roadway aa at present 10-
ated approximately twenty feet in 
Idlh" along a certain line desighated 
,was held to confine he road to a 
idth of four een and on -half fee, 
tince it was clear from the record that 
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the road used at the time the deed and 
contract were made and at the time of 
the trial was not more than that width. 
In Decatur v. Walker (188 ) 137 
!tin 141, where the instrument re-
ferrl!d to onl) boundary line as run-
ning "to a passage ay to be made," 
but there was some evid nce that the 
way was then id entified and ran over 
the grantor's land, the court said th t 
if it "was identified" by mutual agree-
ment at the time, or ven aft rw rd, 
"it stood on the same footing as ii 
it had been described in the deed." 
In Colting v. Murray (1911) 209 
oM 133, 95 NE 212, where the deed 
included a right of pa ing "over said 
asugeway not less than five f t 
wide leadIng to Carv r street," the 
court noted that if the grantors in-
tended to limit the passo,ge\ ay to five 
feet lind no more it was difficult to 
understand why lh y did not do so, 
whi/e on the other hand the indefinite-
ne~s of the grant was accounted lor 
by the fact hnt although a portion of 
the way" wa already indicated on the 
urCac8 of the earth as twelve feet 
wide, the grantors had not finished 
laying out and wsposing of the rest 
f their land and might well have pre-
f erred to leave the final wid th of the 
way undetormined while gunranteeing 
that in any event it should not be less 
han five teet wid. Hence it WIlS 
concluded that the plaintHTs had the 
r ight of pauing and repassing over 
tbe , ay "as finally locnted by the 
grantors whatever the width might 
be," whether five feet or in excess 
ther of. 
The right given may cover simply 
the ulle of a one-way road, where such 
was .the existing road reterred to in 
the deed. 
In Good v. P etticrew (1936) 165 Va 
526,183 BE 217, where a t the time the 
contract was entered into between the 
adjoining landowners tbe roadway was 
in existence and amounted merely to a 
one-way road on which cars could pa 8 
only by putting a wheel in the ditch on 
either ide, but it w 8 not necessary to 
have anything more to have acce 8 to 
the dwellings in Question, and the 
written contract ran to the effect tb t 
210 AMERIcAN LAW ,REPORTS/ ANNOTATED 
£§§ 9. 10] 
the party of the second part should 
have "the right and pl'ivilege Of using 
the toad and bridge on the lands of the 
firSt party" and paralleling their divi-
sion line, and it was agreed that the 
future maintenance and expense of the 
i:oad should be paid jointly. the i'uling 
made was thai the dominant tenement 
was not entitled to a sixteen-foot road 
without gates or other obstructions 
but was ent itled only to the one-way 
road as it exist ed at the time of the 
grant. 
In Btitroughs v. Milligan (1952)":':' 
:M:d ..:....:. 85 A2d 775, 28 ALR2d243, 
where the lands lay on a wooded penin-
sula 3,000 feet in length but 300 feet 
in width, through which at the date of 
the deed there ran an ordinary farm 
or woods road of a width not estab-
lished by either record or findings, and 
which the chancellor r egarded as pos-
sibly amouriting to "little more than 
two wheel tracks,";it was held that the 
' language reserving to the grantors "a 
tight of way over the property hereby 
conveyed by the existing road" did not 
entitle them to a twenty-foot road nor 
to a two-way toad nor to a road reason-
ably 'sufficient for convenient passage 
nor one necessarily adequate for later 
requirements. Consequently ' it was 
held that the suit brought by one 
claiming under the grantors and seek-
ing the establishm'ent of a way twenty 
feet in width and ,the removal of ob-
structions reducing the cleara'nce sub-
stantially below that figure should 
have been dismissed. The dissenting 
juage was of the opinion. that the lan-
guage should not be given a construc-
tion so restricted as to allow a road 
narrower than a way of necessity,imd 
he pointed out that no case had' been 
cited in which a way of necessity had 
been restricted to a one-way road, 
+ 
In: Lattimerv. Sokolowski (1941, 
Sup) 31 NYS2d 880, a reservation of a 
"right of way across 'the above de-
scribed property from the highway" 
to a certain lot, "as the ' same is now 
used," was held . riot to entitle the 
grantor to the unobstructed use of a 
strip thirty feet in width then marked 
by fences; rather, as indicated by the 
testimony, the way intended was sim-
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ply of a right of passagedo'r' g'eneh! 
farm purposes; so that away. si~te 
and a:half feet iIi width, whichaccprd. 
ed with the user, was, under the t .' i. 
mony, sufficient. ' Compare, generally, 
thecases' stipra, §7; 1Cj. " . 
§ 10. Width not so defined. 
The, idea tl)ata grantoJ;'r()serv;:ttioll 
of a right of way "over" a particular 
piece of ground does not give a :way 
whose bounda.ries are' coextensive with 
the boundaries of the ground sQ ~,h­
ferred to . (see cases supra, §. '7) ' ha~"jn 
some instances produced surprjsj,tig 
conclusions. 1f ' 
In Atkins v. Bordman (1841, I I . ) 
2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, where.,the 
deed, after reCiting that there laY' ion 
the southerly side of the premises con-
veyed "a gate and passageway of about 
five foot wide, leading from the s aid 
street," reserved to the grantor free 
liberty of ingress a'nd egress "through 
and upon thes~dd gate or passageway, 
for carrying and recarrying woo'd~ or 
any' other thing; through the same," 
and into and ' from the '~hotising'Ulnd 
land" 'of the· grantor for , the use 'and 
accommodation thereof, the court wa 
of the opinion that that languagec,,di 
not fix the width of ' the ; passageway 
reserved but ·that what 'wasreseryed 
was in 'effect "the right of' as 
and :convenient" :passage for therp 
poses indiCated. Tlie court 'statedl 
the grantor's adjoining house ' 
dwelling house,the way was 
articles usually carried to .andfrO'Ih 
dwelling house in its ordinary occtill • 
tion as sllch,and th'at the presumption 
Was excluded that the way was t@ be 
'adapted to : the· carriage Of 
'dise, sU'ch as bales, boxes, or 
That is to say,the right reserved 
one of a convenient footway of dim~ -
sions suitable for the carrying of iI' r-
niture, provisions and necessari 
familY-use, imd 'to the use of ·wfli!eif-.. iIf 
barrows; hand:' sI'eds, and such '"." .... ,-'-
vehicles ' as 'are commonly. used li n 
footpassage in : a closely built!! nnll 
settled town. So' the court was on, lie 
'dpinioir that the judge had in"', wr ... ,,,,y 
inst ructed the jury that the 
.were bound to maintain a pa::;l>a~r l:-':''''l 
equal in breadth to the distanc.e. 
.. ,' , :1: 
tween the old ga 
that "SUpposing 
sonable width t 
~. same thing, this 
the rule would 
error in the resu 
the distance betw 
. and one of rea~: 
' not practically 'dl 
: In Grafton v. 
; i 465, 29 NE 974, 2 
, court stated that · 
incIullionof a' "r 
andoyei the cari 
: the rear of th:~' 
• premises to the ti 
as such stables; sl 
• private stables ';: 
, grantee . toa . ~~ 
whole of such aiJ~ 
that was regtjh:e'a 
th(lt h.~ shOUld 1.61 
I way as to dep'dv 
" ~ea~onable andcBl 
,; in~~6 and f1-<>[ .1:1  
i. oPllllOnconcede'sJ 
:, would .have be~il~ 
• over tl,1e Whole ott 
r width 'Yerenec ~!l1 
;, of a reasonable rl~ 
• hi P,almerf. 
W Va, 13, 112 SE I! 
of a tract of 11~ AC 
from a 'back 'lot 
. "an outlet" lea.din 
. r.eCiting, "it b,eing 
. leading , from, t b.e 
tract of land< ,an4 
i 
ATED 
, passage"for general 
o that· a way sixteert 
width, which.accprcb 
was, under the testii< 
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gr:a,n t- or reservation 
r "over" a parti~ular 
does not give a ~~y 
are' coextensive with 
f the ground soj .. e--
es supra, § 7)hal1in 
produced surprisillg 
" 
rdman (1841, Mas ) 
Dec 100, where the 
19 that there lay ~n 
of the premises con-
passageway of about 
tding from the said 
to thegrimtot fi'ee 
and egress "through 
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IT the "housing aii'd 
tor . for the' use 'an ti 
~reof, the court wltS 
t that language :did 
of the ' passagewBY 
what 'was :reser,ved 
right of ' a suitabl 
assage , for the ' pur. 
le court .'stated. tnat, 
ning house being a 
i way was limited .tb 
rried td land from~a 
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llit the ,presumption 
the way was to: f e 
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tween the old gate posts, but conceded 
that "supposing that width and 11 rea,-
sonable width to be practically the 
~ , - [§'ioi: 
' q ame thing, this mode of laying down 
' the rule would lead to no pz:actical 
error in the result" since a passage of 
the distance between the old gate posts . 
l and one of reasonable width "might 
i' not practically \Uffer." . , " 
sometime prior to the conveyance the 
road , in, litigation had been used to 
reach the back lot from the public road 
and that an oil and gas well had been 
sunk on .that lot and that a width of 
twenty feet had been left through the 
fence at ; tnepublic r,()~d for the pur-
pose ()~ affording convenient passage 
, for wagons' hiiu'ling the: iJong pipe and 
:' In Grafton v, Moir (1892) 130 NY 
; 465, 29 NE 974, 27 Am St Rep 533, the 
, court stated that the conveyance, in its 
(; incIu~iol1 .of a"righ,t,of way through 
,. and 'oy'er the: carriage or alley-way in 
i: the rear of the said above-granted 
l.' pi-emises to the three stables" ,so long 
as. stlch ' stables should, be occupied as 
fC,privatestables,' ,did Il,Qt entitle the 
' grantee . to a . passag.eway over tl~e 
whole of such alleyway, .rather 'that all 
thatwas .reqiiired' of the grantor was 
that he should not so reduce the alley-
n ~iy a§ to deprive theplaintiff ot a 
"reasonable and conveni'ent use in pass~ 
>' i'U'g.J toa'nd ff-o: The language of the 
,6pihion ' concedes that the grantee 
t:would , ha.vebeen en,titledto passage 
Qve'rthe whole of the aIley ifthe whole 
:}vjdthW.erenecessaryJ,o the enjoyment 
uiof a wlsonable right of passag~, 
. + ' 
",LIn' ,P aIiner v. Newm'an (HI22) 91 
'W:Va f3, 112 SE 194; \vl1ere the owner 
.' 'O'fittactof 114 acres, in selling there-
",fl'o'ni a "baclLlot of 41 'acres, granted 
,Van: outlet" Jeadingto. tlJ.e pttbli(:road, 
i ,e¢iting, '~it b,eing thesam~; road IloW 
!!!ading from ~he, pubIi~ road to ~his 
S~'aCt of.1and." ,anqit'yias shown that 
~'r . 
.-1';' 
;J ,. 
.jl ,; 
timbers used in building the well, and 
that there had been erected at the road 
two gates hinged on posts twenty feet 
apart, but it was further shown that 
at some places in the road the used 
portion was wider than at others, the 
narrowest part beingortlyabout seven 
feet and the widest aboqt fifteen feet, 
alld it was further plain tl:iat at ,the 
date of, the deed the necessity for . a' 
twenty-foot gate ,at the high~ay'; foi' 
the purpose 'of haUling of the ' long 
timbers and well piping ha'd loiig sihce 
ceased, the ruling ' made was -that the 
decree of thetriai judge providing 'for 
an unobstructed passage tV\:'entyfeet 
in width at the entrance to tj1e high-
way and for a right of way .of aupi-
, form width of sixteen feet, eight feet 
. on ' each side of a lirie to' ,be ' run by a 
surveyor in. the center of the' old road, 
was not justified, especially' in view of 
the practical interpretatiOn which the 
parties ,had placed upon the language 
granting the road. In fact, in view of 
the' circumstance that plaintiff com-
• phiined not of tl)e·wid.th of the passage 
being re~tricted but of the ereCtion of 
gates, it was concluded that the bill 
shollld siInply be dismissed. ; 
. . W. W. Allen. 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-l0-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an FEES AND COSTS 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
lOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
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::I of Attorney's Fees and Costs.doc 
COMES NOW Defendant and Counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, by 
and through its attorney, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, 
PLL(, and moves pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 12-123, and I. R.C.P. 
54{d)(l)and 54{e}{l1) for an award of attorney's fees against plaintiffs and 
counterdefendants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & 
Heating, LLC . 
This motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that Highway 101 is 
the prevailing party and therefore entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
This motion is based upon this Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees, the Affidavit 
of Bryan D. Smith, the Memorandum of Costs filed hereWith, the Brief In Support Of Award 
Of Attorney's Fees and Costs, and upon the Court's files and records herein. 
Highway 101 requests oral argument. 
DATED this I ~y of June, 2011. 
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-E3~ Bryan D%tth 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I~ne, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be 
served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
lOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-10-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an AND COSTS 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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COMES NOW, defendant and counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, 
by and through its counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm of Smith, Driscoll 
& Associates, PLLC, and moves the court pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 
12-123, and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54{d)(1) and 54{e)(1) for an award of costs 
and attorney's fees. 
I. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. 
(1) Filing Fees: 
a. Notice of Appearance $ 58.00 
(2) Service Fees: 
a. Unfound Service Fees - Dean Moon Subpoena $ 45.00 
(3) Deposition Fees: 
a. Nephi H. Allen taken 1/28/11 $ 679.50 
b. Kenton D. Johnson taken 1/28/11 $ 328.50 
(4) Exhibits: 
a. Color copies of exhibits $ 34.28 
TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED. $ 1,145.28 
Defendant Highway 101 hereby claims as total costs $ 1,145.28 
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Defendant hereby claims as total attorney's fees $16,083.00 
TOTAL FEES AND COSTS: $17,228.28 
To the best of defendant's knowledge and belief, the costs claimed above are 
correct and the costs claimed comply with Rule 54 (d)(5). 
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~/ 
Dated this J.!- day of June, 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
~,",,""-N~'\iItJ.t ,Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Id~f June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be served, 
by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-10-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
Idaho limited liability company, ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
county of Bonneville 
BRYAN D. SMITH, Esq. of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, being first 
duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC in the above-styled action. I obtained a Juris Doctorate 
degree from the McGeorge School of Law, at the University of Pacific, in 1989 and have 
been actively practicing law since then. 
2. I am licensed to practice law in the Courts of Idaho, the United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho, and in the Courts of California. A substantial 
portion of my practice has been devoted to civil litigation. 
3. I submit this Affidavit in Support of defendant's Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are true and accurate time itemizations 
generated by my office for work performed on this case. My time entries are identified 
as BDS entries. B. J. Driscoll's time entries are identified as BJD. 
5. My rate of billing on the above-referenced matter was $185.00 per hour. 
thru December 31,2011 and $195.00 per hour from January 1, 2011 to the present. I 
believe that this hourly rate is reasonable, especially given the amount involved and the 
result obtained, the desirability ofthe case, the nature and length of my professional 
relationship with my client, awards in similar cases, my experience (particularly in the 
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area of law involved in this caseL and the rates charged by other attorneys with 
comparable experience in comparable cases in the southeastern Idaho area. 
6. The rate of billing on the above-referenced matter for B. J. Driscoll, is 
$150.00 per hour. I believe that this hourly rate is reasonable, especially given the 
amount involved and the result obtained, the desirability of the case, awards in similar 
cases, his experience (particularly in the area of law involved in this case), and the rates 
charged by other associate attorneys with comparable experience in comparable cases 
in the southeastern Idaho area. 
7. The attorney's fees as set forth in this affidavit were and are necessarily 
and actually incurred in this action. 
Further sayeth your affiant naught. 
DATED this l~une'2011. _~ ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Iotc day of June, 20 
Notary Publi or Ida 0 
Residing at Idaho Is, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 04/11/17 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
11I(j~ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF ATIORNEY/S FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
[-rtf. S. Mail 
[ 1 Fax 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
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Smh~l, Driscoll & Associates, ."LLC 
414 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
TIN: 82-0518512 
(208) 524-0731 
Invoice submitted to: 
Danny Miller 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
120 Lost Trail Place 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
June 10, 2011 
In Reference To: Rexburg Plumbing & Heating LLC, et al. vs. Highway 101 
Investments, LLC 
Professional Services 
3/12/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of email, complaint, and pictures from client 
received 3/1/2010; telephone conference with Hyrum Erickson; 
telephone conference with client; preparation of notice of 
appearance; letter to Hyrum Erickson; 
3/16/2010 - BJO Consideration of counterclaim, third-party claim, and affirmative 
defense to extinguish right of way; 
- BOS Meet with client; consideration of further handling; telephone 
conference with client; 
3/18/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of email from client received 3/17/2010; 
research regarding forfeiture of easement; preparation of memo; 
email to client; 
- BJO Review warranty deed and easement; consideration of permissible 
scope of express easement; 
3/30/2010 - BOS Preparation of answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaim and 
demand for jury trial; review memos from Barbara Miller; telephone 
conference with Barbara Miller; 
3/31/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of plat from client received 3/29/2010; 
telephone conference with client; receipt and review emails from 
client; revise answer and counterclaim and add claim for trespass; 
emails to client; 
4/7/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of reply to counterclaim received 31712020 from 
Hyrum Erickson; 
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HrslRate Amount 
1.00 185.00 
185.00/hr 
0.40 60.00 
150.00/hr 
1.75 323.75 
185.00/hr 
2.50 462.50 
185.00/hr 
0.30 45.00 
150.00/hr 
3.00 555.00 
185.00/hr 
1.00 185.00 
185.00/hr 
0.15 27.75 
185.00/hr 
Danny Miller 
4/8/2010 - BOS Letter to client; 
5/10/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of notice of service, plaintiffs first request for 
production to defendant, and plaintiffs first set of interrogatories to 
defendant received 5/11/2010 from Hyrum Erickson; 
5/11/2010 - BNZ Review legal documents creating right-of-way and other documents 
in file; preparation of interrogatories and requests for production; 
5/21/2010 - BOS Telephone conference with Barbara Miller; 
6/7/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of emails from Barbara Miller received 6/1/2010 
and 6/2/2010; telephone conference with client; 
6/8/2010 - BOS Preparation of discovery responses; 
6/9/2010 - BOS Review discovery responses (.30); telephone conferences with 
client (.20); preparation of interrogatories and requests for 
production to plaintiffs (.75); preparation of requests for admissions 
to plaintiff (.75); meet with clients (.50); 
6/10/2010 - BOS Complete discovery; preparation of notice of service; 
6/11/2010 - BOS Letter to client; 
6/18/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of notice of service and plaintiffs response to 
defendant's first set of requests for admissions received 6/17/2010 
from Hyrum Erickson; 
6/21/2010 - BOS Letter to Hyrum Erickson; letter to client; 
7/27/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of plaintiffs' supplemental response to 
defendant's first set of requests for admissions, plainitffs' response 
to defendant's first set of requests for production of documents to 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs' answers top defendant's first set of 
interrogatories to plaintiffs received 7/12/2010 from Hyrum 
Erickson; preparation of demand letter to Leischman Electric, Inc. 
9/1/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of letter from Hyrum Erickson received 
9/1/2010; receipt and review of plaintiffs supplemental responses 
to first set of discovery to plaintiff and notice of service received 
9/1/2010 from Hyrum Erickson; 
9/2/2010 - 80S Letter to clients; 
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HrslRate Amount 
0.25 46.25 
185.00/hr 
OAO 74.00 
185.00/hr 
0.75 90.00 
120.00/hr 
0.20 37.00 
185.00/hr 
0.90 166.50 
185.00/hr 
2.75 508.75 
185.00/hr 
2.50 462.50 
185.00/hr 
1.00 185.00 
185.00/hr 
0.25 46.25 
185.00/hr 
0.25 46.25 
185.00/hr 
0.75 138.75 
185.00/hr 
1.00 185.00 
185.00/hr 
OAO 74.00 
185.00/hr 
0.25 46.25 
185.00/hr 
Danny Miller 
11/12/2010 - BOS Meet with clients; 
11/18/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of letter from Greg Moeller received 
11/18/2010; telephone conference with Barbara Miller; 
11119/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of motion for summary judgment, affidavit of 
counsel in support of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and 
brief in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment received 
11/18/2010 from Hyrum Erickson; receipt and review of letter from 
Judge Greg Moeller received 11/18/2010; telephone conference 
with Hyrum Erickson's office; telephone conference with client; 
letter to client; 
12/112010 - BOS Receipt and review of motion requesting voluntary disqualification 
received 12/1/2010; letter to client; letter to client; 
12/6/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of voluntary disqualification received 12/3/2010 
from court; 
12/7/2010 - BOS Letter to clients; 
12/9/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of notice of hearing received 12/9/2010; 
telephone conference with clients; preparation of motion to continue 
hearing on motion for summary judgment, affidavit of Bryan O. 
Smith, and brief in support of motion to continue hearing on motion 
for summary judgment; 
12/13/2010 - BOS Complete motion for Rule 54(f) continuance, brief in support of 
motion, and affidavit of Bryan O. Smith; preparation of notice of 
hearing; preparation of depositions for Kenton Johnson, Nephi 
Allen, Oean Moon, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC; 
12/14/2010 - BOS Letter to client; 
12/15/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of email from Hyrum Erickson received 
12/12/2010; 
12/16/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of order of assignment received 12/3/2010; 
letter to client; 
12/20/2010 - BOS Letter to Madison County Sheriff; 
1/5/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of brief in opposition to Rule 56(f) motion, 
affidavit of Hyrum Erickson, affidavit of Oeann Chadwick received 
1/4/2011 from Hyrum Blackburn; letter to client; 
117/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of letter from Hyrum Erickson received 
1/7/2011; letter to clients; 
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HrslRate Amount 
0.50 92.50 
185.00/hr 
0.25 46.25 
185.00/hr 
1.25 231.25 
185.00/hr 
0.50 
185.00/hr 
0.15 
185.00/hr 
0.25 
185.00/hr 
2.00 
185.00/hr 
1.50 
185.00/hr 
0.25 
185.00/hr 
0.15 
185.00/hr 
0.40 
185.00/hr 
0.25 
185.00/hr 
0.50 
195.00/hr 
0.40 
195.00/hr 
92.50 
27.75 
46.25 
370.00 
277.50 
46.25 
27.75 
74.00 
46.25 
97.50 
78.00 
Danny Miller 
1/11/2011 - BOS Attendance at hearing on motion for continuance of summary 
judgment; telephone conference with client; 
1/13/2011 - BOS Telephone conference with client; 
1/15/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of photos from client received 1/14/2011; 
1/19/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry on Rule 56(f) motion received 
1/19/2011 ; 
1/25/2011 - BOS Meet with clients and prepare for depositions; 
1/26/2011 - BOS Preparation for depositions; 
1/28/2011 - BOS Preparation for and attendance at depositions of Nephi Allen and 
Kenton Johnson; 
2/8/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of depositions of Nephi Allen and Kenton 
Johnston received 2/8/2011 from John Terril; email to client; 
2/9/2011 - BOS Letter to clients; 
3/3/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief and statement of facts in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
3/5/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
preparation of separate statement of facts in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
3/7/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment, 
separate statement of undisputed facts, and motion for summary 
judgment; 
3/8/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, affidavit of Bryan O. Smith, affidavit of Danny Miller, 
notice of hearing, separate statement of undisputed facts, and 
motion for summary judgment; meet with clients; letter to clients; 
3/30/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment; 
3/31/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment; preparation of affidavit of Bryan O. Smith with exhibits; 
receipt and review of answering brief in opposition to Highway 101's 
motion for summary judgment received 3/31/2011; telephone 
conference with client; research for reply brief; 
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HrslRate Amount 
0.75 146.25 
195.00/hr 
0.25 48.75 
195.00/hr 
0.15 29.25 
195.00/hr 
0.15 29.25 
195.00/hr 
3.00 585.00 
195.00/hr 
1.50 292.50 
195.00/hr 
5.00 975.00 
195.00/hr 
0.30 58.50 
195.00/hr 
0.25 48.75 
195.00/hr 
3.50 682.50 
195.00/hr 
6.50 1,267.50 
195.00/hr 
3.50 682.50 
195.00/hr 
1.50 292.50 
195.00/hr 
3.00 585.00 
195.00/hr 
4.50 877.50 
195.00/hr 
Danny Miller 
4/1/2011 - BOS Letter to client; review cases for reply brief; telephone conference 
with client; 
4/5/2011 - BOS Meet with client; 
4/6/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of reply brief received 4/2/2011 from client; 
preparation of reply brief; 
4/7/2011 - BOS Telephone conference with client; preparation of affidavit of 
Barbara Miller; preparation of reply brief; 
4/8/2011 - BOS Letter to client; receipt and review of reply brief in support of 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment received 4/7/2011 from 
Hyrum Erickson; 
4/14/2011 - BOS Preparation for and attendance at hearing on cross motions for 
summary judgment; 
5/6/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of memorandum decision on summary 
judgment received 5/5/2011; telephone conference with client; letter 
to client; 
5/23/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of motion for reconsideration and brief in 
support of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration received 5/23/2011 
from Hyrum Erickson; letter to clients; 
5/31/2011 - BOS Receipt and review of notice of hearing; 
6/1/2011 - BOS Letter to client; 
6/9/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for fees and costs, motion 
for fees and costs, memorandum in support of fees and costs, 
affidavit of Bryan O. Smith and notice of hearing; 
6/10/2011 - BOS Preparation of motion for dismissal, brief in support of motion for 
summary judgment, memorandum of fees and costs, notice of 
hearing on hearing for fees and costs and motion; preparation of 
notice of hearing on motion for dismissal; 
6/30/2011 - BOS Preparation of brief in opposition to motion for reconsideration; 
7/7/2011 - BOS Preparation for and attendance at hearing on motion for 
reconsideration; 
For professional services rendered 
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HrslRate Amount 
2.00 390.00 
195.00/hr 
0.75 146.25 
195.00/hr 
3.75 731.25 
195.00/hr 
2.50 487.50 
195.00/hr 
0.50 97.50 
195.00/hr 
2.50 487.50 
195.00/hr 
0.75 146.25 
195.00/hr 
0.50 97.50 
195.00/hr 
0.15 29.25 
195.00/hr 
0.25 48.75 
195.00/hr 
2.50 487.50 
195.00/hr 
0.75 146.25 
195.00/hr 
2.50 487.50 
195.00/hr 
1.00 195.00 
195.00/hr 
84.35 $16,083.00 
Danny Miller 
Additional Charges: 
3/12/2010 - 80S Paid to: Madison County - filing fee - Notice of Appearance. 
3/25/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
4/23/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
5/25/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
6/11/2010 - 80S Paid to: Copies of maps for exhibits; 
6/25/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
8/25/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
9/24/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
11/25/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
12/24/2010 - 80S Photocopies 
1/1112011 - 80S Paid to: Madison County Sheriff's Office - unfound service fees 
Dean Moon. 
1/25/2011 - 80S Photocopies 
2/8/2011 - 80S Paid to: T&T Reporting - Deposition of Nephi H. Allen taken 1/28/11 
- 80S Paid to: T&T Reporting - deposition of Kenton O. Johnson taken 
1/28/11 
2/16/2011 - 80S Paid to: Westlaw chargeds - January 1-31. 2011; 
2/25/2011 - 80S Photocopies 
3/8/2011 - 80S Paid to: Zip Print - color copies for exhibits. 
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Qty/Price Amount 
1 58.00 
58.00 
9 1.35 
0.15 
41 6.15 
0.15 
15 2.25 
0.15 
1 2.86 
2.86 
340 51.00 
0.15 
60 9.00 
0.15 
89 13.35 
0.15 
233 34.95 
0.15 
147 22.05 
0.15 
1 45.00 
45.00 
94 14.10 
0.15 
1 679.50 
679.50 
1 328.50 
328.50 
1 120.00 
120.00 
312 46.80 
0.15 
1 31.13 
31.13 
Danny Miller 
3/14/2011 - 80S Paid to: Westlaw charges - Feb. 2011. 
3/24/2011 - 80S Photocopies 
3/31/2011 - 80S Paid to: Zip Print - color copies of exhibits 
4/22/2011 - 80S Photocopies 
5/11/2011 - 80S Paid to: Westlaw charges - 04/01/11 - 04/30/11 
5/2512011 - 80S Photocopies 
Total costs 
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Qty/Price Amount 
1 144.00 
144.00 
497 74.55 
0.15 
1 3.15 
3.15 
427 64.05 
0.15 
1 90.00 
90.00 
51 7.65 
0.15 
$1,849.39 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-l0-115 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
The defendant and counterclaim ant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC ("Highway 
101"), files this brief in support of its motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. For 
the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court should award Highway 101 its attorney's 
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123. 
II. HIGHWAY lOllS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S4(d)(1)(A) states that "costs shall be allowed as a 
matter of right to the prevailing party." Rule S4(d)(1)(B) states that "In determining which 
party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought 
by the respective parties." 
Here, this court ruled on summary judgment that Highway 101 use of its property 
did not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff's right of way easement. Thus, Highway 
101 is the prevailing party on the plaintiff's complaint and entitled to an award of costs as 
set forth in the accompanying memorandum of costs. 
III. HIGHWAY lOllS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THE 
PLAINITFFS BROUGHT THEIR COMPLAINT FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY OR 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION. 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 provides as follows: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. 
The term "party" or {(parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
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Idaho Code Section 12-121 "has been limited by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) which provides that in 
order to award attorney's fees under this provision the court must find that the action 
was pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Matter of 
Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho 350, 354 (Idaho App.1985). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that attorney's fees are awardable 
when the plaintiff pursues an action "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212 (2008); Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704 (2008); 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397 (2002); and Makin v. Liddle, 108 Idaho 67 (1985). See 
also Hansen v. Herrero, 137 Idaho 787 (Ct. App. 2002)(Plaintiff acted frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation where he ignored well settled Idaho case law in 
pursuing his claim). 
Idaho Code Section 12-123 provides in relevant part as follows: 
12-123. Sanctions for frivolous conduct in a civil case.--(l) As used in this 
section: 
(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or 
other position in connection with a civil action, or taking any other action in 
connection with a civil action. 
(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his 
counsel of record that satisfies either of the following: 
* * * 
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law 
and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. 
(2)(a) In accordance with the provisions of this section, at any time prior to the 
commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one (21) days after 
the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
TORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - Page 3 
-t of Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
PAGE 490 
attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous 
conduct. (Emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has awarded attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 
12-121 against a party seeking a determination that a guardian was unfit to act as 
guardian. In re Doe, 148 Idaho 432 (2009). The Supreme Court held that the motion 
"was in legal effect a motion to remove [the party] as guardian" and that the party filing 
the motion was basically contending that the governing statute "should be interpreted 
to permit removal if someone else would be a slightly better guardian." Id. In awarding 
the party prevailing against the motion attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-
121, the Supreme Court quoted from the magistrate court as follows: 
Heisses' cross-appeal simply asked this Court to disregard the current 
statutes regarding appointment and removal of guardians and adopt a scheme 
Heisses believed would be more favorable to them. The magistrate court wrote 
that "much of Heiss' case asserting Conti's unfitness did have the appearance of 
'grasping at straws.' This appeal has even less merit." 
In re Doe, supra, 148 Idaho at 441. 
Here, the central issue of the plaintiffs' complaint was whether the sign post and 
bollards could stay or had to go. Highway 101 asked this Court to apply the 
reasonableness test-that is, the issue was whether the sign post and bollards 
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' right of way easement. The plaintiffs totally 
ignored the reasonableness test and asked this Court to apply the per se rule from 
foreign jurisdictions. This court was a little taken aback with this argument stating, "This 
Court, however, is not aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than 
the reasonableness test." Accordingly, this court "concludes the law of Idaho gives 
servient estate owners the right to use their land, but forbids them from unreasonably 
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burdening the privileges ofthe dominant estate owner." See Memorandum Decision 
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 9. 
The plaintiffs' approach was much like the approach in In re Doe, where the 
Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees against a party who simply asked the court to 
disregard applicable Idaho law in favor of law more favorable to the requesting party. 
Thus, on the reasonableness issue, the plaintiffs' argument were not supported in fact 
or warranted under existing law as Idaho Code Section 123 requires. Moreover, at no 
time did the plaintiffs ever make any good faith argument for an extension, modification 
or reversal of existing law as Idaho Code Section 123 requires. Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs' meet the definition of having "frivolously pursued their complaint," and this 
Court should award attorney's fees against the plaintiffs and in favor of Highway 101. 
The only other argument the plaintiffs' made to avoid summary judgment was 
closely connected to their per se rule. The plaintiffs argued that the description in the 
granting language precisely described the entire location of their right of way easement 
identifying all the property they were entitled to use rather than the location of the land 
upon which they could exercise their ingress and egress privilege. The court rejected 
the plaintiffs' tenuous argument because it was not supported in fact: The granting 
language implies a right of way over the property it describes because any other reading 
would give the plaintiffs a fee simple interest to the entire property than a mere 
easement. Plaintiffs obviously do not have a fee simple interest. 
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IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth above, the court should grant Highway 101's motion and 
award Highway attorney's fees and costs against plaintiffs as set forth in the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith and Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs filed concurrently 
DATED this / ~ of June, 2011. herewith. 
By: ----~~T4--~----~-------
Bryan D. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIFIC~Jl~ SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J!!!. :;;; of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
[~U.S. Mail 
[ 1 Fax 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-1O-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and MOTION TO DISMISS 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
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Counterdefendants. 
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COMES NOW Counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and moves the 
court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) for an order dismissing without 
prejudice Counts III, IV and V of the counterclaim. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that this court has 
granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of Highway 101 on the 
issue of IIreasonable use." This means that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their causes 
of action for injunctive relief and damages. Accordingly, judgment should be entered 
against the plaintiffs on their complaint; however, final judgment cannot be entered 
against the plaintiffs because there are remaining causes of action arising from the 
counterclaim. 
In this regard, this court has granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on 
Highway 101's causes of action for Right of Way Forfeiture (Count I) and Unjust 
Enrichment (Count II) leaving Counts III and IV for Trespass and Count V for Equitable 
Recoupment/Estoppel. 
Highway 101 moves to dismiss Counts III, IV, and V from the counterclaim which 
will allow the court to enter a final judgment as to all claims in the complaint and 
counterclaim effectively terminating the litigation before the district court except for 
post judgment issues. 
This motion is based on this Motion, the Notice of Hearing, and on the court's 
records and files. 
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Highway 101 requ~rgument. 
DATED this I (J day of June, 2011. 
Bryan D. S 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIFIC')~F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thif_ctrn_ d~ay of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing in the United States Mait postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexbuf&ldaho 8340 
;s.doc 
1 Overn ight Delivery 
1 Hand Delivery 
Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-IO-115 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS AND OBJECTION TO 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby, 
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) and 54(e), hereby object to Highway 101's 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and object to Highway 101's Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
1. Even if the Court declines to reconsider its opinion, Highway 101 is not the 
prevailing party. 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to reconsider and any determination of prevailing party 
status is premature prior to the Court's ruling on that motion. However, even if the Court 
determines that its original ruling is correct, Highway 101 is not the prevailing party. Prevailing 
party status is not determined on a count by count basis. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I) 
reads as follows: 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the fmal iudgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
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The relief sought by the parties on all claims is as follows: 
By Plaintiffs - a) 
b) 
removal of the sign and bollards 
an undefined amount of damages for the damage to Plaintiff's business by 
the placement of the sign and bollards 
By Highway 101 - a) the forfeiture of the entire right-of-way 
b) 
c) 
compensation for Highway 101's expenses in repaving the right-of-
way 
injunction preventing Plaintiffs Allen, Johnson, and Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating or its clients from crossing a "small strip of 
land" owned by Highway 101, that would have effectively cut off 
access to the business from the right of way. 
In its decision on the parties respective motions for summary judgment the Court granted 
Plaintiff's summary judgment as to Highway 101's claims of forfeiture and unjust enrichment 
and Defendant's summary judgment as to the placement of the sign and bollards. Highway 101 
has subsequently moved to dismiss their claim of trespass. The Court is not required to find that 
there is a prevailing party, rather the rule states that the Court "may" determine that a party 
prevailed. When both parties are partially successful, the Court may determine that there is no 
prevailing party. Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 
(2007). In the action related to the right-of-way, Plaintiff's prevailed on Highway 1 01's assertion 
of forfeiture and Highway 101 prevailed as to the placement of the sign. The Court should find 
that there is no prevailing party as to the claims involving the easement. 
2. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party as to the claim for unjust enrichment and 
forfeiture and are entitled to attorney's fees and costs as to those counterclaims. 
When claims and counterclaims are distinct and discrete, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that the trial court must analyze the claims separately to determine who is the prevailing 
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party. 0 Bar Cattle Co. v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2011 WL 692220, (D.Idaho 2011) (U.S. 
District Court for the District ofIdaho summarizing Idaho Supreme Court case law); Rockefeller 
v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 PJd 450 (Idaho 2003); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 
P .3d 723 (Idaho 2003); Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P .2d 13 81 (1990)). 
The Plaintiff s claims relate to the placement of the sign within the easement. Only Highway 
10 l's claim for forfeiture bears any substantial relation to the Plaintiff s claim. Highway 10 l's 
counterclaims of unjust enrichment and trespass bear no relation to the sign, have no points of 
law, and relatively few facts in common with Plaintiffs complaint regarding the sign. They are 
discrete and distinct claims upon which Plaintiffs have prevailed. Additionally, because the 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment is a discrete and distinct claims, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
attorney's fees on that claim pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 as it was brought and pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. As such, when the case is concluded and judgment is 
entered, Plaintiffs expect to request costs as to Highway 10 l's claim for trespass and costs and 
fees as to the claim for unjust enrichment. 
3. Regardless of prevailing party status, Highway 101 is not entitled to attorney's fees 
as the Plaintiffs' action was not brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-121 "when the 
court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 
235,220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). Plaintiffs have provided various valid arguments in support of 
their position. They have cited extensively to case law that is directly on point from other 
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jurisdictions. Additionally, Plaintiffs have cited to various Idaho decisions that support their 
position. In fact, the Plaintiffs recent motion to reconsider is based entirely on Idaho case law. 
Even if Plaintiffs argument ultimately fails to persuade the Court, it cannot reasonably be said to 
fall within the type of cases to which I.C. § 12-121 is intended to apply. 
4. If Highway 101 is found to be a prevailing party, the costs set out in Highway 101's 
memorandum of costs are unreasonable. 
If Highway 101 is determined to be the prevailing party on any claims, Highway 101 has 
failed to show that discretionary costs claimed were "necessary and exceptional costs" as 
required by I.R.C.P. 54d)(1 )(D). Additionally, Plaintiffs object to Highway 10 l's costs as 
excessive. Highway 101 claims $347.25 in copying fees - 2,315 pages at .15 cents per page. No 
explanation of the nature of these copies is provided. In any event, .15 cents per page for copies 
is not a reasonable charge. Idaho Falls copy centers charge between 6 to 8 cents a page and will 
discount it by a penny a page for large projects. A reasonable amount for copying fees is 7 cents 
per page or $162.05. 
Highway 101 claimed $354.00 as Westlaw charges for various dates. There is no 
indication if this is a percentage of their total Westlaw bill for certain dates or if these are charges 
for accessing specific products. There is no evidence that these charges are necessary or 
exceptional or how and why these charges relate the present case. As such the request should be 
denied. 
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Conclusion 
A determination of prevailing party status is premature at this stage. However, if it does 
rule, the parties have each prevailed as to the other parties claims regarding the easement and no 
party should be found to be the prevailing party for those claims. Plaintiffs prevailed on the 
distinct and discreet claims of trespass and unjust enrichment. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Courtesy Copy 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
/ 
, ~-
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-10-11S 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
Idaho limited liability company, RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS AND OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF 
ATIORNEY'S FEES 
OR RECONSIDERATION - Page 1 
Ir Reconsideration.doc 
PAGE 503 
I. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION CONTAINS NO NEW EVIDENCE OR CASE LAW. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration contains no new evidence or case law. 
Rather, Plaintiffs attempt to have this Court change its decision that "Highway 101 has the 
right to use its servient estate (the Subject Property) in a manner that does not 
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right to use the Subject Property as a 'right-of-
way.1II Frankly, Plaintiffs' arguments are repetitive and contradictory as Highway 101 
explains below. 
II. PLAINTIFFS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THEY CAN PREVENT HIGHWAY 101 FROM USING 
ITS PROPERTY EVEN THOUGH HIGHWAY 101's USE DOES NOT UNREASONABLY 
INTERFERE WITH PLAINITFFS' PRIVILEGE. 
Plaintiffs argue that because this Court found the granting language precisely 
describes the location of the easement, Plaintiffs are entitled to use the entire location of 
the land, including the portions the sign post and bollards occupy. Essentially, Plaintiffs 
argue that they have an express 25 foot wide easement: I/[als a practical matter, the 
Court's Decision says nothing about the privilege granted, but addresses only the location 
by shrinking the size of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating's right-of-way from 25 feet wide, as 
set out in their deed, ta 19 feet. 1/1 
Plaintiffs further argue that "the Court erred when it ruled that Plaintiffs' right-of-
way was solely for the purpose of ingress and egress to their property. Rather, the 
Plaintiffs have the right to pass over the right-of-way regardless of purpose. Their ability 
to access their property is not relevant to the analysis of whether their easement rights 
1 See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-4. 
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have been infringed upon.,,2 However, Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between a privilege 
created by an easement and the location ofthe easement. 
Here, Plaintiffs do not have a 25 foot wide easement. In fact, the granting 
document says nothing about a 25 foot wide easement. This is a fiction Plaintiffs have 
created. Instead, the granting document says Plaintiffs have a right-of-way easement and 
then identifies the property over which the easement runs. If the granting document said 
Plaintiffs have a 25 foot easement, then they would have a good faith argument that the 
Court cannot shrink their easement to 19 feet. Since the granting document does not say 
they have a 25 foot easement, they do not have a good faith argument that the Court has 
shrunk their easement. 
This Court got it exactly right when it concluded: "The privilege created by the 
Easement is a right-ai-way, or a right to use the Subject Property for ingress and egress. 
The legal description contained in the granting language precisely describes the location of 
the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise that privilege. Thus, while the location of the 
Easement is precisely defined, the privilege is stated generally as a "right-of-way." 
(Emphasis in the original.) 
Moreover, Plaintiffs are simply dead wrong that the purpose for their right-af-way 
easement is irrelevant. Idaho law requires that the Court determine whether Highway 
101's use of its property unreasonably interferes with Plaintiffs' use. This necessarily 
requires that the Court consider the purpose for which the Plaintiffs have an easement. 
2 c~~ nl~'~"' •• r' O.'n+'~ C •• ~~n.t nf Dbintiffc' I\Antinn for Reconsideration, p. 4. 
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The Court cannot judge whether Highway 101's use of its property unreasonably 
interferes with Plaintiffs' use unless the Court considers the purpose of Plaintiffs' use. 
For example, if Plaintiffs' use is to haul 25 foot wide farm equipment to its own 
property, then obviously Highway 101's use of its property restricting the width of the 
easement to 19 feet would unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the easement. 
However, Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way is for ingress and egress to Plaintiffs' own 
property and nothing else. The evidence is undisputed that Highway 101's use does not 
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' purpose. 
Obviously, purpose is relevant to determining whether Highway 101's use 
unreasonably interferes with the purpose of Plaintiffs' use. If this Court were to adopt 
Plaintiffs' argument that the purpose ofthe easement is irrelevant, this Court would 
render Idaho's well-established "reasonable use" test a nUllity. Plaintiffs know this. 
Rather than ask the Court to not apply well-established Idaho law, Plaintiffs disguise their 
effort telling the Court that the purpose of Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement is irrelevant. 
Nonsense! 
III. PLAINTIFFS MISAPPLY CASE LAW. 
Plaintiffs rely on Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370 (Ct. App. 1986) for 
the proposition that this Court-like the trial court in Boydstun Beach-committed 
reversible error because "the Court has found that the location of the right is more than 
is necessary-the Plaintiffs do not need the full 25 fees set out in their deeds.,,3 
However, the easement at issue in Boydstun Beach granted express "parking privileges 
3 SRI' Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8. 
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along the entire 200 by 75 foot strip." Id. at 377. Specifically, the granting document 
extended parking privileges "in a southeasterly direction 200 feet from north line of said 
drive, and extending 75 feet in width from the meander line." Id. The trial court ignored 
this express privilege instead limiting parking to a 25 foot strip where access was provided. 
Id. 
The trial court also allowed a fence erected through the 75 foot easement. But the 
appellate court found that this violated the express prohibition against structures. 
Boydstun Beach, supra, 111 Idaho at 378. The trial court also limited a boat dock to only a 
25 foot strip. But the appellate court found that this too violated the express easement to 
"boating and bathing privileges along [the entire] said 200 ft strip." Id. Importantly, the 
appellate court approved the trial court's allowing a gate at the end of the driveway 
easement because there was no express prohibition against obstructions on the driveway 
easement and limiting access to the easement to those with use rights was "sensible." Id. 
In other words, allowing a gate on the access easement was "reasonable" and allowable in 
the absence of an express provision to access of the entire driveway easement. 
Thus, Boydstun Beach continues to support Highway 101's position. Unlike the 
trial court in Boydstun Beach that diminished the express parking, boating, and fenCing 
easements contained in the granting document, this Court has not diminished any express 
grant of privilege for Plaintiffs. However, like the trial court in Boydstun Beach that 
"sensibly" or "reasonably" allowed a gate on the driveway easement in the absence of an 
express provision to access the entire driveway easement, this Court has found that 
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Highway 101's use of its property is "sensible," i.e., "reasonable" in light of the undisputed 
fact that its use does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement. 
Plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Carson v. Elliot, 111 Idaho 889 (Ct. App. 196). 
The court in Carson found that the raised garden unreasonably interfered with the 
plaintiff's right-of-way easement to "access" her garage and with the turning of vehicles in 
the driveway. Specifically, "cars and a boat occasionally required the extra room in the 
circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised garden." Id. at 
891. Plaintiffs argue that striking the raised garden is like striking the sign post and 
bollards. Therefore, this Court should conclude factually like the court in Carson that the 
sign post and bollards unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement. 
However, in Carson the plaintiff "claimed that the garden interfered with access to 
her garage and with the turning of vehicles in the driveway." Carson, supra, 111 Idaho at 
890. Here, as the Court has already found, Plaintiffs have admitted that the sign post and 
bollards do not interfere with their access to their property. Moreover, in Carson, the 
extra room in the circle's center was required to turn around. Drivers did not strike the 
raised garden just because they were not paying attention. They had no choice ifthey 
wanted to turn their vehicle. However, here, according to Nephi Allen, drivers like himself 
have embarrassingly struck the sign post and bollards in plain sight not because they had 
to in order to turn their vehicles, but because they were not paying attention. 
20 Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the 
21 bollard? 
22 A. I tried to get out ofthere pretty quick. 
23 Q. But were you embarrassed? 
24 A. Yeah. I looked around. 
25 Q. So you were embarrassed? 
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Why? 
3 A. It's embarrassing. 
4 Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight 
5 you shouldn't hit it? 
6 A. Maybe4 
* * * 
25 Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit 
1 the sign? 
2 A. They should.5 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the sign post and bollards unreasonably interfere with 
their use of their easement even if they do not unreasonably interfere with ingress and 
egress to their property because the sign post and bollards prevent Plaintiffs from passing 
over that portion of the easement where they are located. This is another way of saying 
that the Court should not apply the reasonableness test that Idaho has applied uniformly. 
Plaintiffs are asking the court to turn a blind eye to whether Highway 101's use of its 
property is reasonable asking the Court instead to apply a bright line test that Idaho does 
not follow. Nor do Plaintiffs make any attempt at a good faith argument why this Court 
should disregard well-established Idaho law and apply the law of some foreign jurisdiction. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH THE MOST APPLICABLE CASE LAW. 
Conspicuously absent from Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is any effort to 
distinguish Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 
Idaho 518 (2001). This case simply tanks Plaintiffs' theories. 
As the Court probably remembers, in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, the 
Idaho Supreme Court applied the "reasonableness test" to an express 40 foot easement. 
4 See Nephi Alien, Depo., 60:20-61:6 attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated June 3D, 
201l. 
5 See Nephi Alien, Depo., 61:25-62:2 attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated June 3D, 
2011. 
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At issue was whether Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and sidewalk within 
an irrigation district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district claimed that 
Washington Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the easement. 
The court concluded that "Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed 
fence would unreasonably inter/ere with its easement, the district court denied NMID's 
injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled to construct the sidewalk and 
fence." Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District., supra, 135 Idaho at 521. (Emphasis added.) 
Importantly, in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, the Idaho Supreme Court 
applied the reasonableness test even though the easement gave NMID an express 40 foot 
easement. This means the Idaho Supreme Court will likely apply the reasonableness test 
to any granting document unless the granting document clearly and unequivocally grants 
an express right to the entire easement regardless of purpose. Obviously, Plaintiffs' 
granting document fails to meet this high standard where it grants a general right-of-way 
privilege. 
V. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE PLAINTIFFS' INVITATION ON THIS MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION TO LITIGATE NOW ANY FUTURE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to change a general easement into a specific easement by 
arguing that such specificity is necessary in order to avoid future litigation. The Court 
should leave to future attorneys, judges, courts and parties, if any, to resolve additional 
disputes. 
First, the whole basis for asking the Court to describe the area over which Plaintiffs 
are entitled to pass is based on speculation to avoid further disputes: It may never 
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happen. Second, if a future dispute arises, the Court can look at that issue then. See 
Boydstun Beach Ass'n, supra, 111 Idaho at 378 ("uses made by the servient and dominant 
owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective 
lands"). Third, Plaintiffs' pleadings do not ask for declaratory relief. In other words, 
Plaintiffs have not raised this issue in their pleadings. The Idaho Supreme Court "has 
repeatedly held that tissues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the 
pleadings.'" Vanvooren v. Austin, 141 Idaho 440, 443 (2005); Beco Const. Co. v. City of 
Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 (1993); and Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 939 (1986). 
Finally, Plaintiffs cite Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530 (2011) for the proposition that 
"any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, 
width, length and location of the easement." However, this Court has not determined the 
existence of an easement. There has never been any dispute that Plaintiffs have an 
easement. Here, the Court has concluded that Highway 101's use of its property does not 
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiff's easement. Plaintiff cites no law that would allow 
the Court to then order prospectively uses that will or will not unreasonably interfere with 
Plaintiffs' use of their easement. Accordingly, the Court should decline Plaintiffs' invitation 
on this motion for reconsideration to litigate here any future disputes between the 
parties. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
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DATED this ~ ~une, 2011. 
By: ____ ~~~--~----_+_=_~~-
Bryan . mith 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIF~VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiS$ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
[ -1 u. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
COUNTY 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-l0-11S 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION 
Idaho limited liability company, TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Bonneville 
BRYAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
(1) I am one of the attorneys for the defendant, Highway 101 Investments in 
the above-referenced matter. 
(2) I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
(3) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit flAil is a true and correct copy of 
the cover page and pages 60-62 ofthe deposition transcript of Plaintiff Nephi Allen, on 
his own behalf and as the 30(b)(6) designee for Plaintiff Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, 
LLC, taken on January 28, 2011. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this '1ot:'t-June, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ..lL-::""-...." 
Notary Public f 
Residing at Idaho s, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 04/11/17 
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OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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Transcript of the Testimony of Nephi H. Allen 
Date: January 28, 2011 
Volume: I 
Case: JOHNSON, et al. VS. HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, INC. 
Printed On: June 30, 2011 
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1 talking about a 25·foot strip, correct? 1 A. Fair enough, 
2 A. Correct. 2 Q. And when you said everybody uses Bron's 
3 Q. With respect to the easement isn't it ' 3 property as part the roadway, that would include your 
4 true that this sign is not in the center, it's not 4 customer's, too, correct? 
5 located near the center of the easement? I' 5 A. Certainly, 
6 A. That's correct. It would be located in 6 Q. And your service vehicles? 
7 the northeast - northwesterly section of the 7 A. Certainly, 
8 easement. 8 Q. And you? 
9 Q. Okay. So when you say in paragraph 9 A. Yes, 
10 11 - or when the complaint says "The sign is located 10 Q. And Kent? 
11 near the center the roadway," in tenns the roadway, 11 A. Yes, 
12 you're talking about Bron Leishman's property, you're 12 Q. And anybody else who wants to access 
13 talking about the easement and even part of Rexburg 13 your property? 
14 Plumbing's property, correct 14 A. Yes, 
15 A. Correct. 15 Q. Yes. How wide is it approximately, 
16 Q. Now, you're treating all three of those 16 from the center of the pole north to Bron Leishman's 
17 parcels as a roadway? 17 building? 
18 A. Well- 18 A. I have no idea. 
19 Q. Is thattrue? 19 MRS, MILLER: The pictures might help. 
20 A. Yes. Yes. 20 Can-
21 Q. All right. But if we look at the 21 MR. SMITH: Can I have Exhibit 6? 
22 specifics, if we look at the easement Highway 101 22 MR. JOHNSON: His building don't go that far 
23 did not put the sign in the middle of the easement 23 west. 
24 did it? 24 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it doesn't even go to the 
25 A. No. 25 building. Kent is right. There is no building north 
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1 Q. Would you agree that they placed the 1 of the pole. 
2 sign about as near north of the edge of the easement 2 MR. JOHNSON: His customers dbn't have no 
3 as they could? 3 problem with it. 
4 A. I believe it is several feet away from 4 THE WITNESS: There you go. His building is 
5 the edge of the easement. 5 not north of the pole. 
6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. (By Mr. Smith) All right Paragraph 12 
7 A. On the north side of the easement. 7 says "The Plaintiffs are currently being damaged by 
~ Q 8 Q. All right 8 the presence of the sign." And as I understand your 
z I- 9 A. So several feet away from Bron's 9 testimony, the damage is is that you cannot use the 
C§ ~ 10 property. 10 exact location where the pole and the bollards are Zw 
w 9 11 Q. Well, if you look at Exhibit 5, doesn't 11 located? 
Ll.V) ~ 6 12 the exhibititselfshow that it's approximately - 12 A. Yes. And-
LI. u 13 the center of the pole atleas~ is approximately 13 Q. Yes. ow 
f- 0:: 14 five feetfrom the edge of the easement; is that 14 A. - our customers hit that sign. And when 
C5 C5 15 correct 15 we have customers hit that sign, I don't think they 
~ ~ 16 A. There you go. 16 want to come back and visit us. Whether it be from 
~ Q 17 Q. Now, do you agree with that? Is that 17 embarrassment, or whether they don't want to hit the 
~ b 18 about what it is? 18 sign again, or what have you. We - we don't believe E ~ 19 A. Sure. 19 that sign is helping our customers either, so. 
~ w.. 20 Q. Leaving approximately 19 or 20 feet to 20 Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the 
V)u.. 
Cl;::: 21 the south for the easement use, correct? 21 bollard? 
~ ~ 22 A. Nineteen point three four. 22 A. I tried to get out of there pretty quick. 
~ a: 23 Q. All right So when the complaint talks 23 Q. But were you embarrassed? 
~ ~ 24 about "The sign being in the center the roadway," 24 A. Yeah. I looked around. 
o 2: 25 it's not the center of the easemen~ is it? 25 Q. So you were embarrassed? 5 g ~ Page 58 Page 60 
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1 A. Yeah. 1 A. Sure. Why not? 
2 Q. Why? 2 Q. And you think that's reasonable? 
3 A. It's embarrassing. ! 3 MR. ERICKSON: I've got to object. I don'! 
4 Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight 4 think that's consistent with the testimony. 
5 you shouldn't hit it? 5 The original question was ''what is the 
6 A. Maybe. 6 damage that's been done to the property?" 
7 Q. Okay. Well, if it's such in plain sight 7 MR. SMITH: Well, I know. That was a 
8 and your customers shouldn't hit it, why is that your 8 question about eight minutes ago, but now we're 
9 problem? 9 talking about - he says he's got further damages and 
I 10 A. Well, because when you have a guy that . 10 that's because he says his customers hit this sign 
11 pulls in there every day for nine years and then he 11 because they're not looking. 
12 forgets about having that sign back there that wasn't 12 Q. (By Mr. Smith) Isn't that what you 
13 there, you can see how we're creatures of habit. And 13 said? 
14 that building has been there since 1980. I've had a 14 A. I said they hit it. 
15 lot of customers that use that building for different 15 Q. Yes. And you said-
16 businesses before we were there. 16 A. I don't know the reason why they hit it, 
17 They pull in - you know, you can see 17 sir. I really don't. 
18 how creatures of habit would pull in, we back out 18 Q. Wouldn't you agree that if you're 
19 without looking just because we have been there 19 looking that you shouldn't hit the sign? 
20 before, so. 20 A. It's possible. You know, there is such a 
21 Q. So are you saying you want Highway 101 21 thing as blind spots, is there not? 
22 to move the sign because people hit it without 22 MR. SMITH: Can I see Exhibit 6 again? 
23 looking? 23 THE WITNESS: I had two people hit it 
24 A. No. 24 yesterday. 
25 Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit 25 Q. (By Mr. Smith) Take a look at Exhibit 
Page 61 Page 63 
PAGE 62 ======== _____ -=jJ rr== PAGE 64 ___ ===========-=jJ 
1 the sign? 1 6.2. Can you show me where the blind spot is around 
2 A. They should. 2 the pole? . 
3 Q. Okay. And so because your customers 3 A. Maybe if I was in my car I could. 
4 don't bother to look, you think Highway 101 should 4 Q. But you can't show on Exhibit 6.2? 
5 move its sign? 5 A. There's no car there. 
6 A. That's not why I want the sign moved. 6 Q. So is the blind spot on the car or on 
7 Q. Okay. So the fact that your customers 7 the pole? 
~ 6 8 hit it really is irrelevant? 8 A. The blind spot would be in the person's 
~ ~ 9 A. No, it is relevant. 9 car, would it not, if you're sitting in the driver's 
c3 ffi 10 Q. But you just said the reason they hit it 10 seat? So now you're saying that because there's 
~ 9 11 is because they don't look. 11 blind spots in people's cars, Highway 101 should move 
u.. Vl 
LU z 12 A. That might be one of tile reasons, yes. 12 the sign. Is that what you're saying? 
~ 8 13 Q. And what are the other reasons? 13 A. I don't believe I'm saying that. 
~ ~ 14 A. I just told you. Because they're 14 Q. All right Can you identify one 
~ ~ 15 creatures of the habit. 15 customer who has not engaged in a purchase or has not 
~ ~ 16 Q. Because they've developed a habit - 16 done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the sign 
~ Q 17 A. They didn't need to look. 17 and the bollards are located where they are? 
~ b ·8 Q. Why don't they need to look? 18 A. I cannot. E ~ i 9 A. Do you look when you back out of the 19 Q. So nobody ever came to you and said, 
~ w.. ~O garage to see if there's a truck there? 20 "Hey, you've got that sign out there, and I think 
~ ~?1 Q. I look if I don't want to hit it 21 it's a nuisance," or "It's a problem," or "I can't 
~ ~?2 So as I understand what you're saying is 22 drive over that spot," or for any reason, ''We're not 
~ ~ ?3 is that because your customers aren't looking, and 23 going to do business with you." 
~ ~ 24 because they've developed habits to drive where the 24 Can't find anybody? 
o z 25 sign is, you think Highway 101 should move the sign? 25 A. I've had lots of people say everything 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-10-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING 
Idaho limited liability company, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
CounterciaimtJnt, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION Motion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to 
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THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Dane H. 
Watkins, Jr., District Judge on July 7,2011, with plaintiffs appearing by and through 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq., of the firm Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered, and defendant 
appearing by and through Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, 
PLLC; and the Court having reviewed its files, considered oral arguments from counsel, 
and otherwise being fully advised on the premises orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 
MADE AND ENTERED this~ day of July, 2011. 
APPROVED: 
i/6Y#Z t;e-z/ Hyr~ D. Erickson, Esq. 
Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
; Motion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this If~day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope 
and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. [ vf"U. S. Mail 
SMITH, DRISCOLL [ ] Fax 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC [ ] Overnight Delivery 
P.O. Box 50731 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, 1083405-0731 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. ['-tLI. S. Mail 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, [ ] Fax 
Chartered [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ ] Hand Delivery 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
· ~l(}).) 
----- --....... - •• " .... " ... ,""n "'''''' .. ,c,nI:DI\TIfU.1 1\1\11) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
lotion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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1 14:23 FAX 12085294166 Smith Driscoll & Assoc's 
THIS COURT having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated May 5, 2011; and having subsequently granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V from the counterclaim; 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment 
be entered in favor of the defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and against the 
plaintiffs, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, on 
plaintiffs' complaint; and that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Kenton D. 
Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, on defendant's 
counterclaim, with no party recovering any damages nor any relief as sought for in the 
complaint or counterclaim. 
MADE AND ENTERED this ~ day of July, 2011. 
APPROVED: 
Hyrum . Erickson, Esq. 
Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Han. Dane H. Watkin , 
District Judge 
~004 
JUDGMENT 
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! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -0 U. S. Mail 
SMITH, DRISCOLL [ ] Fax 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC [ ] Overnight Delivery 
P.O. Box 50731 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, 1083405-0731 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. -r] u. S. Mail 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, [ ] Fax 
Chartered [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ ] Hand Delivery 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Clerk of the Court 
Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MADISON COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby, 
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd., pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d), move the Court for an award of costs and 
attorney's fees as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are prevailing parties as to Highway 101 's various counterclaims. 
Highway 101 brought the following causes of action against the Plaintiff: 1) Right of 
Way Forfeiture - seeking to declare the right of way non-existent; 2) Unjust Enrichment-
seeking to force Plaintiffs to pay an undefined amount of money as result of Highway 101's 
improvements to the right-of-way; 3) Trespass - seeking undefined damages and an injunction 
preventing Plaintiffs from traversing the alleged "small strip of property". Highway 101 was 
unsuccessful on all of its counterclaims. The Court granted summary judgment as to the claims 
of unjust enrichment and forfeiture and Highway 101 moved the court to dismiss the claim for 
trespass. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that defeating a claim is as important to a 
prevailing party analysis as winning a money judgment. 
Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that 
a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. 
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Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 PJd 
130, 133 (Idaho, 2005). Plaintiffs prevailed as to all claims brought by the Highway 101. 
2. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) reads as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party an entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final iudgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Although the majority of the parties' effort and argument in this matter have been related to the 
Plaintiffs' cause of action of seeking the removal of the sign, the amount of time or attention paid 
to a particular matter is not the basis on which a prevailing party decision is made. Rather, the 
Court must determine the prevailing party "in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties." Id The relief sought by the Plaintiffs was precise and limited - the removal of the sign 
and a unspecified amount of damages related to its placement. The relief sought by Highway 101 
was broad and sweeping - the forfeiture of the entire easement. If Highway 101 had prevailed as 
to its claim, it would have essentially destroyed Plaintiffs' business. While Plaintiffs greatly 
desire the removal of the sign, its importance is dwarfed by the possibility that the entire 
easement could have been forfeited. Although Plaintiffs' sought damages related to the 
placement of the sign, those damages were slight in relation to the damages sought by Highway 
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101 in its unjust enrichment claim or the consequences that would have resulted had Highway 
101 been successful in preventing Plaintiffs from accessing their property based on the "small 
strip ofland" alleged in its trespassing claim. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(I), based on the "final 
judgment in relation to the relief sought by the parties," Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. 
3. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party as to the claim for unjust enrichment and 
forfeiture and are entitled to attorney's fees and costs as to those counterclaims. 
When claims and counterclaims are distinct and discrete, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that the trial court must analyze the claims separately to determine who is the prevailing 
party. 0 Bar Cattle Co. v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2011 WL 692220, (D.Idaho 2011) (U.S. 
District Court for the District ofIdaho summarizing Idaho Supreme Court case law); Rockefeller 
v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (Idaho 2003); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 
P.3d 723 (Idaho 2003); Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,794 P.2d 1381 (1990)). 
Highway 101 's claims for unjust enrichment and forfeiture are distinct and discrete and, as they 
were brought unreasonably and without foundation, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
The cause of action for forfeiture was brought without foundation. In support of the 
cause of action Highway 101 provided no evidence that supported its claim for forfeiture. The 
totality of its argument regarding forfeiture was a citation to a Wisconsin case that, although it 
does contain the language quoted by Highway 101, does not have anything to do with forfeiture 
of an easement. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 0-11 (citing Grygiel 
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v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 2010). The Court in the Wisconsin 
case cited did not grant forfeiture and the parties were not even seeking forfeiture of an easement. 
There was no evidence presented that the Plaintiffs behavior regarding the easement was 
inconsistent with prior uses and no legal argument made in support of the cause of action. 
The cause of action for unjust enrichment was brought without foundation. Unjust 
enrichment is a well established cause of action in Idaho. The standard for unjust enrichment is 
clearly set out in Idaho case law. Highway 101 failed to provide either evidence or argument in 
support of its cause of action. It cited to no case law, in or out ofIdaho, in support of its 
contention that Plaintiffs should be required to pay a portion of the improvements. Opposition to 
Plaint!ff's Motion/or Summary Judgment, 12. Idaho case law is clear that one may not force a 
benefit upon another and then require payment based on unjust enrichment. Curtis v. Becker, 
130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (Ct.App. 1997)(explaining "officious intermeddler" rule); 
Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 372,374 
(Ct.App.l989) (adopting Restatement (First) of Restitution § 2 (1937); Teton Peaks Inv. Co., 
LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394,398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Idaho,2008). Given Highway 101 IS 
failure to provide any factual support or legal argument in support of its claim for unjust 
enrichment, the Court should find that it was brought unreasonably and without foundation and 
award costs and fees. 
Although these causes of action were without foundation, because they carried with them 
such serious consequences to the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs were required to spend the time and 
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resources to respond thoroughly and completely. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees incurred 
in the defense of these causes of action. 
Conclusion 
Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the matter as a whole and should be awarded costs. 
In addition, because the counterclaims of forfeiture and unjust enrichment were distinct, discrete, 
and brought without a basis in law or fact, Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees pursuant to I.e. 
12-121 as to those counts. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
Hyru 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Courtesy Copy 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~~----~~~----~t~~l;2m1 
MADISON ~~=:~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-10-115 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, and through their attorney of record, 
Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered, hereby submit the following 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) 
and 54(e), and Idaho Code § 12-120. This is based upon the "Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson in 
Support of Memorandum of Costs" filed simultaneously herewith. 
Non Discretionary Costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) 
Filing fee 
Service of Process 
Deposition Costs to T &T Reporting 
Total Costs 
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$88.00 
$40.00 
$494.40 
$622.40 
Attorney Fees 
(See attached Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson) 
Total Attorney Fees 
Total Attorney Fees and Costs 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
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$1,000.00 
$1,622.40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Courtesy Copy 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-1O-115 
AFFIDAVIT OF HYRUM ERICKSON IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Madison. ) 
Hyrum Erickson, being first dully sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult, competent to testifY to the matters contained herein. 
2. I am the attorney of record for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in the above entitled 
action. 
4. Attached as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct 
itemization of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by my clients concerning this action. 
5. To the best of my knowledge and belief the items described herein are correct and the 
costs are in compliance with LR.C.P. 54. 
5. During the course of this matter, I billed my time at the rate of$125 per hour. Other 
attorney's in the law firm billed their time at a slightly higher rate. 
6. I spent approximately 8 hours responding to Highway 101 's claims for unjust 
enrichment and forfeiture. This amounts to $1,000 out of the total attorney's fees of$13,700.79. 
This includes researching the claims, drafting applicable portions in the memorandum supporting 
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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, reviewing Highway 101's response to the motion for 
summary judgment, researching and drafting a reply to Highway 101's response, and researching 
and drafting the motion for costs and fees .. 
7. All costs and attorney fees requested in this matter were reasonably incurred. 
8. These fees are reasonable given the time and labor required. The rates charged are 
quite low for attorneys in southeastern Idaho. The time was reasonable. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN To before me this 8th day of August, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIA TES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Courtesy Copy 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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) 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, CHARTERED 
25 North 2nd East - P.O. Box 250 
Rexburg, 10 83440-0250 
Invoice submitted to: 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
KENTON JOHNSON 
NEPHI ALLEN 
PO BOX 759 
REXBURG, 1083440 
August 08, 2011 
In Reference To: REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING v. Highway 101 
Investments 
E 19695 
Opened: 9/23/09 
Professional Services 
9/22/2009 Telephone conference w/client; research; Letter to opposing counsel; 
Consultation with Jerry Rigby 
9/24/2009 Attempt to contact opposing counsel 
11/20/2009 Draft complaint 
11/23/2009 Consultation with Jerry Rigby 
11/25/2009 Draft complaint 
12/14/2009 File Review; Attempt to contact client 
12/15/2009 Telephone conference w/client; Consultation with Jerry Rigby; edit complaint; 
letter (email) client 
2/15/2010 File Review; Letter to Client 
2/19/2010 Telephone conference w/client ; edit complaint 
3/3/2010 Receipt and review return of service; calendar dates for default; Letter to Client 
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HrslRate 
1.78 
125.00/hr 
Amount 
222.50 
0.05 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
1.20 
125.00/hr 
150.00 
0.17 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
1.13 
125.00/hr 
141.25 
0.15 NO CHARGE 
125.00lhr 
0.57 71 .25 
125.00lhr 
0.20 25.00 
125.00/hr 
0.23 28.75 
125.00lhr 
0.27 33.75 
125.00/hr 
I 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
3/12/2010 Tel. call w/opposing counsel re: filing an answer, requested he file a notice of 
appearance 
3/15/2010 Receipt and review Letter from opposing counsel and notice of appearance; 
Letter to Client 
3/31/2010 Receipt and review letter (email) from client; letter (email) client; 
4/1/2010 Receipt and review Answer and Counterclaim; letter (email) client 
4/2/2010 Receipt and review of Answer and Counteclaim; prepare reply 
4/5/2010 Telephone conference w/client; draft reply; draft interrogatories; letter (email) 
client 
4/6/2010 Consultation with client re: situation and drafting settlement agreement 
4/16/2010 Receipt and review voicemail from client; research self help and right to move 
sign; Consultation with Rich Andrus; letter (email) client 
4/19/2010 Draft settlement agreement; letter (email) client 
4/22/2010 Telephone conference w/client 
4/16/2010 Consultation 
4/27/2010 letter (email) Jerry Rigby re: consultation on complaint and answer views on 
case 
5/3/2010 Consultation with Jerry Rigby 
6/14/2010 Receipt and review answers to interrogatories and requests for 
production/admissions; Letter to Client; review discovery request 
6/16/2010 Draft response to requests for adm issions; Telephone call with client 
6/23/2010 Receipt and review letter from opposing counsel; research re: response to 
requests for admissions; draft letter to opposing counsel (not sent); letter 
(email) Jerry Rigby 
6/30/2010 Telephone conference w/client; prepare responses 
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Hrs/Rate Amount 
0.05 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
0.33 
125.00/hr 
0.05 
125.00/hr 
0.18 
125.00/hr 
1.23 
125.00/hr 
2.18 
125.00/hr 
0.75 
125.00/hr 
2.30 
125.00/hr 
0.73 
125.00/hr 
0.28 
125.00/hr 
0.20 
140.00/hr 
0.28 
125.00/hr 
41.25 
NO CHARGE 
22.50 
153.75 
272.50 
93.75 
287.50 
91.25 
35.00 
NO CHARGE 
35.00 
0.33 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
0.85 
125.00lhr 
0.45 
125.00lhr 
1.15 
125.00/hr 
1.02 
125.00/hr 
106.25 
56.25 
143.75 
127.50 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
7/1/2010 Draft responses to discovery 
7/2/2010 Consultation with client and completing responses to discovery (reduced 30 
minutes for non-case conversation); drafting/editing responses 
7/6/2010 Draft responses to discovery; review Defendant's documents produced in 
discovery 
7/7/2010 Review Defendant's documents; Attempt to contact client; Attempt to contact 
client; Telephone call with client 
7/8/2010 Receipt and review voicemail from client 
7/9/2010 Prep. response to discovery; Telephone call with client; signing and mailing 
6/29/2010 Receipt and review and reply to discovery questions issue. 
6/24/2010 Review email and letter from Hyrum re: requests for admissions; email Hyrum; 
Consultation re: discovery 
8/3/2010 Draft motion for summary judgment 
8/9/2010 Draft brief in support of motion for summary judgment 
8/10/2010 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
8/11/2010 Draft affidavits; transfer photos 
8/16/2010 Consultation with Bron Leishman; Consultation with Jerry Rigby 
8/30/2010 Draft supplemental response to request for production of documents 
9/7/2010 Draft brief 
10/18/2010 Attempt to contact client 
10/19/2010 Telephone call with client;Review and edit brief; email clients 
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Hrs/Rate Amount 
0.25 31.25 
125.00/hr 
2.23 278.75 
125.00/hr 
3.52 440.00 
125.00/hr 
0.38 47.50 
125.00/hr 
0.05 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
1.63 203.75 
125.00/hr 
0.20 35.00 
175.00/hr 
1.00 NO CHARGE 
175.00/hr 
0.75 93.75 
125.00/hr 
0.78 97.50 
125.00/hr 
3.08 385.00 
125.00/hr 
1.08 135.00 
125.00/hr 
1.60 200.00 
125.00/hr 
0.35 43.75 
125.00/hr 
2.52 315.00 
125.00/hr 
0.05 6.25 
125.00/hr 
0.17 21.25 
125.00/hr 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
11/12/2010 Draft affidavit and motion for summary judgment 
11/15/2010 Drafting and editing affidavit and brief 
11/16/2010 Draft and edit documents; letter (email) client 
11/17/2010 Draft motion for summary judgment affidavit and attachments; file motion 
11/19/2010 Receipt and review message from opposing counsel re: he would like to 
postpone summary judgment hearing until he can schedule depositions 
11/29/2010 Receipt and review notice of prior association; file review re: dates the firm 
started on the matter and dates Judge Moeller left the firm; prepare motion for 
voluntary recusal 
11/30/2010 Draft order and motion 
12/3/2010 Consultation with Jerry Rigby 
11/15/2010 Receipt and review docs and make comments. 
12/10/2010 Telephone call with client; email opposing counsel; letter (email) client 
12/20/2010 Receipt and review filings from opposing counsel; schedule 
12/22/2010 Receipt and review filings and motion; Letter to Client; calendar 
12/31/2010 Draft brief and affidavits in oppostion to rule 56(f) motion 
1/1/2011 Draft brief re: opposition to motion to postpone summary judgment 
1/3/2011 Consultation with Jerry Rigby re: brief in opposition to 56(f) motion 
1/4/2011 Draft affidavit and file; research re: subpeonas and depositions; Telephone 
conference with Dean Moon 
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Hrs/Rate 
1.85 
125.00/hr 
1.50 
125.00/hr 
0.52 
125.00/hr 
0.67 
125.00/hr 
0.13 
125.00/hr 
0.43 
125.00/hr 
0.20 
125.00/hr 
0.05 
125.00/hr 
0.20 
185.00/hr 
0.67 
125.00/hr 
0.22 
125.00/hr 
0.73 
125.00/hr 
4.37 
125.00/hr 
1.00 
125.00/hr 
0.27 
125.00/hr 
2.03 
125.00/hr 
Page 4 
Amount 
231.25 
187.50 
65.00 
83.75 
16.25 
53.75 
25.00 
NO CHARGE 
37.00 
83.75 
27.50 
91.25 
546.25 
125.00 
33.75 
253.75 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
1/5/2011 Attempt to contact Dean Moon; Consultation with Jerry Rigby; Attempt to 
contact Dean Moon;Telephone conference with Dean Moon; draft Letter to 
opposing counsel; letter (email) Jerry Rigby 
1/10/2011 Preparing for hearing 
1/11/2011 Travel; court appearance re: motion to postpone summary judgment hearing; 
Travel; Letter to Client 
1/27/2011 File Review; Telephone call with client; Consultation with client re: depositions 
tommorow 
1/28/2011 Travel; attend depositions; Travel (from 8:00 to 3:30 minus an hour lunch) 
1/5/2011 Consultation with Hyrum Erickson 
1/3/2011 Consultation; Reviewing brief 
3/2/2011 Reviewing depositions 
3/11/2011 Receipt and review motion for summary judgment and supporting docs; 
Consultation with client; Research; 
3/14/2011 Letter to client; calendar deadlines 
3/25/2011 Preparing response to motion for summary judgment 
3/28/2011 Draft brief 
3/29/2011 Re: briefing 
3/30/2011 Draft brief 
3/31/2011 Draft and file brief; email client 
4/1/2011 Receipt and review brief in opposition to summary judgment 
4/6/2011 Draft brief 
!\FFIDAVIT OF HYRUM ERICKSON IN SUPPORT OF 
V1EMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES 
)AGE 544 
Hrs/Rate 
0.48 
125.00/hr 
Page 5 
Amount 
60.00 
0.10 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
2.10 262.50 
125.00/hr 
1.23 153.75 
125.00/hr 
6.50 812.50 
125.00/hr 
0.20 37.00 
185.00lhr 
0.20 37.00 
185.00/hr 
0.28 35.00 
125.00/hr 
1.33 166.25 
125.00/hr 
0.33 41.25 
125.00/hr 
0.10 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
3.40 425.00 
125.00/hr 
2.08 260.00 
125.00/hr 
5.23 653.75 
125.00/hr 
3.42 427.50 
125.00/hr 
0.10 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
2.90 362.50 
125.00/hr 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
4/7/2011 Drafting and filing reply brief 
4/11/2011 Telephone conference w/client 
4/12/2011 Attempt to contact court personnel 
4/14/2011 Prepare for hearing 
4/512011 Preparing brief 
4/8/2011 Receipt and review briefing by Highway 101 
4/14/2011 Appearance at court hearing oral argument on summary judgment; and Travel 
3/31/2011 Edit and revise docs. 
4/25/2011 Reviewing Supreme Court's latest easement cases 
5/6/2011 Receipt and review Memorandum Decision and Order and Receipt and review 
e-mail from 
5/9/2011 Research regarding Court's Memorandum 
5/11/2011 Reviewing and Consultation 
5/20/2011 Reviewing 
5/10/2011 Consultation with Jerry Rigby; Research regarding definition of "right of way" 
5/16/2011 Attempt to contact client; research 
5/17/2011 Telephone conference w/client; Research 
5/18/2011 Draft motion to reconsider 
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Hrs/Rate Amount 
4.77 596.25 
125.00/hr 
0.23 28.75 
125.00/hr 
0.05 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
2.58 322.50 
125.00/hr 
0.20 25.00 
125.00/hr 
0.70 87.50 
125.00/hr 
2.00 250.00 
125.00/hr 
0.30 55.50 
185.00/hr 
0.37 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
1.05 131.25 
125.00/hr 
1.00 125.00 
125.00/hr 
0.40 56.00 
140.00/hr 
0.30 42.00 
140.00/hr 
1.26 157.50 
125.00/hr 
1.33 166.25 
125.00/hr 
1.27 158.75 
125.00/hr 
1.36 170.00 
125.00lhr 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
5/19/2011 Draft and Research motion to reconsider 
5/20/2011 Draft motion to reconsider; Consultation with Rich Andrus and Consultation with 
Rob Wood 
6/13/2011 Receipt and review motion for attorneys fees and costs and supporting 
documents; Preparing motion to dismiss 
6/14/2011 Telephone conference with various copy centers 
6/20/2011 Research and calendar deadline to object to costs and fees 
6/21/2011 Draft brief re: costs and fees 
6/22/2011 Research and draft objection to attorneys fees and costs; Reviewing Supreme 
courts latest easement cases 
7/412011 Receipt and review opposition to motion to reconsider 
7/5/2011 Telephone conference w/client 
7/6/2011 Prepare for hearing 
7/7/2011 Prepare for hearing; Travel; Appearance at court hearing on motion to 
reconsider 
Re: time at hearing spent on attorneys fees and motion to dismiss 
7/12/2011 Receipt and review proposed order and juegment 
7/13/2011 Receipt and review email re: draft of judgment 
7/18/2011 Receipt and review revised proposed judgment 
7/20/2011 Receipt and review proposed order and judgment; review, sign & return to 
opposing counsel 
7/27/2011 Receipt and review signed order and judgment; draft letter to client re: appeal 
\FFfDAVIT OF HYRUM ERICKSON IN SUPPORT OF 
VlEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
)AGE 546 
Hrs/Rate 
0.45 
125.00/hr 
2.46 
125.00/hr 
0.42 
125.00/hr 
0.17 
125.00/hr 
0.13 
125.00/hr 
1.67 
125.00/hr 
1.50 
125.00/hr 
0.17 
125.00/hr 
0.10 
125.00lhr 
0.75 
125.00/hr 
Page 7 
Amount 
56.25 
307.50 
52.50 
21.25 
16.25 
208.75 
187.50 
21.25 
NO CHARGE 
93.75 
5.00 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
0.25 
125.00/hr 
31.25 
0.17 NO CHARGE 
125.00/hr 
0.05 
125.00/hr 
0.05 
125.00/hr 
0.15 
125.00/hr 
1.83 
125.00/hr 
6.25 
6.25 
18.75 
228.75 
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING 
8/3/2011 Draft and research motion re: costs and fees and associated memorandum and 
affidavit 
8/8/2011 Draft motion, affidavit, and memorandum re: costs and fees 
For professional services rendered 
Additional Charges: 
2/19/2010 Filing fee - Madison County Clerk of the Court - Complaint 
Page 8 
Hrs/Rate Amount 
3.18 397.50 
125.00/hr 
1.10 137.50 
125.00/hr 
121.34 $14,230.75 
88.00 
2/28/2010 Service 'of Process - Bonneville County Sheriff's Office - Summons & Complaint - Paper ID: 
201001073 - Case No: CV10115 
40.00 
1/28/2011 Deposition costs - T & T Reporting - Invoice #9575A 
Total additional charges 
For professional services rendered 
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494.40 
$622.40 
121.34 $14,853.15 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -IS8 # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-l0-U5 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
1/I0TION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
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Counterdefendants. 
ts.doc 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Highway 101, and moves this Court pursuant to Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure S4(d)(6) for an order disallowing the attorney's fees and costs 
plaintiff seeks in its Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs are not 
the all overall prevailing parties and therefore not entitled to recover any costs. This 
motion is made further on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to recover any attorney's fees even assuming they were the overall prevailing 
party because Plaintiffs cannot establish any right to entitlement of attorney's fees. 
This motion is based on this Motion, the Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Disallow Costs, the Not~aring, and on the Court's records and files herein. 
DATED this --I..U- day of August, 2011. 
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Bryan D. mith 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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CERTIFICAWRVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jf day of August, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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[-1~Mail [-1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
osts.doc 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Drisco", Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
PAGE 551 
Case No. CV-l0-115 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS 
Page 1 
Motion to Disallow Costs.doc 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Plaintiff sued Highway 101 for injunctive relief and damages arising from 
Highway 101's placement of a signpost and bollards on Highway 101's property but 
within an ingress and egress easement in favor of Plaintiff. Highway 101 filed an answer 
and counterclaim. Both Plaintiff and Highway 101 have filed motions for costs and 
attorney's fees, and both claim to be prevailing parties. Highway 101 files this brief 
opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
II. ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFFS PREVAILED ON SOME CLAIMS, PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE 
"OVERALL PREVAILING PARTY" BECAUSE HIGHWAY 101 PREVAILED IN "THE 
ACTION." 
"A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and 
may, in some cases, also be awarded discretionary costs and attorney fees." Shore v. 
Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,914 (2009). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The 
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion 
the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
conSidering all ofthe issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant 
judgment or judgments obtained. 
"In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims 
between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed {in the action'; that is, 
the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a 
claim-by-claim analYSis." Shore, supra, 146 Idaho at 914. In determining who prevailed 
"in the action," the court is to look at whether there is a "primary issue in the case" and 
determine who won that primary issue. Id. at 915. The court should not focus on claims 
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that are dismissed as lIunnecessary" to the primary issue in the case especially where 
the court never makes any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id. A court can also 
give less or more weight to claims depending on whether the party IIvigorously pursued" 
the claims. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 539 (2010). 
Here, this Court should determine, if it can, whether there was a IIprimary issue" 
in the action and then decide who won that primary issue. Obviously, whether Highway 
101 had to remove the signpost and bollards was the IIprimary issue" in the action. The 
Plaintiffs essentially concede as much in their brief when they state lithe majority of the 
parties' effort and argument in this matter have been related to the plaintiffs' cause of 
action of seeking the removal of the sign." See Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, p. 3. Thus, the lIoverall prevailing party" in the action is 
Highway 101 because it won the primary issue in the case. 
Plaintiffs mistakenly claim they are the prevailing party by looking at who 
prevailed on a claim-by-claim basis. However, the Court determines the prevailing party 
question from an "overall view/, not by a claim-by-claim analysis. Shore, supra, 146 
Idaho at 914. Moreover, of the five claims Highway 101 asserted, Highway 101 
voluntarily dismissed three of them. Under Shore, the Court has discretion to give very 
little weight to these claims especially since the Court entered no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law regarding these claims. 
As for the remaining forfeiture and unjust enrichment claims, Highway 101 
asserted the forfeiture claim as an affirmative defense in its answer and only raised 
forfeiture in the counterclaim to get an affirmative declaration/judgment if forfeiture 
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became an issue. However, forfeiture really did not become an issue because discovery 
revealed that Highway 101 did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' easement. 
Similarly, Highway 101 raised set off as an affirmative damage defense in its 
answer and only raised "unjust enrichment" in the counterclaim to leave open the 
possibility of obtaining an affirmative judgment depending on the evidence on Plaintiffs' 
claim for damages. However, once Highway 101 determined that Plaintiffs did not have 
any damages, Highway 101 did not "vigorously purse" the unjust enrichment claim 
either. 
In fact, the Court can tell from the briefing that Highway 101 did not "vigorously 
pursue" either the claim for unjust enrichment or forfeiture. Under Jorgensen, supra, 
138 Idaho at 539, this Court can give less weight to these claims in determining who 
prevailed in the action because Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" these claims. 
As further proof that Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" these claims and 
that the placement of the signpost and bollards was the "primary issue," the Court 
should consider that Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees for eight hours of work defending 
against the unjust enrichment and forfeiture claims whereas Plaintiffs' counsel spent 
over 121 hours on "the action." Thus, Plaintiffs' counsel spent 93% of his time on the 
placement of the signpost and bollards issue. Highway 101 submits that any issue 
occupying 93% of counsel's time necessarily makes that issue the "primary issue" in the 
action. Importantly, Highway 101 prevailed on this "primary issue" thus making 
Highway 101 the floverall prevailing party." 
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III. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST THE 
FORFEITURE OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12-121 allows for an award of attorney's fees "to 
the prevailing party or parties./I Here, Highway 101 has set forth above that it is the 
overall prevailing party. Plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees under 12-121 when 
they are not the prevailing parties. 
Plaintiffs claim that Highway 101's claim for forfeiture was frivolous. However, 
no Idaho case has ever addressed whether overburdening an easement can result in 
forfeiture ofthe easement although other courts have addressed the issue. 
"[EJxtinguishing an easement is appropriate when the additional burden imposed on the 
servient estate is so violative of the terms of the express easement that 'continued use 
of the easement is precluded as a matter of law."' Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game 
Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 2010). Even this Court cited to A.L.R. 5th 313 Section 2(a) 
(not Idaho law) for the propOSition that forfeiture of an easement is available in certain 
limited circumstances. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 13. 
Plaintiffs' easement was expressly granted only to plaintiffs Nephi Allen and 
Kenton Johnson. But Allen and Johnson have allowed Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, 
LLC's customers and suppliers to use the easement as well. The Court never addressed 
this legal issue of whether Allen and Johnson's allowing customers and suppliers of 
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC (who does not have an easement but is a separate 
entity) to use the easement amounts to conduct overburdening the easement such that 
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Highway 101 could seek forfeiture as a remedy. At this point, the issue is moot because 
Highway 101 has prevailed on the placement of the sign and bollards issue. But 
Highway 101's argument that an issue of fact existed to defeat summary judgment is 
not frivolous especially where Idaho has never addressed the forfeiture issue. 
Plaintiffs also claim that Highway 101's claim for unjust enrichment was 
frivolous. However, "The owner of an easement has the right and duty to maintain, 
repair, and protect the easement." Gibbens v. Seisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 640 (1977). 
"The owner ofthe servient estate has no duty to maintain the easement." Id. Having 
the Court declare whether paving the easement was "maintenance" requiring 
contribution from Plaintiffs is not frivolous especially where no case in Idaho has ever 
addressed this issue. 
Again, once Highway 101 discovered that Plaintiffs had no damages, Highway 
101 did not "vigorously pursue" its unjust enrichment claim. Similarly, once Highway 
101 discovered that the signpost and bollards did not unreasonably interfere with 
Plaintiffs' use of the easement, Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" its forfeiture 
claim. However, neither claim was frivolous especially where no Idaho law exists on 
point on the issues. 
The Court can contrast the fact that no Idaho law exists on point for these issues 
with Plaintiffs' position on the easement issue. Plaintiffs cited law from other 
jurisdictions that Highway 101's placement ofthe signpost and bollards was 
unreasonable per se because it prevented Plaintiffs from using the exact location where 
the signpost and bollards were located. However, Idaho has never followed this 
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approach. The law in Idaho is very clear that Highway 101 can make whatever use of its 
property as it wants that does not "unreasonably interferell with Plaintiffs' easement 
privilege i.e., ingress and egress rights. Plaintiffs' failure to provide any good faith 
argument for reversing this Idaho law makes Plaintiffs' argument on the issue frivolous. 
In fact, Plaintiffs' ignoring relevant, on point, applicable Idaho law (and arguing against it 
when Highway 101 pointed it out) makes Plaintiffs' conduct fundamentally frivolous. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' request for 
attorney's fees and costs.~ 
DATED this K day of August, 2011. 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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CERTIFICAp""::RVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J!!day of August, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS to 
be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property, ) 
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING,) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2010-11~ 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
August 29,2011, at 8:30 A.M., Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees came on for hearing before the Honorable Dane H. 
Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Hyrum Erickson appeared on behalf ofthe plaintiff. Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on 
behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Smith presented argument supporting defendant's motion for attorney fees. 
Mr. Erickson argued in opposition to defendant's motion for attorney fees. 
The Court took this matter under advisement. 
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Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Hyrum Erickson 
Bryan Smith 
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/' District Judge 
Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendantsl 
Appellants, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant/Counterclaimanti 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-1O-115 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FEE CATEGORY: L.4. 
FEE: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRYAN D. SMITH, ESQ.,SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, P. O. BOX 50731,IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405 AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man dealing with his 
sole and separate property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing with his sole 
and separate property, and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on July 25,2011. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and/or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
11(a)(1), LA.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement ofIssues on Appeal: 
(A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.) 
A. Did the Court err in ruling that the owner of a servient estate may place a 
permanent obstruction within an express right-of-way? 
B. Did the Court err in using extrinsic evidence to determine the "reasonableness" 
of an encroachment upon a unambiguous express right-of-way? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. (a) A reporters transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
January 11, 2011 - hearing on Highway 101 IS Rule 56(f) motion. 
April 14, 2011 - hearing on motions for summary judgment 
July 7, 2011 - hearing on motion to reconsider 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R. 
1. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 11117/2011 
2. Brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 11117/2011 
3. Affidavit of Counsel in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 
11117/2011 
4. Plaintiffs' motion requesting voluntary disqualification filed 11130/2011 
5. Brief in Opposition to Rule 56(f) motion filed 115/2011 
6. Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson in opposition to Rule 56(f) motion filed 115/2011 
7. Affidavit of DeAnn Chadwick filed 115/2011 
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8. Brief in Support of Defendant's motion for summary judgement filed 3/9/2011 
9. Answering brief in opposition to Highway lOl's motion for summary judgment 
filed 3/3112011 
10. Affidavit of Counsel in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
filed 3/3112011 
11. Reply brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 4/7/2011 
12. Motion for reconsideration filed 5/20/2011 
13. Brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 5/20/2011 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set our below: 
Karen Konvalinka 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(b)(1) That the Reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's 
transcript, by payment to the Clerk of the District Court therefore. (A check payable to the 
Reporter has been delivered to the Clerk of the District Court concurrently with the filing of this 
Notice of Appeal). 
(c)(1) The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid. 
(d)(1) The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
LA.R. 
Dated this 1 st day of September, 2011. 
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H m Erickson 
Attorney for Appellant 
y " 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 1 st day of September, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Clerk of the Court 
Attention: Gwen 
Madison County Courthouse 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Karen Konvalinka 
Court Reporter 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Mail 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendantsl ) 
Appellants ) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 3 q 16 () 
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HIGHWAY 10IlNVESTMENTS, LLC) 
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Respondent ) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEAL 
APPEAL FROM: tIt Judicial District Madison County 
HONORABLE Dane H. Watkins, Jr. PRESIDING 
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-2010-115 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Judgment, dated July 25, 2011 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Hyrum DErickson, 25 North Second East, Rexburg, ID 
83440 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Bryan D Smith, PO Box 50731, Idaho Falls, ID 
83405 
APPEALED BY: Kenton D Johnson, Nephi HAllen and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating LLC 
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Dated this8 day o¥ 2011 
KIM HMUIR 
BY ~ 
DEPUTY CLERK 
FILED - ORIGINAL 
SE~ 
I Supr~rt_Court ~eal$ 
, Entered on ATS bv~ -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property, ) 
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING, ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-201O-11S 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS 
FILED IN CHAMBERS 
at Idaho Falls 
Bonnevill 
Honor Ie J 
Date ~I.f-L~~~~~ 
Time -_ ......... ~ ....... -¥""".-
Deputy Clerk _~~~,,;;;.. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Ncphi Allen and Kenton Johnson are the managing partners of Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating LLC. On October 23,2000, Plaintiffs acquired real property in Rexburg 
together with a "right-of-way" easement (hereafter, "Easement") over a strip ofland (hereafter, 
"Subject Property") abutting their property. 
On February 20, 2007, Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereafter, "Highway 101") 
acquired real property in Rexburg and a right-of-way easement over the Subject Property. On 
July 29, 2009, Highway 101 acquired fee simple title to the Subject Property. 
In 2008, Highway 101 obtained a permit from the City of Rexburg to have a sign erected 
on the northwest comer of the Subject Property. Young Electric Sign Company (hereafter 
"YESCO") began installing the sign on August 6, 2008, and finished on August 26, 2008. 
On February 19,2010, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking removal of the sign. On April 
1,2010, Highway 101 filed an answer and counterclaim. On November 17,2010, Plaintiffs filed 
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a motion for summary judgment asking this Court to rule in their favor on the following 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by Highway 101: latches, estoppel, equitable 
estoppel/recoupment, unclean hands, merger, forfeiture, right-of-way forfeiture, no unreasonable 
restriction, set off, unjust enrichment, and trespass. 
On March 9,2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for summary judgment asking this court 
to conclude the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the Easement and that 
the doctrines of latches and equitable estoppel bar Plaintiffs' claims. 
On May 5, 2011, this Court entered a memorandum decision that (1) granted Highway 
101 's motion for summary judgment on the issue of reasonable use, (2) granted Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment on the issues of forfeiture and unjust enrichment, and (3) denied 
the parties' motions in all other respects. Highway 101 subsequently moved to dismiss its 
trespass counterclaim. 
On June 13,2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, a supporting 
brief, a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs, and a supporting affidavit of counsel. On 
June 23, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an objection to Highway 101 's request for attorney's fees and 
costs. 
On August 8, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, a memorandum 
of attorney's fees and costs, and a supporting affidavit of counsel. On August 18,2011, 
Highway 101 filed a brief and a motion to disallow Plaintiff s request for attorney's fees and 
costs. 
On September 1, 2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding attorney's fees and 
costs. 
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II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
An award of attorney fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb v. 
Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526,148 P.3d 1267,1272 (2006). The amount of attorney fees and costs 
awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,435, 111 P.3d 110, 
120 (2005). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Highway 101 asserts it is the prevailing party and that Plaintiffs' action was frivolous or 
without foundation. Plaintiffs contend they are the prevailing party and that Highway 101' s 
counterclaim was frivolous or without foundation. 
A. Prevailing Party 
Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. I 
The Idaho Court of Appeals identified three areas of inquiry that a court should consider 
when deciding whether a party "prevailed." 
(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues 
between the parties; and ( c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on 
each of the issues or claims. If the court detennines that a party prevailed only in 
part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
I Rule 54(d)(1)(B) only speaks of costs. However, Rule 54(e)(1), which pertains to attorney's 
fees, incorporates the Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) definition of prevailing party. 
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Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in 
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 
130, 133 (2005). 
In Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536,539,224 PJd 1125,1128 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that neither party prevailed. In that case, 
Coppedges prevailed on a breach of contract claim and Jorgensen successfully defended against 
Coopedges' fraud, breach of contract, unfair competition, and intentional interference with 
business advantage counterclaims. Id. As the court considered that result in relation to the relief 
sought by the parties, the court noted that Jorgensen's claim was more than double that of 
Coopedges' counterclaims. Id. Nevertheless, Coopedges' counterclaims "potentially subjected 
Jorgensen to nearly a half million dollars of liability," and Coppedges "vigorously pursued" 
those claims "through the expense of time and effort." Id. Coppedges "made the decision to 
seek affirmative relief in the form of counterclaims rather than simply asserting defenses to 
Jorgensen's claim." Because Jorgensen prevailed on those counterclaims, the Idaho Supreme 
Court concluded, "Rule 54( d)(1 )(B) expressly requires the district court to consider the multiple 
claims between the parties. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in making its determination under Rule 54(d)(1)(B) [that there was no overall prevailing party]." 
Id 
In Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126, (2009), Peterson 
prevailed on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, but lost on his claim of 
S FOR ATTORNEY'S 
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converslOn. The Idaho Supreme Court held, "the district court abused its discretion by 
determining that Peterson was not the prevailing party." The court explained, 
Id. 
This determination was an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, the primary 
issue in this case was the claim to collect on the promissory note. In the district 
court's decision, it made no findings on the substance or merits of the conversion 
claim because it determined that the claim was unnecessary as a result of 
Peterson's successful defense of the collection claim. However, in its decision 
denying costs and attorney fees, the court did an about-face and found that the 
conversion claim was not in the alternative and that Peterson lost on that claim . 
. . . Second, the court made no mention of the fact that the Shores' claim for 
conversion was dismissed after the presentation of their case-in-chief at trial. 
Thus, the district court's decisions are inconsistent, and the district court erred by 
failing to identify Peterson as the prevailing party. 
In this case Plaintiffs sought (1) removal of the sign and bollards and (2) damages for 
harm caused to Plaintiffs' business as a result of Highway 101 's placement of the sign and 
bollards. This Court granted Highway 101 's motion for summary judgment on both of those 
issues. 
Highway WI's counterclaims sought (1) forfeiture of Plaintiffs' easement, (2) 
compensation via an unjust enrichment claim for paving done by Highway 101 on the Subject 
Property, and (3) an injunction preventing Plaintiffs from crossing a strip of land owned by 
Highway 101. This Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the forfeiture 
and unjust enrichment claims, and Highway 101 voluntarily dismissed its third claim. 
Similar to the Jorgensen case, this case involved multiple claims and counterclaims. 
Similar to the outcome in Jorgensen, the parties in this case each prevailed in some substantive 
regard. The major distinction between this case and Jorgensen is that Highway 101 did not 
"vigorously pursue" its counterclaims. This Court did make substantive conclusions on the 
merits of Highway 101's forfeiture and unjust enrichment claims, but the parties seem to agree, 
and their affidavits of cost support the conclusion that more than ninety percent of the work by 
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each party in this case was spent on the sign and bollards issue. This Court is convinced that 
issue was the "primary issue" in this case, and there is no dispute Highway 101 prevailed on that 
issue. This Court concludes Highway 101 was the overall prevailing party in the action. 
B. Costs 
As the prevailing party, Highway 101 is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right. 
LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(C). Plaintiffs do not object to the costs as a matter of right claimed by 
Highway 101 in its affidavit of costs? This Court therefore concludes Highway 101 should be 
awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount 0[$1,145.28. 
C. Attorney's Fees 
Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
In the discussion above, this Court concluded Highway 101 was the overall prevailing party in 
the action.3 
Fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter 
of right but, rather, are subject to the district court' discretion. Coward v. Hadley, 
150 Idaho 282, 290, 246 P.3d 391, 399 (2010). A district court should only award 
fees "when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, 
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 
135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, "when a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, 
the action is not considered to be frivolous and without foundation." Id A claim 
is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a 
matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 
890, 894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct. App. 1984). Furthermore, "[a] misperception 
of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. 
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so 
plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 Plaintiffs objected to certain costs in their brief but withdrew those objections at the hearing on September 1, 2011. 
3 Because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney's fees and this Court need not 
. . Corp., 2011 WL 3904754 (Idaho Sep. 7, 2011). 
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Garner v. Pavey, 2011 WL 3332258 at 5 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2011). 
In this case, Highway 101 asserts Plaintiffs' claim was unreasonable because Plaintiffs 
asked this court to apply a rule of law that had previously not been applied in Idaho. This Court 
rejected Plaintiffs' argument and as a result their claim failed as a matter oflaw. This Court, 
however is not left with the abiding belief that Plaintiffs brought or pursued their claim 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Plaintiffs cited and argued multiple Idaho 
cases in support of the position they took regarding the effect ofthe granting language of their 
Easement. Thus, even if Plaintiffs misperceived the law in Idaho, or their interest under the law, 
this Court cannot conclude their argument was so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Highway 101, therefore, is not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and costs is denied. 
Highway 101's request for costs is granted in the amount of$I,145.28. Highway 101's 
request for attorney's fees is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this -h- day of September 2011. 
~~ 
Distric~udge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \7 day of September 2011, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Hyrum D. Erickson 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, CHARTERED 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Brian D. Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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Marilyn R. Rasmussen 
Clerk ofthe District Court 
Madison County, Idaho 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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at Idaho Fa.!1e 
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Hono I J dge?"1"~~'4-441 
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nme ____ ~~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk __ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
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Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-IO-115 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
THIS COURT having entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Motions for 
Attorney}s Fees and Costs dated September 12} 2011; 
WHEREFORE} IT IS HEREBY ORDERED} ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Amended 
Judgment be entered in favor of the defendant} Highway 101 Investments} LLC} and 
against the plaintiffs} Kenton D. Johnson} Nephi H. Allen} and Rexburg Plumbing & 
Heating} LLC in the amount of $1}145.28 for Highway 101}s request for costs. 
MADE AND ENTERED thi~=,--_ day of~er} 2011. 
APPROVED: 
Hyrum . Erickson} Esq. 
Rigby} , ndrus & Rigby} Chartered 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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~inS'Jr. 
District Judge 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i day of s!~\~er, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. [ +45. Mail 
SMITH, DRISCOLL [ ] Fax 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC [ ] Overnight Delivery 
P.O. Box 50731 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
--Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. ~U.S.Mail 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, [ ] Fax 
Chartered [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ ] Hand Delivery 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Clerk of the Court 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterc1aimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
) 
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SATISFACT[ON OF JUDGMENT 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
On the 'l9~y of S1f~Oll' Defendant obtained a judgment against 
Plaintiffs in the above court and cause, in the sum of$I,145.28. 
The Judgment has been settled and paid, and the undersigned attorney of record for the 
Defendants do hereby autry3Eze and direct that the judgment be released and satisfied of record. 
DATEDthis2J't'"~dayof S;~201 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On this J,.t}1Ii day of~~~!!ILJ!I...&<!t..L_" 2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public in and for said State, perso ally appeared Bryan D. Smith, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my h 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
KENTON D JOHNSON, a married man ) 
Dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
And NEPHI HALLEN, a married man ) 
And REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING ) 
LLC. an Idaho limited liability company ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendantsl Appellants ) 
) 
VS ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC ) 
) 
Defendantl Counterc1aimant/Respondent ) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39160-2011 
CASE NO. CV-2010-U5 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify that the following is 
a list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or 
retained as indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION SENT lRETAINED 
None 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affIxed the seal of 
the said Court this day of , 2012. 
KIM H MUIR 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By-= ____________________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
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KENTON D JOHNSON, a married man ) 
Dealing with his sole and separate property) 
And NEPHI H ALLEN, a married man ) 
And REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING) 
LLC. an Idaho limited liability company ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants I Appellants ) 
) 
VS ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterciaimant/Respondent ) 
) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39160-2011 
CASE NO. CV-201(1)-115 
I, Kim H Muir, Clerk of the District Court of the 7th Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to 
be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross Appeal, and 
any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for 
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 
of the Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court this day of fC~ 2012. 
KIMHMUIR 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
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SUPREME CT. NO. 39160-2011 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Hyrum DErickson 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
Bryan D Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hav her unto pet my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this day of ,\, 2012 
KIMHMUIR 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
